CARL MANHEIM. (1893-1947)
C. Manheim (Mannheim) Hungarian and German sociologist and social philosopher, the largest representative of the sociology of knowledge, which he created on the basis of a synthesis of the ideas of neo-Kantianism, M. Weber, M. Scheler and Marxism.
According to Mannheim, the task of the sociology of knowledge is to analyze the socio-historical conditioning of thinking - both theoretical and everyday - and to develop a doctrine of "extra-theoretical conditions of knowledge." Analyzing the concept of ideology, he singles out two different meanings in it: “partial” ideology manifests itself where there is a more or less conscious distortion of facts dictated by the social interests of the subject; "total" ideology reflects the originality of the entire structure of consciousness of an entire social group, class or even era. There are two types of collective ideas: ideology proper - the thinking of the dominant social groups, and utopia - the thinking of the oppressed strata. With these concepts, Manheim tries to show the dynamics in the realm of ideas, and most importantly, to make the sociology of knowledge the scientific foundation of politics and political education, thus forming a stronger foundation for democracy. Regarding the attainability of scientific truth, Manheim adheres to "relationalism", according to which knowledge is always relative, since it can only be formulated in relation to a certain socio-historical position. As a researcher, Manheim is one of the forerunners of the "sociological turn" in the philosophy of science.
CM. Solovyov
Fragments from Mannheim's major work, Ideology and Utopia, are quoted from the book:
Manheim K.Diagnosis of our time. M., 1994.
Control over the collective unconscious as a problem of our time
This convergence of science with politics had both negative and positive consequences. It facilitated the dissemination of scientific ideas to such an extent that ever broader strata within the framework of their political existence were forced to strive for a theoretical justification of their positions. In doing so, they learned - though often only in a propagandist way - to think about society and politics in terms of scientific analysis. It was fruitful for political and social science that it came into contact with concrete reality and set itself a theme that served as a permanent link between it and the area of reality within which it acted, i.e. society. The crises and needs of social life created an empirical subject, political and social interpretation and hypotheses, through which social phenomena became accessible to analysis. The theories of Smith and Marx - we limit ourselves to these two theories - were developed and expanded in the course of the attempts of these thinkers to interpret and analyze phenomena from the point of view of the collective experience expressed in them.
The main difficulty with this direct union of theory and politics is that, if it is to properly evaluate new facts, it must always retain its empirical character, while thinking, subject to a political attitude, cannot afford to constantly apply itself to new experience. . For the simple reason that political parties have a certain organization, they cannot use elastic methods of thinking or accept any conclusion they receive as a result of the study. By their structure, these political parties are public corporations and militant organizations. This circumstance alone makes them lean towards dogmatism. And the more intellectuals became party functionaries, the more they lost the receptivity and flexibility they had in their former volatile situation.
Another danger arising from this union of science and politics is that crises of political thought become crises of scientific thought. From the whole range of these problems, we will focus on only one fact, which, however, is very significant for the current situation. Politics is a conflict, and it is increasingly moving towards becoming a life-and-death struggle. The more fierce this struggle became, the more it captured those emotional deep layers that previously had an unconscious, although very intense, impact, and forcibly drew them into the sphere of consciousness.
Political discussion differs sharply in character from scientific discussion. Its goal is not only to prove its case, but also to undermine the roots of the social and intellectual existence of its opponent. Therefore, political discussion penetrates much deeper into the existential basis of thought than those discussions that do not go beyond a few outlined "points of view" and consider only the "theoretical validity" of arguments. In political conflict, which from the very beginning is a rationalized form of struggle for social dominance, the blow is directed against the social status of the opponent, his social prestige and self-confidence. Therefore, it is difficult to decide whether sublimation, the replacement of direct violence and oppression by discussion, has really led to a fundamental improvement in human life. It is true that physical oppression seems at first sight more difficult to endure, but the will to spiritual annihilation, which in many cases has replaced it, is perhaps even more unbearable. Therefore, it is not surprising that it was in this area that the theoretical refutation of the opponent's views gradually transformed into something much more serious, into an attack on his entire life situation, and that the destruction of his theories was an attempt to undermine his social position. There is nothing surprising in the fact that in this conflict, where from the very beginning attention was directed not only to what the opponent says, but also to what group he represents, what practical purpose his words serve, thinking was perceived in combined with the existence with which it was associated. Thought, it is true, has always been an expression of the life and activity of the group (with the exception of the thinking of high academic circles, which for some time succeeded in isolating itself from active life). However, the difference was either - as was the case in religious clashes - that theoretical issues were not of paramount importance, or that, in analyzing the arguments of their opponent, people did not seek to extend this analysis to his group, since, as we have already indicated above, the social elements of intellectual phenomena have not yet become visible to the thinkers of the era of individualism.
