MOROZOV EVGENY ARKADIEVICH 01/4/55 - 11/12/85 major Native of Chelyabinsk. Russian. Higher education. Member of the CPSU. Married. Wife - Morozova Tatyana Emelyanovna. Daughters - Olga and Svetlana. In Afghanistan - commander of a tank battalion (military unit 51884). In 1972, after graduating from secondary school No. 84, he entered the Omsk Higher Tank Command School, which he graduated in 1976. From 1976 to 1985, he served in the Red Banner Central Asian Military District, in the 374th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 155th Motorized Rifle Division of the 1st Army Corps as a tank platoon commander and tank company commander. Since April 1985 - Afghanistan. On November 12, 1985, he died while performing a combat mission. Awarded the medal "For Military Merit". By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR he was awarded (posthumously) the Order of the Red Star. He was buried at the Assumption Cemetery in Chelyabinsk. Morozov's wife E.A. with daughters Olga (born 1984) and Svetlana (born 1977) and Evgeniy’s brother, Yuri Arkadyevich, live in Chelyabinsk. Lieutenant Morozov began his difficult career as an officer as the commander of a tank platoon of military unit 47165 in the Central Asian Military District. His wife Tatyana was there with him. Their daughters, Svetlana and Olga, were born there. Evgeniy served honestly and conscientiously, as required by the Charter, as required by his officer’s sense of duty. His diligence in his service was appreciated by the command. Having received another military rank "Senior Lieutenant", he was appointed to the position of commander of a tank company. And on April 8, 1985, he was sent on a business trip to Afghanistan. Captain Morozov E.A. became the commander of a tank battalion of military unit 51884. He distinguished himself more than once during combat operations and raids to destroy rebel bases. Captain E.A. Morozov especially showed himself. October 20, 1985 in the area of ​​​​the village of Khijan, Parvan province. A tank company under his command cut off all escape routes for a large group of armed rebels from the blockade area. As a result of a fierce battle, the entire group of bandits was eliminated, and Evgeny Morozov himself destroyed eight rebels during the battle. For a well-organized and skillfully carried out military operation, he was awarded the medal “For Military Merit” and was given the military rank of “major”. And on November 12, 1985, the commander of a tank battalion, Major Evgeniy Arkadyevich Morozov, died near Kabul, fulfilling a combat mission of the command, faithful to the military oath and international duty, while showing courage, fortitude and heroism. Major Morozov E.A. was buried. at home, in Chelyabinsk. A marble monument was erected on his grave. His photograph, description of his military path and military merits in the Afghan war are available in the museum of internationalist soldiers of the Traktorozavodsk regional branch of the RSVA and in the Traktorozavodsk RVC in Chelyabinsk. These data were taken from the All-Union Book of Memory of the Fallen: Evgeniy Arkadyevich MOROZOV, major, tank commander, battalion, birth. 01/04/1955 in Chelyabinsk. Russian. In Arms. USSR forces since 1.8.72. Graduated from Omsk Higher Technical School. In Rep. Afghanistan since Apr. 1985. Proved to be a courageous and decisive officer. While commanding a battalion, he repeatedly took part in combat operations. 10/20/85, while in one of the tanks operating with us. point of Khinjan in Parvan province, skillfully organized its battle, as a result of which the escape routes of the rebel detachment to the mountains were cut off. 11/11/1985 M. died in battle. Nagr, medal "For Military Merit" and horde. Red Star (posthumously). He was buried at the Assumption Cemetery in Chelyabinsk. We, like a mother, protect our Motherland from malicious robbery, And if necessary, we can stand under bullets in the very center of the battle! We will get up and go forward, like a wall of immense width, And the commander will go first, And we will follow him, as we were taught. And if the world suddenly explodes, In battle we will prove by right, - It was not in vain that the commander taught us To love and defend the state! And we must keep, going into reserve, Carry for us for a long century The last battle order - Always be human!

The beginning of hostilities in Afghanistan

By the beginning of 1980, the military-political situation in Afghanistan was unclear and contradictory. The entry of Soviet troops occurred without organized opposition from the armed Afghan opposition. The Afghan army also did not offer any resistance to the units and formations of the 40th Army entering the country. In addition, the national armed forces have recently been reduced in strength by about half as a result of desertions.

At first the situation was both generally and generally calm. In the first days of the new year, the local population seemed to be in a daze. However, gradually the activity of opposition formations began to increase. The first attacks on columns of Soviet troops followed. Shelling by the rebels on vehicles and armored vehicles of the Soviet troops was already observed on December 30–31, 1979. The first dead and wounded appeared.

However, it was unclear to the units of the 40th Army what to do in the current situation. The command staff of the association was in some confusion. No clear tasks or instructions were received from senior management. The generals and officers of the 40th Army were convinced that their stay on Afghan soil was exclusively temporary. Formations and units were preparing to carry out some mythical combat missions. This can be judged based on the combat activities of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division, stationed in Kabul.

Let us recall that the 108th Motorized Rifle Division in full force marched to Kabul under its own power and by the end of December 29, 1979, took up defense in the indicated area (covering the capital of Afghanistan), having a classic battle formation in two echelons: 1st echelon - 180 Motorized Rifle Regiment with 1074 ap without adn, 181 msp with adn 1074 ap, 1/234 tp; 2nd echelon - 234th TP with order.

The units received the following combat missions:

– 180 MRR with 1074 AP without adn to defend the area of ​​Khajivazak, Karga, Dekhmuratkhan, Chikhiltukhun, concentrating the main efforts in the Kabul-Laghman, Kabul-Gardez direction with the task of blocking possible rebellious actions of the 7, 8 infantry, 37 op of the national armed forces Afghanistan and prevent their entry into Kabul;

– 181 MSP with adn 1074 ap to defend the Kalasklu section, lane. roads (2032.2), elevation. 1877, south-eastern slopes of the city of Gharibgar. Concentrate the main efforts in the Kabul-Jalalabad direction with the task of blocking possible rebellious actions of the 4th and 15th brigade of the national armed forces of Afghanistan and preventing their entry into Kabul;

– 177 MRR defend the Doshi section, Chaugani, lane. Bugain, Sinjitak, concentrating the main efforts on the Puli-Khumri, Kabul direction, with the task of blocking the actions of the rebels from the north and preventing them from entering Kabul;

– 234 TP with the order to defend the section of the power line bend, lane. Dekhkepak, Kalagulami, lane. Hazarain-Bagal, concentrating the main efforts in the direction of Hazarain-Bagal, with the task of blocking the entry of rebels from the northern outskirts of Kabul;

– 1049 zenap to cover from a possible attack the CP of the mechanized infantry division, order, 234 TP, ordn OP in the Hazarain-Bagal area;

– CP 108th motorized rifle division – 1 km north-east elevation. 1825.

That is, by definition, there was no talk of possibly repelling the aggression of any external forces (which was largely the rationale for the Soviet leadership's deployment of troops into Afghanistan). The 108th Motorized Rifle Division was absolutely not prepared for this. In the last days of December 1979, units of the division improved their defenses, dispersed equipment and personnel in the indicated areas. On January 7, 1980, the command post of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division was visited by the commander of the district troops and a member of the military council of the TurkVO.

At the beginning of 1980, the 40th Army controlled all major cities (including 21 provincial centers and airfields in Kabul, Bagram, Shindand, Kandahar, Kunduz, Jalalabad, Gardez, Herat and Faizabad) and the Termez - Salang Pass - Kabul, Jalalabad - highway. Gardez in the east and Kushka - Herat - Shindand - Kandahar in the west. Gas processing plants in Jarkuduk and Shibargan, power plants in Surubi, Naglu, Puli Khumri, Kabul, a factory in Mazar-i-Sharif, as well as the Salang tunnel were taken under guard.

The first major battle of the 40th Army units was associated with the pacification of the rebellious 4th Artillery Regiment of the Afghan Armed Forces in the city of Nahrin.

Mutiny of the artillery regiment

To suppress the anti-government uprising of the 4th AP of the Afghan Armed Forces (the very beginning of the rebellion is discussed in the next article "VKO"), the 2nd MRB of the 186th MRR, reinforced by a tank company, the adn regiment, the 2nd MRB of the 1st MRB with tank platoon and battalion minbat.

On January 9, 1980 at 9.00 (local time) the battalion passed the starting point at elevation. 525.0 and began moving along the route: Kunduz airfield, Ishakun, Ishkashim, Burka, Nahrin. The 2nd MRR began moving at 11.00 on January 9, 1980 (two hours later) along the route: Baghlan, lane. Shehjamal, Nahrin.

The head marching outpost of the 2nd MSB, having passed 4 km after the starting point, was fired upon by a group of horsemen numbering 100 people. The attack helicopters accompanying the convoy scattered the rebels. However, the matter did not end there. GPZ 2nd MSB by 10.30 a.m. The village of Ishakchi met resistance from a group of rebels numbering up to 150 people. (with three guns), whose firing positions were located on the southern outskirts of Ishakchi. With organized fire from the GPZ, a tank platoon and with the support of helicopters, the rebels retreated into the mountains and suffered losses of up to 50 people. killed. All three rebel weapons were destroyed.

By 11.30 the 2nd MRR reached the Shekhjamal pass, where they encountered a blockage covered by a group of rebels with two mountain cannons. Having destroyed up to 15 soldiers and both guns, the company, having cleared the rubble, continued its advance.

By 15.00 on January 9, 1980, the GPZ of the 2nd MSB again met a group of horsemen numbering up to 50 people on the northern outskirts of Bourke. The company turned around and, together with an Afghan infantry company, attacked the rebels and by 16.00 reached the southern outskirts of Bourke. At 17.00, the 2nd MSB reached the Tovamakh pass (3 km north of Nahrin), where it encountered a rubble. It was not possible to cross the pass straight away. Only after clearing the rubble the battalion continued its advance.

By this time, the 2nd MRR had reached the Avsari area. Without encountering resistance, the 2nd MSB from the north and the 2nd MSB from the west reached the city of Nahrin by 21.00 and blocked the roads from the city, surrounding the military camp of the 4th AP of the Afghan army. During the night, the units were in readiness in case of repelling an organized attack by the rebels of the 4th ap.

From 10.00 on 10.1 the artillery deployed to firing positions in readiness to open fire on the Afghan military camp. Under the cover of fire from combat helicopters, Soviet units in infantry fighting vehicles quickly moved to the barracks of the 4th AP, dismounted and disarmed the garrison.

The losses of the 4th artillery regiment were: up to 100 people killed, 7 guns and 5 vehicles destroyed. Losses of Soviet troops: killed - 2 people, wounded - 2 people, one infantry fighting vehicle fell into a cliff at the pass. Trophies: 76 mm guns – 15 pcs., ammunition for 76 mm guns – 500 boxes, for 122 mm howitzers – 75 boxes, for 82 mm mortars – 60 boxes, cars – 20, armored personnel carriers – 2, 57 mm guns – 3 pcs.

The suppression of the rebellion in Nahrin is the first organized battle of the 40th Army in the almost ten-year Afghan war.

Unrest in Kabul

On the evening of February 21, 1980, mass demonstrations took place in Kabul. Thousands of people took to the streets, chanting anti-karmalist and anti-Soviet slogans. On the morning of February 22, mass demonstrations by Afghans resumed. The number of their participants reached, according to various estimates, approximately 400 thousand. Masses of people filled all the central streets. Access to administrative buildings was blocked, the Soviet embassy came under fire, resulting in the death of Soviet citizens. This is how the direct participants in those events described it.