Since in modern democracies ideas more clearly express the interests of certain groups, here in political discussions the social and existential predestination of thinking comes out more clearly. In principle, it can be considered that for the first time the sociological method of studying intellectual phenomena began to be applied in politics. It was in political struggle that people first discovered the unconscious collective motivations that have always determined the direction of thought. Political discussion is from the outset something more than a theoretical argument; it takes off the masks, reveals the unconscious motives that connect the existence of the group with its cultural aspirations and theoretical argumentation. As modern politics fought with theoretical weapons, the process of unmasking increasingly extended to the social roots of theory.
Therefore, the discovery of the social roots of thinking took the form of exposure at first. The gradual disintegration of a single objective picture of the world, the disintegration, which in the perception of a simple person from the street took the form of a multitude of conflicting concepts of the universe, and appeared to intellectuals as an irreconcilable multitude of styles of thinking, was joined by an increasingly assertive tendency in the public consciousness to expose unconscious socially determined motivations in group thinking. The aggravation of the intellectual crisis that finally set in can be characterized by two slogan-like concepts, “ideology and utopia,” which, in view of their symbolic meaning, were taken as the title of this book.
The concept of "ideology" reflects one discovery made in the course of political struggle, namely: thinking ruling groups may be so closely related to a particular situation that these groups simply fail to see a number of facts that could undermine their confidence in their dominance. The word "ideology" implicitly contains the understanding that in certain situations the collective unconscious of certain groups hides the actual state of society both from itself and from others and thereby stabilizes it.
concept utopian thinking reflects the opposite discovery, also made in the course of the political struggle, namely that certain oppressed groups are spiritually so interested in the destruction and transformation of the existing society that they involuntarily see only those elements of the situation that are aimed at denying it. Their thinking is not capable of correctly diagnosing the actual state of society. They are not in the least interested in what really exists; they only try to mentally anticipate a change in the existing situation. Their thinking is never directed towards a diagnosis of a situation; it can only serve as a guide to action. In the utopian consciousness, the collective unconscious, guided by illusory ideas and the will to act, hides a number of aspects of reality. It turns away from everything that can shake its faith or paralyze its desire to change the order of things. (S. 38-41)
In order to work in the field of the social sciences, it is necessary to participate in the social process, but this participation in the collective-unconscious striving in no way means that the person participating in it falsifies the facts or misunderstands them. On the contrary, it is participation in the totality of the living ties of social life that is a necessary prerequisite for understanding the inner nature of these living ties. The nature of this involvement of the researcher determines how he formulates his problems. Inattention to qualitative elements and complete disregard for the volitional factor lead not to objectivity, but to the denial of the essential quality of the object. However, the reverse view is also wrong, according to which the degree of objectivity is directly proportional to the degree of partiality. In this area, there is a kind of internal dynamics of types of behavior that inhibit the elan politique [political impulse. - Ed.], as a result of which this elan, as it were, submits itself to intellectual control. There is a point where the movement of life itself, especially in its greatest crisis, rises above itself and recognizes its limits; then the totality of the political problems of ideology and utopia becomes the subject of a sociology of knowledge, and skepticism and relativism, arising from the mutual annihilation and depreciation of various political goals, become a means of salvation. For this skepticism and relativism compels self-criticism and self-control and leads to a new conception of objectivity.