In Kabul, from 20.00 21.2 to 3.30 22.2.80, a demonstration of an anti-government and anti-Soviet nature was held. Crowds of several hundred people walked along the streets, using megaphones to shout: “Down with Moscow!”, “Get away from us!”, “Allahu Akbar!” The crowd of Afghans showed particular activity at the stadium, where six police cars that were sent to disperse the demonstration were burned. Demonstrators burned torches and barrels all night and tried to create rubble in the streets. Demonstrators opened fire on patrols of Soviet troops in armored personnel carriers. The police captured 9 Pakistanis among the demonstrators. According to the detainees, there were 170 Pakistanis in the city at that time.

From 9.00 on February 22, 1980, demonstrations with flags in Kabul resumed. The shops were all closed in the morning. There are many armed people among the demonstrators. Explosions and gunshots are heard in the city. Crowds of people headed to the Soviet embassy, ​​which was guarded by a reconnaissance company of the 103rd Airborne Division. Demonstrators seized a grain elevator and a trolleybus depot, which they set on fire. The 3rd MRR of the 180th Motorized Rifle Regiment was sent to seize the elevator and disperse demonstrators in the area. During the seizure of the elevator, a soldier of the 3rd MRR was wounded. In the area of ​​the television center, weapons were seen being handed out to demonstrators. A platoon of BMD from the 103rd Airborne Division was sent there. Art. was killed in this area. Lieutenant Vovk 103rd Airborne Division. At the same time, crowds of thousands gathered at a distance of 6 to 20 km from the city and began moving towards Kabul. In this regard, martial law was introduced in the city, security and defense of facilities and patrols were strengthened. Bridges across the river Kabul is blocked by Soviet and Afghan units. Joint Soviet-Afghan barriers were also set up in all main directions approaching Kabul. Major General A. Kadir was appointed commandant of the city.

Thanks to the measures taken, the crowds of demonstrators on the approaches to Kabul were dispersed. No one managed to penetrate the capital of Afghanistan. The weapon was used twice - during the defense of the television tower by a strike from Mi-24 helicopters and at the elevator.

In total, the following were involved in the fight against the rebels in Kabul: Soviet troops - 24 companies (over 2 thousand people), 30 tanks, up to 200 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers; from the NAF DRA - 11 companies (over 1 thousand people), 43 tanks, up to 40 armored personnel carriers and BRDMs.

To intimidate counter-revolutionary elements in the city and on the approaches to it, low-altitude aviation flights were widely used. Soviet aviation made 158 sorties, Afghan - 49.

Losses of the 40th Army: killed - 1, wounded - 2. In the NAF DRA wounded - 5.

Over 900 active participants in the protests were arrested. Some of them were in military uniform. By 18.00 22.2.80 (local time), order in the city was restored. Units of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division and the 103rd Airborne Division exercised control and maintained order in Kabul. The reconnaissance unit of the 103rd Airborne Division was guarding the Soviet embassy. 3/180 MSP was located in the area of ​​the elevator and trolleybus depot.

On the night from 22.02 to 23.02 and in the morning of 23.2 there were unrest in the village. Mirbachakote (north of Kabul) and Karabagh. In particular, attacks were carried out on local activists and police posts. On the morning of February 23, powerful amplifiers were installed on the minarets of mosques in Mirbachagot. The local population was encouraged to overthrow the existing Afghan government and attack Soviet troops.

At about 11.00 on 23.02 in Mirbachagot, a concentration of armed people of about 200-250 people was observed, moving through the streets, trying to begin the physical destruction of local activists and residents supporting them. At this time, there was an attack on a Soviet post on the southern outskirts of Mirbachagot (as part of the 1st MSV, 2nd MSRP, 181st MSB). Our post opened warning fire in the air, but this did not give the desired results. The fire from the rebels continued, as a result of which Art. was wounded in the bridge of the nose. Lieutenant Satansky I.V.

The events in Kabul are clearly evidenced by the Marshal's reports Soviet Union S. L. Sokolova

From the report of Marshal of the Soviet Union S. L. Sokolov to Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov (02.24.1980)

The tense political situation remained in the country. Martial law in Kabul has not been lifted. The troops are in their positions. Since the morning of February 23, 1980, reactionary forces in Kabul tried to organize anti-government protests among the population. On several streets there are groups of residents of 300–400 people. shouted anti-government slogans and carried green (Islamic) banners. Through the efforts of the Tsaranda, state security agencies and low-altitude aviation flights, the main groups were scattered. By 18.00 on 23.02 the situation in the city had basically returned to normal. Weapons were not used by Soviet and Afghan troops. On February 24, 1980, the situation in the city remained calm. When a group of rebels entered the elevator with the aim of blowing it up, 10 people were detained with weapons. Attempts to provoke anti-government and anti-Soviet protests were noted in Kandahar, Shindand, Herat and Charikar. They were stopped by police and Afghan troops without the use of weapons. In other parts of the country the situation is calm. The DRA NAF did not conduct active combat operations. Aviation carried out reconnaissance of the city and its environs day and night. Part of the force carried out the search and destruction of rebel groups in the provinces of Nangarhar and Laghman. Several gangs have been discovered and targeted. Our aviation carried out 224 sorties, Afghan - 51, of which 23 were combat. On the night of February 23, 1980, a company of the 31st Guards Regiment of the 9th Guards Regiment from the Chaukani garrison (30 km southwest of Asadabad) in the amount of 56 people with weapons went over to the side of the rebels. At the same time, the company commander and his deputy for political affairs were killed. A search for the company and an investigation into the causes of the incident have been organized.

Sokolov

From the report of Marshal of the Soviet Union S. L. Sokolov to Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov (02/26/1980)

1. The situation in Kabul is gradually normalizing, but remains difficult. At night, active counter-revolutionaries and their accomplices are arrested, who in some cases offer armed resistance to Tsarandoy units and Afghan counterintelligence agencies.

Soviet troops do not participate in these events, continuing to guard the most important military, administrative and economic facilities. According to intelligence reports, rebels in Kabul as of February 29 are preparing armed uprisings against the government. In this regard, martial law in the city remains. The plan for joint actions of Soviet and Afghan troops in this case has been clarified.

186th Motorized Rifle Regiment 27.02 from Charikar moves to the north. env. Kabul, and the battalion of the 56th airborne brigade from Jabal Ussaraj to Charikar is ready for action in Kabul.

In other cities and provinces, no large rebel formations or anti-government protests by the population were observed.

The situation remains difficult in Kunar province, which is almost entirely under the control of the rebels. In the Shigal area (15 km north-east of Asadabad), several armed formations numbering up to 2.5 thousand people were discovered. under the command of the former commander of the 30th Guards Brigade, who went over to the side of the rebels, and others. The units of the 9th Civil Aviation Regiment stationed in Kunar province have low combat capability and cannot independently solve the problem of defeating these formations.

In this regard, military operations are planned for 29.02–2.03 to destroy the rebel forces northeast of Asadabad with the involvement of two infantry battalions of the 103rd airborne division (one on a BMD, the second as a helicopter landing force), reinforced by the 181st infantry infantry regiment, 108th infantry infantry regiment and 71st 11th infantry infantry infantry regiment with support the main aviation forces of the 40th Army.

2. The troops of the 40th Army and the National Armed Forces of the DRA carried out combat service and were engaged in combat and political training according to plan. The 353rd ABR, marching from Puli-Khumri to Charikar, was stopped at the approaches to the Salang tunnel until dawn due to worsening weather conditions (heavy ice).

Sokolov

From the report of Marshal of the Soviet Union S. L. Sokolov to Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov (02.28.80)

The situation in Kabul has not changed significantly. All preparatory measures have been carried out in case of an attack by counter-revolutionary forces on 29.02. The interaction between the troops, the police (“tsarandoy”) and the state security agencies (KHAD) has been clarified. To strengthen the Kabul garrison, 186 infantry fighting units were withdrawn from the Charikar area, which is concentrated 1 km north-west of Kabul. His actions in the city were planned, reconnaissance was carried out with unit commanders.

In the provinces of Herat, Kandahar, and Faizabad, there is an increase in tension. Private shops are closed. The population cannot buy food for several days. According to intelligence reports, the leadership of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan has decided to prohibit the supply of food from Pakistan. Through threats and terror, force car owners to stop exporting Soviet cargo from the ports of Hairatan and Sherkhan, create economic difficulties for Afghanistan, thereby causing people's dissatisfaction with government policies.

There were no major military operations. The troops of the 40th Army and the National Armed Forces of the DRA are on combat duty and are engaged in combat and political training according to plan.

122 MRR replaced 149 MRR 201 MSD on guarding the gas pipeline and the Termez, Puli-Khumri road, having two MRBs in Shibargan, one MRB in Asiaabad, the remaining units - 16 km north-west Tashkurgan. 149 motorized rifle division 201 motorized rifle division departs to the place of permanent deployment - Kunduz.

The 4/56th Airborne Brigade concentrated in the Charikar area in readiness to move to Kabul by special order.

353 AAB concentrated 2 km southwest of Jabal Ussaraj. Zrtb and ortb complete crossing the Salang pass and by the end of the day they are concentrated in the Bagram area.

In Puli-Khumri, 48 infantry infantry battalions (designated for the 66th motorized infantry brigade), 108th infantry infantry infantry infantry division and ordnb of the 40th Army are concentrated. Continuation of the march - from 02/29/80.

Preparations for military operations to destroy a large rebel gang in the north-east of Asadabad (Kunar province) have been completed. The troops were withdrawn to the original area (8 km north-east of Jalalabad). Reconnaissance of the enemy group has been completed. If weather conditions are favorable for aviation, combat operations will begin on the morning of February 29, 1980.

Aviation continued aerial reconnaissance of the area of ​​upcoming hostilities, as well as border areas in the interests of ensuring measures to close mountain passes and organizing cover of the state border in accordance with the approved plan. Our aviation carried out 109 combat sorties, Afghan - 24.

Sokolov

Through the joint actions of the 1st MSV and part of the forces of the 2nd MSV of the 2nd MSRP of the 181st MRR under the command of the company commander, Captain Makovsky V.N., this group of rebels was scattered. At the same time, 22 armed oppositionists were killed. In addition, the transmission center in the village was destroyed. p. Mirbachagot.

The uprising in Kabul demonstrated that the state of torpor among the local population had ended. Open resistance intensified. Religious propaganda increased sharply. The Afghan government was openly branded as an agent of communism.

After the unrest in Kabul, shelling of Soviet convoys on the Termez-Kabul and Kushka-Kandahar highways took on a systematic and organized character. Attempts were made to storm small garrisons by rebels. The situation deteriorated so much that the command of the 40th Army had no choice but to take appropriate measures. In response to numerous shelling of their garrisons and transport columns, units and formations of the 40th Army began to conduct combat operations to localize and defeat enemy armed formations. The scale of hostilities has constantly expanded over time.

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In early December 1979, the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, informed the leadership of the General Staff that in the near future a decision would probably be made to send up to 75 thousand Soviet troops to Afghanistan. people

The objections of the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov, as well as his attempts to prove that such a number of troops are not able to solve the task of eliminating the opposition movement (if troops are brought in for this), especially since the Afghan army can resist, came to nothing. Dmitry Ustinov was deeply convinced that as soon as Soviet troops appeared in Afghanistan, the rebels would immediately stop fighting against official Kabul and peace and tranquility would be established in the country.

Operational deployment and preparation of OKVS

December 10, 1979, i.e. Even before L. I. Brezhnev made the final decision (obviously, there was confidence that he would not make another decision), the USSR Minister of Defense began to give orders to the General Staff to create the necessary grouping of troops.

On December 13 (the day after the decision was made), to assist the TurkVO command in carrying out mobilization activities, the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense (OG USSR Ministry of Defense) was formed, headed by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Army General S.F. Akhromeyev.

Later, this group was headed by the First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. L. Sokolov (urgently recalled from vacation). On the evening of December 14, 1979, the OG USSR Ministry of Defense arrived in Termez and began work.

On December 16, 1979, an order was given to separate the 40th Army from the TurkVO administration and mobilize the field administration. The first deputy commander of the TurkVO troops, Lieutenant General Yu. V. Tukharinov, was appointed commander of the army for operational purposes.

Due to the fact that the General Staff did not have a plan for sending troops into Afghanistan (it was not tasked with developing such a plan), a general directive to mobilize troops was not given. Formations and units were put on alert by separate orders after receiving the appropriate oral instructions from D. F. Ustinov.

In just three weeks (until December 31, 1979), more than thirty such orders were issued. The rear and repair units and organs of the 40th A were deployed last (some already during the start of the deployment of troops).

Formations and units of the 40th Army - motorized rifle divisions of type "B", parts of the army set were mobilized 10-12 days before entry, and the formation of the air assault brigade was just being completed. The only personnel unit in the army was the 103rd Airborne Division.

From the second half of January to mid-February 1980, the entire assigned personnel was replaced by personnel units received from the formations and units of all military districts and groups of forces.

During the creation of the group of troops, about 100 formations, units and institutions were deployed. More than 50 thousand officers, sergeants and soldiers were called up from the reserves to staff the troops, and about 8 thousand cars and other equipment were allocated from the national economy.

Mobilization measures of similar scale were never carried out in TurkVO and NEVO in the post-war period. They identified a number of serious shortcomings in the activities of local authorities, managers of enterprises, farms, military registration and enlistment offices and military units.

But the most intolerant of them were in the training of reserve officers. 70% of the total number of conscripted officers did not serve in the army at all (they were trained at military departments of universities). The vast majority of them showed complete unpreparedness and inability to command subordinate units or perform other duties assigned to them in their service.

Often motorized rifle, artillery, and engineer platoons, where the commanders were reserve officers, were practically uncontrollable on marches and in battle. About 20% of officers called up from the reserve, who trained with sergeant units, also did not have practical command skills. The reserve officers of the armored, automotive and logistics services showed completely unsatisfactory professional training.

The experience of mobilization, deployment of troops and conducting combat operations during the first two months, while reserve officers were in the troops, convinced that their lack of preparation to perform duties in wartime is not a consequence of some individual, perhaps even major, shortcomings, but major flaws in common system their preparation.

The experience of the deployment of the 40th Army in December 1979 showed that it is necessary to completely review the entire system of training reserve officers in the Armed Forces of the USSR. It was outdated in 1979 and did not even meet the minimum requirements of modern warfare. Experts agreed in their assessments - a person liable for military service cannot be an officer and command subordinates if he has not served in the army at all.

It became obvious that it was necessary new system training of reserve officers. After development, it must be tested in practice and put into operation. However, by and large, very little has been done in this area to date. Changes for the better, unfortunately, are minimal.

In the first days of mobilization, neither the military registration and enlistment offices nor the military units paid any attention to the quality of the units' staffing. Everyone was sure that a routine check was underway, which would end as soon as the units reported completion of recruitment. In this regard, military registration and enlistment offices sought to quickly send conscription resources, and military units - to quickly staff units with personnel and report to the authorities.

After the arrival of the OG of the USSR Ministry of Defense and orientation in general terms to the relevant commanders and military commissars about the possible implementation of serious tasks, the situation improved significantly. The replacement of those already called up and assigned to units who were unable to perform combat missions began. The replacement lasted 8 days (and in some parts more).

When recruiting troops, there was an acute shortage of many specialists: mechanics-drivers of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, ATGM and radar operators, gunners, artillery computers, radio operators, etc. This is largely explained by the fact that many conscripts of the Central Asian republics served in the construction troops.

The overwhelming majority of officers who came from the reserve and were trained at the military departments of civilian universities had never served in the army and therefore had no practical skills in working in their specialty and, especially, with people. Many of them had poor command of the Russian language. All those liable for military service were characterized by extremely low physical fitness.

A large number of people liable for military service were not found due to violations of the passport regime during registration, lack of information about the demolition of houses, confusion in street names, etc.

Military registration and enlistment offices and military units encountered significant and sometimes unforeseen difficulties when supplying and receiving equipment from the national economy. The managers of the motor depots supplied in large quantities not new cars assigned to the troops, but old cars with a mileage of more than 500 thousand km. Some of them arrived without spare wheels, driver's tools, entrenching tools and repair kits. Many vehicles were not equipped for transporting personnel.

Within a few days, it was necessary to organize and carry out work to replace vehicles or repair vehicles already received and equip them with tools directly in the areas where parts were concentrated. These activities were carried out both through the receipt of property and material resources from civilian organizations, and from the reserves of the military district.

In a word, technical condition The automotive equipment assigned and supplied by the military registration and enlistment offices was clearly unsatisfactory. Thus, 20% of cars arrived with mileage up to 100 thousand km, 30% - up to 250 thousand km and 50% - more than 250 thousand km. Up to 80% of delivered machines had a service life of 5 years or more.

Liquid tankers were in especially poor technical condition. Of the 500 vehicles submitted to fill the tanker battalion, only 221 were selected, and the rest were returned as unusable. Due to the lack of refueling nozzles and meters of the established diameter, up to 80% of the supplied gas stations turned out to be unsuitable for use. There were many other shortcomings.

All this required additional measures to find material and human resources and seriously made it difficult to complete tasks on time.

In addition, when the vehicles were removed from long-term storage, a large amount of equipment was found to be faulty and not equipped with the required equipment. The mobile repair workshops that arrived from the national economy were replenished with tools, since they were almost completely absent from the workshops. In preparing the troops for deployment, all equipment was subjected to an in-depth inspection, re-equipped, refueled, and Maintenance No. 2, some of the equipment was tested by control runs.

Despite the existing shortcomings in mobilization, the command of the TurkVO and SAVO, commanders of formations and units, and military registration and enlistment offices eventually managed to cope with the assigned tasks. By the end of December 24, 1979, the main forces of the 40th A were ready for action.

On December 24, 1979, D. F. Ustinov held a meeting of the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense, which was attended by deputy ministers, commanders-in-chief of the Ground Forces, Air Force, Air Defense Forces of the country, the commander of the Airborne Forces, and some heads of main and central departments. At this meeting, the USSR Minister of Defense announced the decision to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan. The hopes of the generals and officers, who were previously informed about the possibility of such a decision, that this would not happen after all, were completely dispelled.

On the same day, the USSR Minister of Defense signed a directive to the troops, which, in particular, said: “A decision was made to introduce some contingents of Soviet troops stationed in the southern regions of the country into the territory of Afghanistan in order to provide international assistance to the friendly Afghan people, as well as create favorable conditions for prohibiting possible anti-Afghan actions on the part of neighboring states." This task for commanders of all levels was, frankly speaking, very uncertain.

The directive did not provide for the participation of Soviet troops in hostilities in Afghanistan. Moreover, the procedure for using weapons even for self-defense was not determined. It was meant that our formations and units would become garrisons and take under protection important areas and objects, thereby freeing up Afghan troops for active combat operations against the opposition, as well as against a possible external enemy.

In a separate order, the commander of the 40th A, Lieutenant General Yu. V. Tukharinov, was instructed to meet with the head of the operational department of the General Staff of the Afghan Army, Lieutenant General Babajan, and discuss with him issues regarding the deployment of Soviet troops on the territory of Afghanistan (Babadzhan received relevant instructions from Kh. Amin ).

The USSR Minister of Defense set the beginning of the crossing of the state border at 15.00 Moscow time (16.30 Kabul time) on December 25, 1979. Commanders of all levels had less than a day at their disposal to organize the march.

On behalf of the Soviet leadership, on December 2, 1979, the Soviet ambassador informed X. Amin that the Soviet government had found it possible to satisfy his request and send two Soviet battalions (special purpose and parachute) to Afghanistan to strengthen the security of the residence of the head of state and the Bagram airfield. In agreement with X. Amin, on December 3 and 14, 1979, these units were transferred to Afghanistan by military aviation aviation and began protecting the facilities assigned to them.

On December 14, 1979, B. Karmal illegally arrived with one of the battalions at Bagram airfield, where he remained among Soviet officers and soldiers until the end of the month. Somewhat earlier (December 11, 1979), a Soviet transport plane transported A. Vatanjar, S. Gulyabzoy, A. Sarvari and Sh. Mazduryar to Afghanistan from Moscow - the “four” who, on the eve of X. Amin’s coming to power, took refuge in the Soviet embassy . In order to preserve their lives, they were secretly taken from the territory of the embassy in Kabul, and then from Afghanistan to Moscow - after X. Amin came to power. The plan developed in Moscow began to be implemented. There is no documentary evidence, but, undoubtedly, B. Karmal and the “four” took part in the development of the plan. In any case, they knew much more about him than the officers of the Soviet General Staff.

On December 22 or 23, 1979, the Soviet ambassador informed X. Amin that the Soviet leadership had fully decided to satisfy his requests to send troops to Afghanistan and was ready to begin sending them on December 25, 1979. H. Amin expressed gratitude for this decision and ordered the General Staff to facilitate its implementation in every possible way.

Entry of a group of Soviet troops into Afghanistan

In pursuance of the instructions of the USSR Minister of Defense, on the night of December 24-25, the remnants of the 345th separate parachute regiment were airlifted from the Fergana airfield to the Kabul airfield (two battalions of the unit were transferred earlier and performed tasks to protect the airfields of Kabul and Bagram). From 9.00 on December 25, the transfer of units of the 103rd Airborne Division began there.

The grouping of TurkVO troops for entry into Afghanistan looked as follows - the 40th Army (108th and 5th Guards Motorized Rifle Divisions, 56th Separate Air Assault Brigade, 860th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment, 353rd Artillery Brigade, 2 -1st anti-aircraft missile brigade; 103rd Guards Airborne Division and 345th Guards Division; In addition, as a reserve after mobilization, have: the 68th motorized rifle division in the Kushka area and the 201st motorized rifle division in the Termez area.

Simultaneously with the beginning of the advance of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division in the Termez direction, troops flew over and landed at the airfields: Kabul - 103rd Airborne Division; Bagram - 345th airborne division.

The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was planned to be carried out in two directions along the routes Termez - Kabul - Ghazni and Kushka - Herat - Kandahar with the task: by garrisoning troops along this ring in the most vital areas, to create conditions for stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan.

It was also intended to introduce the 860th Motorized Rifle Regiment through Khorog to Fayzabad in the northeast of the country.

Upon receipt of instructions, now with specific deadlines, march calculations were clarified, tasks were assigned to formations, units and subunits, and the objectives of the deployment were explained to all personnel. The command and control of troops when crossing the border and moving to designated areas, as well as appropriate control, was organized.

When carrying out explanatory work with personnel, the emphasis was placed on the fact that the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan is being carried out at the request of its legitimate government, to provide international assistance in the fight against external aggression, which in the future may pose a threat to the southern borders of our Motherland. No other purposes are pursued. As soon as outside interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan ceases, Soviet troops will immediately withdraw from the country. Such explanations met with understanding from the personnel.

Bridges

A serious problem for the troops in the Termez direction was the organization of crossing the Amu Darya - a capricious and wayward river, with a strong current and constantly changing its course. Its sandy shores are easily washed away. All this made it extremely difficult to organize both the ferry crossing of troops and the construction of a pontoon bridge across it.

Thus, one of the important tasks of engineering support for the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was the equipment and maintenance of a floating bridge in Termez, as well as the construction and maintenance of a temporary high-water bridge in Aywaj.

At the time of the entry of a contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan into the territory of the TurkVO by rail Three pontoon-bridge regiments were transferred from the central military districts of the country to the Termez region.

After long reconnaissance work and calculations carried out under the leadership of the chief of the district’s engineering troops, Major General A.S. Korolev, with the involvement of specialists from the Military Engineering Academy called from Moscow, a place was finally chosen to build a pontoon bridge.

The technology for setting it up and securing it in a strong current has been determined, as well as the necessary additional work to secure the banks and unstable soil of the island, which fits into the bridge design (between the shore and the island there are several links of the pontoon-bridge park, along the island there are concrete slabs and then the bridge ).

This 60-meter floating bridge from the PMP park was built within seven hours (work began at 7.00 on December 25, 1979). In March 1980, due to the approaching spring flood, it was replaced by a combined bridge from the PMP and PPS parks.

To prevent erosion of the island and destruction of its surface along the water line, metal pins were driven into the river bottom, protruding 1 m above the water, braided with reeds and straw, after which the braid was secured by adding clay. A 1 m high strip was poured from the same material on the roadway of the island; reinforced concrete slabs were laid on top of the clay.

With the consolidation of the soil on the approaches to the river and on the island, the leaders of the Surkhandarya region, A. K. Karimov and V. M. Mikhailov, provided significant assistance to the troops by freely allocating a significant amount of reinforced concrete road slabs from the reinforced concrete structures plant and ensuring their removal on special slab trucks.

The constructed bridge had an outlet part that ensured navigation on the river. Due to the strong current, great difficulties arose in building the bridge, and especially in maintaining it, which explains such a long period of time for its construction on December 25, 1979.

To duplicate the bridge in Termez, as well as ensure the construction of a temporary high-water bridge and a bypass highway In January 1980, a 60-meter floating bridge from the PMP park was built on Tashkurgan with the help of another pump.

Subsequently, by the forces of the engineering troops, in the shortest possible time - in 51 days in difficult hydrological conditions, a high-water bridge with a length of 588 m was built for loads of up to 40 tons. The bridge supports are metal pipes with a diameter of 320 mm, the driving depth is 20 m. Service bridges were used as a span structure MLRM and BARM kits. The presence of two bridges made it possible to carry out preventive measures on them in a timely manner. Thanks to this, the long-term operation of floating bridges from service parks with heavy traffic (up to 1000 units of equipment per day) was ensured.

March on Kabul

The first Soviet unit to cross the Soviet-Afghan border was the 781st separate reconnaissance battalion of the 108th Guards. motorized rifle division. On the Afghan coast, Soviet troops were met by X. Amin's elder brother, Abdallah Amin, who was responsible for suppressing the opposition movement in the northern provinces of the country.

The passage of Soviet troops across the border was carried out by border authorities without customs inspection according to pre-prepared lists, which were handed to the border guards before the units entered the pontoon bridge. Lists of Airborne Forces personnel were handed over to border authorities at the airfields of the last refueling of aircraft.

At the command and observation post in the area of ​​the bridge were the commander of the TurkVO troops, Colonel General Yu. P. Maksimov, the commander of the 40th A, Lieutenant General Tukharinov Yu.

They observed how, at the appointed time, the 180th motorized rifle regiment on an infantry fighting vehicle, constituting the forward detachment of the 108th Guards. MSD, and the forward echelon of the 103rd Guards. Airborne forces crossed the state border with Afghanistan on the ground and in the air. The generals stayed at the checkpoint near the river until the morning, until the last column crossed to the left bank.

Formation of the marching order of the 108th Guards. The motorized infantry division on the march looked like this: reconnaissance detachment - 781st orb, head marching outpost - 180th motorized rifle regiment (msr and TV), movement support detachment - 271st separate engineer battalion, vanguard - 1/180th motorized rifle regiment with adn regiment , 180th Motorized Rifle Regiment, forward command post (PKP) of the Motorized Rifle Division, 234th Tank Regiment, separate rocket division, 177th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 1074th Motorized Rifle Regiment, CP of the Motorized Rifle Division, separate missile division, 1049th Zenap, 181st MSP, hotel chemical defense battalion, rear control point (TPU) and rear MSD.

The length of the march for the 108th division was 510 km. The march was completed in two transitions. The first is 300 km long, of which 140 km are on flat terrain, 160 km are on mountainous terrain. The second is 210 km long through mountainous terrain.

The first march took 25 hours, including 4 hours for a long stop to refuel equipment. The reconnaissance detachment and the forward detachment of the division (small infantry fighting vehicles on infantry fighting vehicles) covered the second march in 18 hours, the main forces of the division in 21 hours.

The march was carried out in mixed columns with an average speed of movement: on the plain at night - 20 km/h, during the day in the mountains - 15 km/h. Fuel consumption compared to the norm during the march was 2.9 refuelings for gasoline, 3.0 for diesel fuel.

The organization of the first transition of the march took place in the starting area, the first tasks were completed by issuing a combat order. 20 hours were allotted for organizing the 1st transition, 18 hours were allotted for the 2nd transition. The tasks were completed by combat orders. The control was with the PKP, which advanced behind the advance detachment.

It should be noted that the practically newly formed division made a difficult six-hundred-kilometer march along a high-mountain route in winter conditions. Due to the wet snow and the onset of frost, the road became icy at night, the equipment skidded on the ascents, and often skidded on the descents. The precautions provided in advance turned out to be very useful - traffic support units with a supply of sand, tractors and road equipment, wooden wheel chocks for each car, rigid couplings, etc.

A serious obstacle turned out to be the 2,700-meter long tunnel at the Salang pass, designed for the passage of single and small groups of vehicles with carburetor engines, but not diesel vehicles - infantry fighting vehicles, tanks. We had to go through the tunnel in small units with certain intervals between them.

All this significantly influenced the slowdown in the rate of advance of division units. And yet, by the appointed time, the forward detachment of the division - the 180th Motorized Rifle Regiment - was in Kabul, having established contact with units of the 103rd Guards. vdd. WITH the best side The commander of the 180th infantry regiment, Lieutenant Colonel T. E. Kasymov, showed himself here.

During the march, the division did not conduct any combat operations.

By the end of December 29, 1979, the 108th Guards. The motorized infantry division took up defensive positions in the area of ​​the capital of Afghanistan - Kabul. The division was commanded by Colonel Valery Ivanovich Mironov, who had just been appointed to this position. In fact, Mironov took over the division on the march, in extremely difficult and harsh conditions.

We must honestly admit that the newly mobilized units of the 108th Guards. The MSD outwardly bore little resemblance to the victorious Soviet Army. This was clearly not a demonstration of Soviet military power. The appearance of most of the drafted fighters did not inspire much respect for them. The mobilized fathers of large Uzbek and Tajik families were least of all like the brave soldiers who arrived to provide international assistance to the Afghans.

The division headquarters and some units were concentrated on the northern outskirts of Kabul in a village nicknamed in Russian “Teply Stan”, and motorized rifle regiments and a tank regiment were deployed on the approaches to Kabul from all directions, creating, as it were, an outer ring of defense for the city.

Winter in Kabul 1979-1980 It turned out to be frosty. In units of the 108th Guards. The MSD did not have enough stoves or fuel. Any piece of wood was used for cooking, heating tents and dugouts. There were cases when ornamental and even fruit trees were cut down for fuel. This caused serious conflicts with local residents. They settled with considerable difficulties.

And another feature that was not taken into account by the rear services. Kabul is a high mountain region. Cooking food in open boilers required almost 1.5 times more time and fuel than on the plain. Due to this circumstance, many problems arose.

Nevertheless, despite all the difficulties, the introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan continued.

Airborne operation

And when the entry of troops into Afghanistan became obvious, it was necessary to use the 103rd Airborne Division, located in the European part of the USSR several thousand km from the Afghan border (permanent deployment point - Vitebsk, unit commander - Major General Ryabchenko I . F.).

In mid-December 1979, the 103rd Airborne Division was raised on alert and, with full ammunition and supplies, was withdrawn to the initial area, and then to the take-off airfields of the military aviation units. By this time, the headquarters of the Airborne Forces and VTA had already planned the transfer of the division from Belarus and its landing in Afghanistan at the airfields of Kabul and Bagram.

Almost the entire BTA aircraft fleet was used for these purposes. Provision was made for intermediate refueling of aircraft at airfields in the Volga region, Southern Urals and Kazakhstan. It was also planned to feed the paratroopers hot food there.

All preparations for the transfer and landing of troops took place secretly under the guise of conducting tactical exercises with practical landing. It began by putting units on high alert.

The landing (except for units intended to capture airfields in order to ensure the landing of the main landing forces) was planned to be carried out by landing.

Since the airfields of the initial area were located at a considerable distance from the locations of the division's units, the movement of troops to the airfields was carried out in a combined way: to the nearest airfields - under their own power and by rail, to the most distant ones - by military aviation aircraft.

To ensure secrecy, the combat mission of units and subunits was assigned to a preliminary one and only for landing (without disclosing landing areas and airfields). The personnel were given the task of preparing for landing and entering into battle immediately after landing.

Units and subunits of the landing force remained at the airfields of the initial area for several days. Weapons and equipment were loaded onto planes. At some airfields they were concentrated in field parks, grouped by aircraft groups. The leader of each group knew the aircraft number, parking location and the name of the crew commander. This subsequently ensured quick loading and landing.

The personnel were equipped for winter. In addition to felt boots, each paratrooper had boots, which they wore depending on the weather. Combat equipment included personal weapons, a completed backpack and other necessary equipment.

Technical and logistical support for the landing in the initial area was carried out by the forces and means of airfield technical units of the Air Force. This contributed to the preservation of material reserves of the 103rd Airborne Division units. To maintain the combat readiness of infantry fighting vehicles and vehicles in low temperature conditions, the batteries were periodically recharged. In aircraft loaded with military equipment, while they were parked, proper temperature regime. Squadrons and regiments of the VTA, landing forward airborne detachments to capture airfields, could take off 40-50 minutes after receiving the order.

Landing of the 103rd Guards. Airborne operations were carried out using the landing method. There was no need to drop out advance detachments. Both airfields (Kabul and Bagram) by this time had been taken under control by units of the 345th airborne division.

The landing and take-off conditions of the nearby Kabul and Bagram airfields determined the need to land in groups of 6-12 aircraft, allowing no more than an hour for their landing, unloading and take-off of the group. It took from 15 to 30 minutes to unload one plane.

After landing, the unit commanders received directly at the airfield a large-scale plan of the city and maps with military installations, a combat mission and a brief description. explanatory note. These documents were prepared in advance by the Airborne Forces task force.

When performing combat missions, the main responsibility was assigned to the parachute regiments. They were in December 1979 in the 103rd Guards. The airborne division was commanded by: the 317th airborne division - Lieutenant Colonel Batyukov N.V., the 350th airborne division - Lieutenant Colonel Shpak G.I., the 357th airborne division - Lieutenant Colonel Litovchik K.G., the 345th airborne division was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Serdyukov N.I.

To transport personnel and military equipment of the 103rd Airborne Division, 343 aircraft flights were made (including 66 An-22 flights, 76 Il-76 flights, 200 An-12 flights). In total, 47 hours were spent landing airborne units at two airfields (the first plane landed in Kabul at 16.15 on December 25, the last at 14.30 on December 27, 1979).

Airplanes landed day and night on average every 15 minutes. During this time, 7 thousand 700 people were delivered to Kabul and Bagram. personnel, 894 units of military equipment and 1062 tons of various cargo.

Unfortunately, during the transfer of airborne units in Kabul on December 25, 1979 at 19.33 (Moscow time), an Il-76 plane carrying personnel and equipment crashed. The crew of 7 people (commander Captain V.V. Golovchin) and 37 paratroopers were killed. The cause of the disaster was a piloting error, a collision of the plane with a mountain 4662 m high when approaching the Kabul airfield (Captain V.V. Golovchin landed at the Kabul airfield, known for its difficulty, especially at night, for the first time). This disaster opened the list of our losses in Afghanistan.

The areas of concentration of airborne units and subunits were pre-selected and reconnaissance by officers of the airborne task force, led by deputy commander of the airborne forces, Lieutenant General N. N. Guskov, who arrived in Kabul on December 23, 1979.

On the morning of December 25, 1979, Soviet military advisers and specialists working in the Afghan air defense forces, in order to exclude possible hostile actions on the part of Afghan military personnel during the landing of airborne units, established control over all anti-aircraft weapons and ammunition storage sites. Some anti-aircraft installations were temporarily disabled by them (sights, locks, etc. were removed).

During the exit and landing of our troops at their designated points, difficulties sometimes arose. So, with the onset of darkness at the Bagram airfield, the landing lighting system suddenly turned off. At this time, the landing planes were already approaching. It turned out that the system was turned off on the orders of the head of the aviation garrison, who decided to prevent the arrival of troops. Only the decisive actions of Lieutenant General N. N. Guskov relieved the tension, eliminated serious consequences and ensured the completion of the task.

After the landing, units of the 103rd Airborne Division went to important administrative and other facilities (PDPA Central Committee, buildings of the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs, security services, Ministry of Communications, barracks of some units) and strengthened their security. In fact, control of Soviet troops was established over these objects. In some places, officers who were opponents of X. Amin, not knowing why the Soviet troops came, tried to resist them, but were relatively quickly disarmed.

By the new year of 1980, the deployment of the 103rd Airborne Division regiments in Afghanistan was completed. 317th Guards The PDP was stationed in the center of Kabul (on the palace grounds of Delkusha), a battalion of the same regiment was allocated to guard the residence of Babrak Karmal. 357th Guards The PDP was located in the Bala Hissar fortress. 350th Guards The PDP remained in tents on the outskirts of the airfield next to the division headquarters. The artillery regiment and special units of the division were also located there. The few permanent buildings that the paratroopers received were in terrible condition. Ruined and dirty, they required a lot of labor and materials to adapt them for housing. Moreover, they had no heating.

In general, in December 1979, an airmobile operation unprecedented in scope and organization was carried out to transfer troops from one theater of operations to another at a range of about 4.5 thousand kilometers. Comparable to this operation, and even then only partially, was the transfer during one night of August 1968 of two airborne divisions to Prague and Brno during the entry of the combined armed forces of the Warsaw Pact into Czechoslovakia. As it turned out later, this was the last airborne operation of the Soviet army.

First Herat, then Kandahar

On the night of December 27-28, 1979 (at 3.00 local time), by additional order of the USSR Minister of Defense, another motorized rifle division entered Afghanistan - the 5th Guards Motorized Rifle Division.

The formation marched along the route: Kushka - Herat - lane. Mir-Ali - Adraskan - Shindand. The length of the march was 280 km.

The division advanced along one route. The column of the main forces was divided in depth into columns of regiments that moved at shortened distances. Between units - 2 km, between battalions - up to 1 km.

Such shortened distances led to difficult movement along the route, especially when overcoming passes. The resulting traffic jams in the areas did not contribute to a quick march and reduced the average march speed, which for tanks was 20 km/h during the day, 15 km/h at night, infantry fighting vehicles during the day - 30 km/h, at night - 20 km/h, cars - 35 km/h during the day, 30 km/h at night. When overcoming passes, the average speed for all equipment was 5 km/h.

The organization of the march took place in the original area. Tasks were brought to the units by combat order of the division commander, Major General Yu.V. Shatalin.

The MRD headquarters prepared all the necessary data for the unit commanders to make a decision.

The decision determined the order of the march, the number of marching columns, the composition of the advance detachment and marching guards, the procedure for action when meeting the enemy, the formation of the marching order and the distribution of forces and means among the columns, the number of halts and their duration.

The units were assigned tasks for the first daily march.

Management on the march was organized with PKP, KP and TPU. The total time spent on the march was 28 hours, taking into account stops and refueling of equipment. The following was consumed for the march: gasoline - 188.5 tons (0.88 refills); diesel fuel - 248.8 tons (0.7 refuelings).

By the end of December 28, the 5th Guards. The motorized infantry division occupied target areas south of the city of Herat and at the Shindanda airfield. Subsequently, the division’s area of ​​responsibility expanded to Kandahar, where its 373rd Motorized Rifle Regiment went, which was then transformed into a separate motorized rifle brigade (70th Motorized Rifle Brigade).

The commissioning of the 5th Motorized Rifle Division went smoother (in comparison with the 108th Motorized Rifle Division) and without serious deviations from the planned plan. During the promotion, the division commander, Major General Shatalin Yu. V., showed himself to be a mature and competent military leader.

Labor road to Fayzabad

Particularly noteworthy are the unfavorable conditions for the movement of the 860th separate motorized rifle regiment from the Khorog region to Faizabad (Afghan province of Badakhshan). The regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel V.S. Kudlay advanced for a long time under almost continuous fire from small groups and detachments of the opposition, restoring the road completely destroyed by the militants - the only one in this mountainous region.
The maximum rate of advance of the regiment was 10 km per day. Obviously, this was influenced by the fact that a large number of former Basmachi and their descendants who fled from Soviet Central Asia lived here. Despite the difficulties and losses in personnel and military equipment, the regiment completed its combat mission.

As an example, here are a few lines from the combat log of the 40th Army.

11.1.80 - The 860th Motorized Rifle Regiment, without artillery and wheeled vehicles, concentrated in the Gulkhan area. The reconnaissance of the regiment, consisting of four infantry fighting vehicles, was stopped before the blockage in the Kazdekh area (23 km north-west of Gulkhan). The road from Gulkhany to Kazdekh is impassable for infantry fighting vehicles - sheer cliffs. After passing the BMP, the edges of the roads crumble. There is a constant threat of tracked vehicles falling into the abyss. The road is impassable for wheeled vehicles. While attempting to clear the rubble, fire was opened by a gang of rebels. A shootout began. During it, 2 officers of the 860th Motorized Rifle Regiment were wounded.

13.1.80 - The 860th Motorized Rifle Regiment is located in the Gulkhan and Ishkashim area. By the end of the day, the reconnaissance group and the advance detachment of the regiment as part of the SMEs had cleared the blockage on the route up to 120 m deep. 15 km north-west of Gulkhan again encountered a destroyed section of the road. They couldn't overcome him. On the morning of January 15, the regiment will begin restoration work and continue reconnaissance along the route. Exploration was carried out south of Gulkhan to a depth of 12 km to the village of Falahmadin. The BMPs could not pass further, since the roads are accessible only to pedestrians and pack vehicles.

1/16/80 - The 860th Motorized Rifle Regiment continues to clear the road in the Gulkhan area in readiness to carry out the task in the direction of Fayzabad. It needs air support (helicopters) for reconnaissance and landing of small units in order to protect dangerous sections of the road and prevent enemy actions along the route.

01/20/80 - The 860th Motorized Rifle Regiment continues to fulfill its assigned task. At 15.30 the main outpost came under fire and fought all night. The regiment has 14 wounded (including 1 officer) and 3 killed. (including 1 officer).

To help the 860th Motorized Rifle Regiment, units of the 56th Specialized Brigade (brigade commander Colonel Plokhikh) were sent from Kunduz to meet him. However, the brigade's heavy equipment soon ran into a damaged bridge over one of the mountain gorges. The bridge across it was built later from duralumin structures made according to the drawings of the troops by the Tashkent Aviation Association named after. Chkalov (director at that time - V. Sivets), delivered and mounted using Mi-6 and Mi-8 helicopters.

Aviation

The Soviet aviation group in Afghanistan was created by mid-March 1980, taking into account the deployment and conduct of combat operations by combined arms formations and units in isolated operational directions. The basis for the basing of aviation units was the airfield network of the Afghan Air Force, which ensured, if necessary, the regrouping of aviation in order to increase its efforts in certain directions (areas).

Units of Soviet and Afghan aviation were jointly based at most airfields in Afghanistan. This ensured closer interaction between them and shortened the time required to restore the combat capability of Afghan air units and bring them into battle.

To strengthen the security and defense of airfields, one motorized rifle (airborne) battalion (company) was allocated to each of them.

At the home airfields, radio navigation and communications equipment were additionally installed, joint command posts were created for flight control, combat operations control, and air traffic Soviet and Afghan aviation over the territory of Afghanistan.

Soviet air units, together with Afghan ones, were based at four airfields (Kabul, Bagram, Shindand and Kandahar), and Soviet (Kunduz, Faizabad and Jalalabad) and Afghan (Mazar-i-Sharif) units were based separately at four airfields.

During the regrouping of aviation in the interests of upcoming operations, Soviet and Afghan aircraft and helicopters were jointly based at almost all available airfields.

The total staff of the Soviet aviation group in Afghanistan (Air Force 40 A) included two aviation regiments and one squadron of combat aircraft, one mixed aviation and three separate helicopter regiments, three separate helicopter squadrons and one helicopter detachment. A total of 60 combat aircraft and 19 military transport aircraft, 253 combat and transport-combat helicopters.

Taking into account the physical and geographical conditions and the deployment of combined arms formations and individual units of 40 A and the combat areas assigned to them, the aviation group in Afghanistan (Air Force 40 A) was divided into four groups: "North", "Center", "South" and " West".

Group "North" - 181 airborne forces with a squadron of helicopters 335 airborne forces and 146 airborne forces of the 201st motorized rifle division, the combat area is behind the Hindu Kush ridge in the northern and north-eastern regions of Afghanistan (from Shibargan to Faizabad). The base airfields are Kunduz and Faizabad. During the hostilities, the Mazar-i-Sharif airfield and the helipads of Puli-Khumri, Baghlan, Sari-Pul, Shibargan, Ishkashim, Gulkhana, Jarm and others were used for temporary deployment. The total number of Sever combat personnel is 81 helicopters, of which 60 are combat and transport-combat helicopters.

Group "Center" - 50 osap, 263 oaetr, 115 guards. IAP, 262 OVE, 292 OVP. Intended for operations in the central and south-eastern regions of Afghanistan (south of the Hindu Kush range to the border with Pakistan). Base airfields: Kabul, Bagram, Jalalabad. During the fighting, the following airfields were used: Ghazni, Gardez, Chagcharan (all for helicopters only), as well as sites Baghlan, Chak, Urgun, Khost, Asadabad, Asmar, etc. The total number of combat personnel of the Center group was 26 combat aircraft and 114 helicopters (including 110 combat and transport-combat helicopters).

Group "South" - two squadrons of the 280th Airborne Regiment and one squadron of the 136th Airborne Infantry. It operated in the southern regions of Afghanistan (Zabol, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Helmand provinces). The base airfield is Kandarap. During the fighting, the Lashkargah airfield, Girishk, Kalat, Tarinkot and others helipads were used. The total number of the group is 12 combat aircraft and 26 helicopters (of which 16 are transport-combat).

Grouping "West" - 302nd airborne unit, one squadron each from the 280th airborne regiment and the 136th airborne regiment. The combat area is the western and southwestern provinces of Afghanistan (Badgiz, Herat, Farah, Helmand).

The base airfield is Shindand. During the conduct of hostilities, the airfields of Herat, Maymene, the sites of Dilaram, Daulatabad, Zaranj, Farah, Khash and others were used. The total strength of the "West" group is 12 combat aircraft and 32 helicopters (of which 30 are combat and transport-combat).

In some cases, during major operations, individual aviation units from the named groups were involved in operations in other areas, however, when planning military operations, they tried to avoid this due to the difficulties of regrouping aviation.

With the relocation of fighters and fighter-bombers to Afghanistan at the airfields of Bagram (115th Guards IAP), Kandahar (136th Guards IAP) and Shindand (217th, then 136th Guards IAP), combat duty of Soviet aircraft was introduced in the general air defense system of Afghanistan.

Completion of troop entry

By mid-January 1980, the introduction of the main forces of the 40th A was basically completed. On the territory of Afghanistan, two motorized rifle divisions (108th and 5th Guards Motorized Rifle Division) and one airborne division (103rd), an air assault brigade (56th airborne brigade) and two separate regiments (345th airborne infantry division and 860th th omsp).

On February 2, 1980, another division was accepted into the 40th Army - the 201st Motorized Rifle Division (the former point of permanent deployment of the division's control - Dushanbe) as part of the 149th Guards. MSP, 122 MSP, 191 MSP, 285 TP, 998 AP, 990 Zenap, 71 Ordn and other units. At the time of commissioning, the connection was 100% provided with equipment and weapons, ammunition, and refueling. The political and moral condition of the division's personnel was noted as healthy. The 201st Motorized Rifle Division was characterized by a formation that was combat-ready and ready to carry out a combat mission.

To understand the conditions under which the troops of the 40th Army were sometimes deployed, at least a few examples should be given (lines from the combat log of the 40th Army, entry dated January 20, 1980):

": The 186th Motorized Rifle Regiment continued to carry out the previously assigned task. North 21 km of the city of Kishim, not reaching 800 m from the bridge, stopped. The bridge was blown up by the rebels. The cornice section of the rock was blown up and collapsed. A blockage was made on the road. From the road to the rock 2- 2.5 meters. The width of the roadway can only be increased by cutting into the mountains. The depth of the gorge in this area is more than 18 meters. There is no possibility for deploying TMMs and MTUs (heavy mechanized bridges and tank bridgelayers). The task has been set to explore bypass routes further south. the main road and determining the scope of work to restore the destroyed bridge."

Or at least one of the reports about the nature of the destruction of the road on one of the routes of advance of units of the 40th Army: “: the left half of the roadway on a section of 10 meters collapsed into the abyss. A roadway 1.5-2 m wide was left. On the right is a monolithic wall , which hangs over roadway. Rocky soil cannot be mined with overhead charges or manually:".

And, nevertheless, the tasks assigned to the units and units of the 40th Army were carried out.

Troop control in Afghanistan was carried out by an operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense (located in the Termez region) directly or through the commander and headquarters of the TurkVO. Its chief, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov, controlled the advance of the troops, flying to them in helicopters with a group of officers.

In Kabul, command of the troops was assumed by the operational group of the Airborne Forces headquarters, headed by the deputy commander of the Airborne Forces, Lieutenant General N. N. Guskov. At first, the entire group introduced into Afghanistan was subordinate to him.

At the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, a group of officers of the Main Operations Directorate worked around the clock, monitoring the progress of the deployment of troops, changes in the situation in and around Afghanistan, and preparing reports and proposals to the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the state. The duty shifts of this group were headed by the heads of the operational management areas of the GOU General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.

During the period of troop entry, reconnaissance and other types of combat support, technical and logistical support were carried out by the regular forces and means of the incoming troops, since the army bodies had not yet been put on alert. The secrecy of the creation of a group of troops was ensured by the extended period of mobilization and the alternate bringing of formations and units into combat readiness, and most importantly, by the fact that no one in the troops assumed that such a solution was even possible.

The total number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan by the beginning of February 1980 reached 81.8 thousand people. (military personnel - 79.8 thousand, including in combat units of the Ground Forces and Air Force - 61.8 thousand people.

Changes and renamings

In subsequent years (until 1986 inclusive), the combat composition of the group of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was changed several times. Some units were reorganized in order to increase their combat capabilities.

As a result, the final composition of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces became as follows: control of the 40th Army with support and service units; divisions - 4; brigades - 5; separate regiments - 4; separate security battalions - 6; aviation regiments - 4; helicopter regiments - 3; support team; pipeline crew; medical, repair, construction, apartment maintenance and other parts and institutions.

The maximum number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was 108.8 thousand people in 1985. (military personnel - 106 thousand), including in combat units - 73.6 thousand people. (the number of combat troops never exceeded that determined by the Soviet political leadership back in December 1979).

In early January 1980, the question arose of what to call the troops in Afghanistan. They continued to be part of the troops of the TurkVO and SAVO and for this reason could not be called a Group of Forces. Calling them 40th A was not entirely legal. In addition to the 40th A itself, in Afghanistan there was a division and a separate regiment of the Airborne Forces, an air assault brigade, several air force combat aviation regiments, regiments of combat and transport helicopters, and parts of the Center's rear.

The political leadership wanted the general name of our troops to reflect their numerical limitations and the temporary nature of their stay in Afghanistan. Ultimately, the name “Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops in Afghanistan” (abbreviated as OKSV) was approved. It was decided to abandon the indication in the title of the temporary stay in Afghanistan in order not to complicate the abbreviation.

The original propaganda meaning of the name, which undoubtedly existed, disappeared over time. This name began to be perceived by everyone as official, open for printing and everyday communication,

The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan by the Afghan population, especially the poor, was initially received favorably. People willingly made contacts with Soviet military personnel and showed interest in life in the Soviet Union. The people sincerely hoped that our troops would help end the war and help establish peace and tranquility in the country. The word "shuravi" (Soviet) was pronounced with special warmth.

During the march of the troops, when they stopped in populated areas, impromptu rallies arose, at which it turned out that the population of the villages adjacent to the highway knew about the upcoming arrival of Soviet troops. The soldiers of the Afghan army, as well as members of the committees for the defense of the revolution, were especially friendly towards the Soviet Army. In their speeches at rallies, Afghan servicemen thanked our soldiers for their help and expressed their readiness for military cooperation. Slogans of Soviet-Afghan military friendship were chanted.

At the same time, the wealthy sections of the population were wary of the Soviet troops and did not enter into contact. There were also isolated hostile manifestations. In particular, there were cases of shelling of some Soviet vehicles on the march (mostly lagging behind).

There was also an attempt to prevent Soviet troops from establishing control over the Salang Pass. A large group of rebels tried to strike at the airborne assault battalion of Captain L. Khabarov while he was setting up posts on the pass. This group had at its disposal armored personnel carriers and even a tank (as it turned out later, stolen from the Afghan unit by Afghan army soldiers who had gone over to the side of the rebels). The battalion's combat reconnaissance patrol under the command of Lieutenant N. Krotov discovered the rebels and repelled their attack. During the battle, Lieutenant N. Krotov was killed. This was one of the first OKSV officers to die.

The Soviet troops brought into Afghanistan, in agreement with the government of the country and together with Afghan units and units of the army, Tsarandoy (Afghan Ministry of Internal Affairs), and security services performed a complex of various tasks. They took under protection all the main highways: Kushka-Herat-Shindand-Girishk-Kandahar; Termez-Puli-Khumri-Kabul; as well as Kabul-Jalalabad and Puli-Khumri-Kunduz-Faizabad.

Many sites of Soviet-Afghan economic cooperation were taken under protection, where Soviet civilian advisers and specialists lived and worked. Such facilities included the Jarkuduk and Shibargan gas fields, power plants in Surubi, Naglu, Puli-Khumri and Kabul, a nitrogen fertilizer plant in Mazar-i-Sharif, a tunnel and all structures of the Salang Pass, some educational establishments in Kabul and other objects.

The security and uninterrupted operation of the airfields of Kabul (including its international part), Bagram, Kunduz, Faizabad, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Shindand, Herat, and Lashkar Gah were ensured. By placing Soviet garrisons, state authorities in 21 provincial and many district and volost centers were supported and strengthened in every possible way.

An important task of the Soviet troops was to conduct, together with Afghan units, combat operations of various scales to defeat the most dangerous, aggressive detachments and groups of the armed opposition, as well as to fight caravans delivering weapons and ammunition to Afghanistan from Pakistan and Iran. This task emerged in March 1980 and finally became one of the main ones in 1981.

(abbreviated as 108th Motorized Rifle Division) is a military unit of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the Armed Forces of Uzbekistan. The division was formed from the 360th Infantry Nevelsk Red Banner Division, which was formed in accordance with the Resolution of the State Defense Committee dated August 13, 1941 and the order of the Commander of the Volga Military District, Lieutenant General V. F. Gerasimenko dated August 14, 1941.

Story

The division's combat path during the Great Patriotic War Patriotic War

The division began to form in the city of Chkalov (now Orenburg), and some of its units and divisions - in the cities and villages of the Chkalov (now Orenburg) region. By October 1, 1941, the division was mostly manned. The 360th Infantry Division began its combat journey on November 12, 1941, when the first echelon, loaded with personnel, equipment and weapons, moved west. As part of the troops of the Western Front, units and divisions of the division occupied the second line of defense, erected defensive structures, where they received the first blows of the enemy.

On December 25, 1941, by order No. 0508 of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the division was included in the 4th Shock Army of the North-Western Front.

On January 29, 1942, the division launched an attack on the city of Velizh. As a result of a two-hour battle, the first battalion of the 1193rd Infantry Regiment, attacking from the right flank, broke into the city and fought street battles. The 1197th Infantry Regiment was advancing on the northern outskirts of the city. One of the units of the 1193rd Infantry Regiment blocked the enemy’s retreat route and the approach of his reserves on the Nevelskoye Highway. By the morning of January 30, the 1195th Infantry Regiment, with a strike from the southwest, cut the Vitebsk Highway, broke into the outskirts of the city and began to advance towards the center. From the southeast, crossing the Western Dvina River on ice, soldiers of the 1197th Infantry Regiment occupied the outskirts of the city. Thus, the enemy garrison in the city of Velizh was completely surrounded.

In the battles for Velikiye Luki, which lasted from December 24, 1942 to January 14, 1943, division units destroyed 23 guns, 72 machine guns, 5 six-barreled mortars, 30 vehicles, 81 tanks and 4 aircraft, up to 7,000 enemy soldiers and officers. The 205th Wehrmacht Infantry Division, sent to help the encircled garrison, was unable to get through to the city; the garrison was destroyed and partially captured. The order of the commander of the 3rd Shock Army dated January 23, 1943 noted: “The 360th Infantry Division coped with the task. The enemy was dealt a blow and was forced to turn away from the direction in which the 360th Infantry Division stood as a solid wall.” For skillful actions in the Velikiye Luki area, the entire personnel of the 360th Infantry Division was thanked by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

On October 6, 1943, after a two-hour battle, the division captured the settlements of Volchi Gory, Isakov, Gerasimov, Krasny Dvor and cut the Nevel-Velizh highway. The 236th Tank Brigade followed the division onto the highway and with a sudden blow burst into the streets of the city of Nevel. By the end of the day, the division had completed its immediate and subsequent mission; Having fought 20 km, she assisted in the capture of the city of Nevel. Units and subunits of the division defeated the 2nd Infantry Division and the 83rd Regiment of the enemy. In his order dated October 7, 1943, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief expressed gratitude to the division's personnel. The division was given the name "Nevelskaya".

On February 3, 1944, the division launched an offensive in the direction of Volkovo. As a result of numerous battles, by February 16, it captured the settlements of Volkovo, Gorbachi, Bryli, Prudnaki and crossed the Zaranovka River. Until April 10, 1944, the division fought in various sectors of the 1st Baltic Front.

On April 29, 1944, the division went on the offensive and captured the strongholds of Glistinets, Tikhonov, and Yasinovtsy. The Germans threw fresh reserves into the battle. The division's units fought off 6-10 counterattacks per day. During fierce battles that lasted from April 29 to June, the division exhausted the enemy and on June 27, 1944, going on a decisive offensive, captured the village of Rovnoye, broke through the German defenses and began to advance in the direction of Polotsk. 3a Excellent combat performance in the battles for Polotsk, the division received the third commendation from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

On July 27, 1944, scouts, and after them the rest of the units of the 1193rd Infantry Regiment, burst into the streets of Dvinsk. For skillful actions in the battles for the capture of the city of Dvinsk - an important railway junction and a powerful stronghold of the Germans in the Riga direction - the division received the fourth letter of gratitude from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The 1193rd Infantry Regiment was given the name "Dvinsky". Until the end of 1944 and in January 1945, the division fought in the area of ​​the Venta River (the settlements of Zavkalma, Dangas, Sunas, Lichi). As a result of stubborn and fierce fighting, the division crossed the Venta River and made significant progress.

In 1944, the division fought over 335 km from Polotsk to the Venta River, liberating up to 500 settlements, including the cities of Polotsk, Dvinsk, Drissa, Volyntsy and others. The division's units destroyed over 10,000 enemy soldiers and officers, 58 tanks, 74 self-propelled guns, 160 machine guns.

On May 7, 1945, the division crossed the Viesata River, knocked out the defending units of the 205th Wehrmacht Infantry Division from their positions and began to pursue the retreating enemy. On May 8, German resistance began to weaken, and by the end of the day, more than 600 soldiers and officers surrendered. Pursuing demoralized enemy units, on May 8 the division captured the city of Kandava, and on May 9 - the town of Sabile. The 1193rd Infantry Regiment continued the offensive, occupied the city and port of Vindava (now Ventspils), and reached the Baltic Sea. On May 9, the division began to disarm the surrendered enemy units: the 205th Infantry Division, the 12th Tank Division, the 218th Infantry Division, the motorized mechanized brigade, the Kurland 24th Infantry Division, the 15th and 19th Light Infantry Divisions, 16th and 38th tank corps.

During the Great Patriotic War, the division fought over 850 kilometers, made marches over 2,500 kilometers during redeployments and maneuvers, and liberated more than 2,500 settlements. During this time, it destroyed over 50,000 Nazi soldiers and officers, 100 tanks, more than 200 guns and 650 machine guns, and captured more than 11,000 enemy soldiers and officers; 200 tanks, 250 guns, 800 machine guns and many other weapons and property were captured. For excellent military operations during the Great Patriotic War, the division received a total of five commendations from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The 1195th Infantry Regiment was awarded the Order of Suvorov, III degree.

Composition of the division 1941-1945

• Directorate (headquarters)

• 1193rd Infantry Regiment

• 1195th Infantry Regiment

• 1197th Infantry Regiment

• 920th Artillery Regiment

• 664th separate anti-aircraft division

• 419th separate motor reconnaissance company

• 637th separate engineer battalion

• 435th separate chemical protection company

• 472nd separate transport company

• 442nd separate medical battalion

• 221st field bakery

Post-war history of the division

The division was part of the Leningrad Front and the Baltic Military District until October 1945, when it was redeployed to the city of Termez and became part of the Turkestan Military District. By November 1, 1945, the division was located in military camps at a new location and until the end of the year was engaged in combat and political training. In November, the division carried out the second stage of demobilization of older people; in November-December, units of the division received reinforcements, units were created according to new states.

Until December 1979, the former 360th Rifle Division, and now the 108th Nevelskaya Red Banner Motorized Rifle Division, ensured the security of the Soviet Union on the southern borders.

The division's combat path in Afghanistan

In December 1979, the war in Afghanistan began, and the 108th Nevelskaya Red Banner Motorized Rifle Division again found itself in the fire of battle. By that time the division was "cropped"— that is, with a partially deployed staff. In a short two-week period, all units of the division were staffed with officers, soldiers and sergeants called up from the reserve - the so-called "partisans"- residents of the Central Asian republics and the south of the Kazakh SSR. Exactly "partisans" and will make up up to 80% of the division’s personnel when troops enter Afghanistan.

On December 10, 1979, by order of the General Staff, the division was put on high alert, one motorized rifle regiment and one tank regiment were put on full alert. On December 13, the entire division was put on full combat readiness. On December 24, the Minister of Defense signed a directive on the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, where the time of crossing the state border was determined - 15.00 on December 25. At 15.00 on December 25, 1979 108msd began crossing the pontoon bridge in the Kabul direction.

The first unit of the Soviet Army to enter the territory of Afghanistan by land was 781st Separate Reconnaissance Battalion 108msd. At the same time, BTA planes crossed the border with units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division (previously stationed in Vitebsk), which was transferred to Kabul airport. By mid-December 27, advanced units entered Kabul 108th Motorized Rifle Division, which strengthened the security of military administrative facilities. On the night of December 27-28, Afghanistan entered 5th Guards Motorized Rifle Division on the Herat direction. By mid-January 1980, the deployment of the main forces of the 40th Army was basically completed. By the spring of 1980, all military personnel called up from the reserves ( "partisan") the division's personnel were replaced by conscripts who arrived from the USSR.

• From 1980 to 1989, the division carried out tasks to ensure the safety of the movement of convoys along the Doshi-Kabul, Kabul-Jalalabad routes, and to protect important facilities (elevator, warehouse fuels and lubricants, power plant in Kabul, dam and hydroelectric power station in Surubi, Bagram airfield, etc.)

• The entire period of the division's stay can be divided into stages:

December 1979 - February 1980 Entering the division into Afghanistan and placing the division in garrisons, organizing the protection of deployment points;

March 1980 - April 1985 Conducting active combat operations, including large-scale ones, work to strengthen the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan;

April 1985 - January 1987 Transition from active operations primarily to supporting Afghan troops with artillery and engineer units. Providing assistance in the development of the armed forces of the DRA and participation in the partial withdrawal of Soviet troops from the DRA;

January 1987 - February 1989. Participation of troops in the Afghan leadership's policy of national reconciliation, continued support of Afghan troops, preparation of division units for complete withdrawal from the DRA.

The stages of the war in Afghanistan were not homogeneous and differed different character military operations. Thus, the 3rd and 4th stages are characterized by the accumulation of rebel forces and the deployment of numerous bases in Afghanistan, which led to more active military operations.

In terms of personnel, it was the largest motorized rifle division in the Armed Forces of the USSR at that time. Number of personnel 108th Motorized Rifle Division at the time of the withdrawal there were 14,000 troops. It was the only one of its kind in the Armed Forces in terms of structure, quantity and quality of weapons and military equipment. It consisted of four motorized rifle regiment, each of which consisted of 2,200 military personnel.

In the period from the beginning of 1985 to the end of 1986, the 1074th artillery regiment (1074th ap) 108th Motorized Rifle Division was the only one artillery regiment The USSR Armed Forces simultaneously had 6 types of guns in their arsenal.
The standard number of types of guns for such a unit in the structure of a Soviet motorized rifle division did not exceed 3: 2 howitzer divisions D-30, 1 rocket division BM-21 "Grad" and 1 division self-propelled units 2С3 "Acacia".
The leadership of the USSR Armed Forces decided to find out in practical conditions the effect of using large-caliber guns to destroy adobe buildings with thick walls, duvals (adobe walls), caves and shelters built from stones that were used by the Afghan Mujahideen.
To this end, as an experiment, it was decided to reorganize the 1074th Artillery Regiment and the 28th Army Artillery Regiment.

Merimsky V. - In pursuit of the “lion of Panjshir”:

Thus, the army does not have the means, except for fighter-bomber aircraft, to destroy adobe buildings with walls up to 2 m thick, duvals, caves, shelters made of stones, etc., behind which the rebels are hiding, since this requires artillery systems with a caliber of at least 152 mm.

The degree of enemy fire damage has decreased.

It was further proposed to conduct research on the use of new large-caliber, high-precision long-range systems to solve various problems in Afghanistan. To conduct the research, create an experimental organization and replace an artillery regiment in one division 108th Motorized Rifle Division 122-mm howitzers for two batteries of M-240 "Tulpan" mortars and two batteries of 152-mm "Gyacinth" guns....

For the purposes of this experiment, in the 1074th ap, from the beginning of 1984, they reorganized 2nd Howitzer Artillery Battalion in 2nd Mixed Artillery Battalion. Formed 2nd cannon artillery batteries 152 mm towed guns 2A36 "Gyacinth" and 1-u mortar battery towed M-240 mortars. From the beginning of 1985 to the end of 1986, the M-240 mortars were gradually replaced by their self-propelled version - the 240 mm 2S4 "Tulip" mortar.
At the time of withdrawal from Afghanistan, at the end of December 1988, the 1074th AP had 5 types of guns - 2S3 (18 units), D-30 (18 units), BM-21 (18 units), 2A36 (8 units .), 2С4 (4 units).
On February 11, 1989, the division, acting in the rearguard of the 40th Army, was withdrawn from Afghanistan and concentrated in Termez.

“Standing in Rukh” - the situation with the 682nd motorized rifle regiment

A critical situation in which the personnel of the 682nd Motorized Rifle Regiment found themselves in the period from April 26, 1984 to May 25, 1988.

Losses of personnel of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division in the Afghan War

For the period from January 1, 1980 to September 1, 1988 (4 and a half months before the complete withdrawal of troops), the irretrievable losses of the division ( killed, died from wounds and diseases, died as a result of accidents) amounted to 2972 ​​military personnel.
For comparison, for the same period, the 5th Guards. The MSD lost 1,135, and the 103rd Guards Airborne Division lost 902 troops.

Composition and location of parts 108th Motorized Rifle Division in OKSVA

Organizational and Staff Structure
781st separate reconnaissance battalion
108th Motorized Rifle Division for autumn 1988

• Division headquarters - Bagram, Kurugulai suburb.

• Agitation squad.

• Bakery.

• Military fire brigade

• 632nd courier-postal communication station.

• 545th Control and Artillery Reconnaissance Battery.

• 581st bath and laundry point.

• Commandant's company

• Field institution of the State Bank of the USSR

• 113th separate flamethrower company(until 03/01/85 - 113th separate chemical defense company).

• 177th Dvina Motorized Rifle Regiment. Jabal Ussaraj.

• 180th Motorized Rifle Red Banner Order of Suvorov Regiment.

In everyday speech - "Court Regiment"- due to deployment near the headquarters of the 40th Army located in the Taj Beg Palace. Kabul district Darulaman.

• 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion 180msp— Restricted zone of Bagram airfield.

• 181st Motorized Rifle Regiment. Kabul, Tyoply district Stan (Khairkhana).

• 285th Uman-Warsaw Red Banner Order of Kutuzov Tank Regiment. Reformed on March 15, 1984 into 682nd MSP.

• 682nd Uman-Warsaw Red Banner Order of Kutuzov Motorized Rifle Regiment. Until March 1984 - Bagram. Since March 1984 - village. Rukha in the Panjshir gorge. On May 25, 1988, he was fought out of the Panjshir gorge and dispersed among outposts around the “Charikar greenery” with the regimental headquarters in Jabal Ussaraj.

• 1074th Lviv Red Banner Order of Bohdan Khmelnitsky Artillery Regiment. Kabul district Teply Stan (Khairkhana).

• 1049th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment. On December 1, 1981, he left for the PriVO, and arrived in return 1415zrp.

• 1415th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment. Kabul district Darulaman. Withdrawn October 20, 1986

• 781st Separate Order of the Red Star Reconnaissance Battalion. Bagram.

• . Bagram.

• 1003rd separate logistics battalion. Bagram

• 808th Separate Signal Battalion. Bagram

• 333rd Repair and Reconstruction Battalion. Bagram.

• 100th Separate Medical Battalion. Bagram.

• 738th separate anti-tank artillery division. Bagram.

• 646th separate missile division. Withdrawn September 1, 1980.

Ingredient addition 108th Motorized Rifle Division in OKSVA

Organizational and staffing structure 108th Motorized Rifle Division as of September 1986

Organizational and staffing structure1074th Artillery Regiment

108th Motorized Rifle Division as of July 1986

Inclusion and exclusion from the division of the 186th motorized rifle regiment]

In the original composition 108th Motorized Rifle Division, introduced into the DRA, there was the 186th Vyborg Motorized Rifle Regiment ( 186th MSP). Before entering 186th MSP was not included in 108th Motorized Rifle Division, but was assigned from the 68th Novgorod Motorized Rifle Division of the SAVO.
After entering 186th MSP will be stationed in Kabul.
On March 1, 1980, the 66th separate motorized rifle brigade will be formed on the basis of the regiment (by reorganizing the staff structure of units and including 48th separate air assault battalion) and will subsequently be relocated to Jalalabad.

Rotation of tank regiments

Before entering the DRA as part of 108th Motorized Rifle Division had its own staff tank regiment- 281st Tank Regiment ( military unit 44077), which was formed in 1947 on the basis 845th separate self-propelled artillery division (845th siege) Same 108th Motorized Rifle Division. He remained on the territory of the USSR due to the fact that he had outdated weapons (T-34, T-44, BTR-152).
Instead, on January 28, 1980, the 108th Motorized Rifle Division The 234th Permyshl-Berlin Red Banner Order of Suvorov Tank Regiment was included from the 201st Motorized Rifle Division ( 234th TP or military unit 71177).
In its turn 234th TP ended up as part of the previously squadroned 201st Motorized Rifle Division, stationed on the territory of the Tajik SSR and did not have its own staff before the introduction tank regiment, from the 58th Roslavl Motorized Rifle Division, stationed on the territory of the Turkmen SSR.
Except 234th TP The 2nd Motorized Rifle Division will be transferred to the subordination of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division before the entry of troops tank regiment from the 60th Sevsko-Warsaw Red Banner Order of Suvorov tank division of the Moscow Military District - 285th Uman-Warsaw Red Banner Order of Kutuzov 3rd degree tank regiment ( 285th TP).
By September 1, 1980, stationed in Kabul 234th TP will be released to the USSR - 108th Motorized Rifle Division will be without again tank regiment.
And in the period from December 30, 1980 to January 5, 1981, the 285th Tank Regiment (without 1st Tank Battalion remaining to reinforce the 860th separate motorized rifle regiment in the city of Fayzabad) was redeployed to the city of Bagram, Parvan province, and reassigned from the 201st motorized rifle division to the 108th Motorized Rifle Division.

Mobilization of the 285th Tank Regiment, deployment to wartime levels, completion and entry into Afghanistan:

… 285 tp(military unit 77755, Dzerzhinsk, Gorky region) 60th TD, Gorky.

From January 2, 1980, in accordance with the directive of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces 285th TP, at the place of permanent deployment, was transferred to new states, staffed to full strength... and in full force came under the command of the 201st Motorized Rifle Turk. VO, replacing in the division 234th TP...

Fulfilling the order on December 30, 1980 - January 5, 1981 285th TP(without the 1st TB, the commander, Mr. Kuksov, remained to carry out the task in the area of ​​​​Fayzabad, the airfield) made a march along the route Kunduz - Puli-Khumri - Salang - Bagram, concentrated in the area of ​​​​Bagram and came under subordination 108th Motorized Rifle Division...

After withdrawal from Afghanistan

• After February 1989, units and divisions of the division were stationed for permanent deployment in the cities and towns of the Surkhandarya region of the Uzbek SSR in the following composition:

• Headquarters and management of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division - Termez

• 180msp on BMP - Termez

• 177msp on an armored personnel carrier - Termez (fortress)

• 181msp on an armored personnel carrier - village. Uchkizil

• 285tp— Termez ( north gate cities). Reformed from 682msp.

• 1074ap— Termez city (northern gate of the city)

• 1415zrp— Termez city (fortress)
• order

• 738optdn— Termez city (northern gate)

• 781orb— Termez city (northern gate)

• 808obs— Termez

• 271oisb— Termez

• 100omsr— Termez

• 1003obmo— Termez

• 333orvb— Termez city (northern gate)

• 113orxz— Termez city (northern gate)

• Commandant's company— Termez city (fortress)

• 720th training center(later 787th Umsp).

After the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, units and divisions of the division, using the experience of combat operations in mountainous desert areas, were intensively engaged in combat training.
The division continued to provide weapons, equipment, ammunition and military equipment to the Afghan army. For example, on May 15, 1989, a column of 130 T-62 tanks and other equipment passed through the Friendship Bridge, which in the river port of Hairatan were transferred to recruit a tank brigade and a battalion of the Ministry of State Security of Afghanistan. The equipment prepared by the division's specialists successfully reached Kabul and took part in battles against anti-government forces.

The situation with the battle flags

• 108th Motorized Rifle Nevelskaya Twice Red Banner Division in the period from the 60s to December 1993, the Battle Banner of the 360th Nevelskaya Rifle Division of the Order of the Red Banner, on the basis of which it was formed, was used as a Battle Banner.

• The 682nd motorized rifle Uman-Warsaw Red Banner Order of Kutuzov regiment of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division in the period from March 1984 to February 1989 used the Battle Banner of the 285th tank Uman-Warsaw Red Banner Order of the Kutuzov Regiment of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division as a Battle Banner, at the base which was formed.

Heroes of the Soviet Union of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division

“For the courage and heroism shown in providing international assistance to the Republic of Afghanistan, by the Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the internationalist soldiers were awarded”:

• Aushev Ruslan Sultanovich. Website "Heroes of the Country".

• Kremenish Nikolai Ivanovich. Website "Heroes of the Country".

• Shikov Yuri Alekseevich. Website "Heroes of the Country".

• Grinchak Valery Ivanovich. Website "Heroes of the Country".

• Vysotsky Evgeniy Vasilievich. Website "Heroes of the Country".

• Anfinogenov Nikolai Yakovlevich. Website "Heroes of the Country".

• Shakhvorostov Andrey Evgenievich. Website "Heroes of the Country".

• Sokolov Boris Innokentievich. Website "Heroes of the Country".

• Gromov Boris Vsevolodovich. Website "Heroes of the Country".

Commanders of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division

• Kuzmin, Konstantin Aleksandrovich - in December 1979 introduced a division into the DRA,

• Mironov, Valery Ivanovich - 1979-1982

• Ustavshchikov, Grigory Ivanovich - 1982-1983

• Loginov, Viktor Dmitrievich - 1983-1984,

• Skoblov, Valery Nikolaevich - June 1984 - October 1984

• Isaev, Vasily Ivanovich - 1984-1986

• Barynkin, Viktor Mikhailovich - 1986-1988

• Klynkin, Yuri Andreevich - 1988-1989

108th Motorized Rifle Division in the Armed Forces of Uzbekistan

Since January 1992, the division has been part of the Armed Forces of Uzbekistan.
In 1992-1993, the situation in Afghanistan continued to deteriorate, and a civil war began in Tajikistan.
In the current conditions, the leadership of the Republic of Uzbekistan, fulfilling the CSTO Charter, sends units 108th Motorized Rifle Division and the 15th separate special purpose brigade into a joint one, with 201msd RF Armed Forces, combat mission to destroy paramilitary groups of the Tajik opposition and Afghan Mujahideen on the territory of the Republic of Tajikistan.
In December 1993, by Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, in connection with the transition of the troop structure to brigade recruitment, 108th Motorized Rifle Division was disbanded, and its units and units after reorganization became part of 1st Army Corps (1st AK) with headquarters located in Samarkand, some of them transferred to the Central subordination.
The following reorganization of regiments, individual battalions and divisions took place 108th Nevelsk Motorized Rifle Division:

• 180th Motorized Rifle Regiment (180th MSP) reorganized into 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (7th Motorized Rifle Brigade) (military unit 11506), Kokaity village, Surkhandarya region

• 177th Motorized Rifle Regiment reorganized into 3rd Motorized Rifle Brigade(military unit 28803), Navoi

• 181st Motorized Rifle Regiment reorganized into 21st Motorized Rifle Brigade(military unit 36691), Khairabad village, Surkhandarya region

• 285th Tank Regiment in 22nd Motorized Rifle Brigade(military unit 44278), Sherabad, Surkhandarya region

• 1074th Artillery Regiment V 23rd Artillery Brigade(military unit 54831), Angor, Surkhandarya region

• 1415th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment in 193rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade(military unit 25858), Sherabad, Surkhandarya region

• 271st separate engineer battalion V 80th engineer brigade(military unit 93866), Angor, Surkhandarya region

• 738th separate anti-tank division V 6th optdn(military unit 62387), Angor, Surkhandarya region

• 333rd Hotel Repair and Reconstruction Battalion V 101st Orvb(military unit 49976), Sherabad, Surkhandarya region

• 781st Hotel Reconnaissance Battalion V 50th Separate Reconnaissance and Electronic Warfare Battalion (50th electronic warfare regiment or military unit 71308), Termez. Disbanded in 2001.

In 2000, as a result of ongoing reforms in the Ministry of Defense Republic of Uzbekistan, formed Southwestern Special Military District with headquarters in Karshi. 108th Motorized Rifle Division.

It currently includes formations of the former

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“...Today the tanks walked without stopping,

with the crash of shrapnel on the armor,

there are no teachings here, and there are few rainbows

in this undeclared war..."

Introduction

Analyzing the publications of periodicals and major works on the Afghan war of 1979 - 1989, it can be noted that the main characters who attract the attention of the authors are special forces, paratroopers, helicopter pilots, sappers, and finally, motorized riflemen. Tankers and crews of other armored vehicles are usually mentioned in passing, in connection with the combat activities of other branches of the military. There are objective and subjective reasons for this.

With this work we want to restore justice by highlighting, as far as possible, the features of the combat work of armored vehicles in Afghanistan.

The divisions of the Turkestan Military District that entered Afghanistan had a staffing and organizational structure that differed very little from the structure of similar formations in the European theater of operations. Initially, the motorized rifle divisions, as expected, included tank regiments:

234th Tank Regiment in the 201st Division;

24th Guards tank regiment in the 5th division;

285th Tank Regiment in the 108th Division. In total, taking into account the tank battalions of motorized rifle divisions, by 1980 there were 39 tank battalions in Afghanistan. However, already in June 1980, the 234th Tank Regiment was withdrawn to the Union - news tank battles “...in the mountains, tankers could not fully, with maximum effect, use the combat capabilities of their vehicles. In the green zone, the tanks literally got stuck in the rice fields. As a rule, they were used only for protecting objects and during operations on small plains where vehicles could turn around. To carry out combat missions there were enough tank battalions, which were located in the staff of motorized rifle units...”