What in life seems so unbearable, namely the need to come to terms with the fact that unconscious impulses are discovered, is historically a prerequisite for scientific critical self-awareness. In personal life, self-control and self-regulation also arise only when we, in our originally blind, vitalistic striving forward, encounter an obstacle that throws us back to ourselves. In the course of collisions with other possible forms of existence, the peculiarity of our way of life becomes clear to us. Even in our personal life, we gain mastery over ourselves only when the unconscious motives that previously acted as if behind our backs suddenly come into our field of vision and thus become subject to conscious control. Objectivity and independence of the worldview are achieved not by giving up the will to act and from one's own value judgments, but through confrontation with oneself and testing oneself. The criterion for such self-clarification is that not only our object, but also ourselves, completely falls into the field of our vision. We begin to see ourselves not only in general terms, as a cognizing subject in general, but in a certain role, up to this moment hidden from us, in a situation up to this moment inaccessible to us, guided by motives, until then we were not aware of. At such moments, we suddenly begin to feel an inner connection between our role, our motives, and the nature and way we perceive the world. Hence the paradox associated with these experiences, which lies in the fact that the possibility of a relative liberation from social determinism increases in proportion to the understanding of this determinism. The people who talk the most about freedom are usually the most blindly socially determined, because they don't even realize in most cases the extent to which their behavior is determined by their interests. On the contrary, it is those who insist on the influence of social determinants, which we are not aware of, who seek to overcome these determinants as far as possible. They bring out unconscious motives so that the forces that previously dominated them can be gradually transformed into an object of conscious decision. (S. 46-47)
Until now we have hidden from ourselves and did not include in our epistemology the fact that, starting from a certain stage, knowledge in the field of political and social sciences differs from formal mechanistic knowledge; this happens at the stage when it goes beyond a simple enumeration of facts and relationships and approaches the model of situationally determined knowledge, which we will repeatedly refer to in this work.
Once the relationship between sociology and situational thinking becomes clear (this has happened, for example, in the field of political orientation), we can feel free to explore the potentialities of this type of thinking, as well as its limits and the dangers associated with it. It is also important that we start from that state of crisis and uncertainty, within which both the danger of this way of thinking and new possibilities of self-criticism were discovered, allowing us to hope for a way out of this state.
If we approach the problem from this point of view, then it is uncertainty, which has become an increasingly unbearable burden in the life of society, that will form the basis that will allow modern sociology to achieve a completely new understanding of the phenomena it studies. It boils down to three main tendencies: first, the tendency to criticize collectively unconscious motivations insofar as they define contemporary social thinking; secondly, to the tendency to create a new type of history of thinking, capable of explaining the change of ideas depending on social and historical changes; thirdly, to the tendency to revise our epistemology, which until now has not sufficiently taken into account the social nature of thinking. In this sense, the sociology of knowledge is systematization that doubt, which in social life finds its expression in a feeling of vague uncertainty and instability. Therefore, the purpose of this book is to give a more precise theoretical formulation of the same problem, considered from different angles, and also to develop a method that, by criteria of increasing precision, will allow us to distinguish and isolate different styles of thinking and relate them to appropriate groups.
There is nothing easier than to say that a certain type of thought is feudal, bourgeois or proletarian, liberal, socialist or conservative, until there is no analytical method by which this assertion can be proven, and criteria have not been developed to allow this proof to be tested. Therefore, the main task of this stage of research is to develop and concretize such hypotheses that can be used as the basis for inductive research. At the same time, the segments of reality that we study must be divided into factors in the process of analysis with much greater accuracy than we used to do in the past. Thus, our goal is, first, to give the analysis of meanings in the realm of thought such a subtlety that it will be possible to replace crude undifferentiated terms and concepts with increasingly precise and detailed characteristics of different styles of thinking; secondly, to bring the technique of reconstructing social history to such a degree of perfection that would allow us to see not isolated facts in their fragmentation, but social structure as a kind of integrity, as an interweaving of interacting social forces, from which various types of observation of the existing reality and its comprehension as they developed in various times. The combination of a semantic analysis of meanings with a sociological definition of the situation creates such opportunities for refinement that, in time, perhaps, will make it possible to approach the methods of the natural sciences. Moreover, the method of the sociology of knowledge will have the advantage that it will not have to ignore the sphere of meaning as uncontrollable; on the contrary, he will turn this interpretation of meaning into a means of achieving greater precision. If the method of interpretation used by the sociology of knowledge reaches such a degree of precision that, by means of increasingly adequate correlations, makes it possible to show the significance of social life for spiritual activity, then this will entail the advantage that the social sciences will no longer have to, in an effort to be precise, refuse to consider extremely important issues. For there is no doubt that the borrowing of natural scientific methods by the social sciences leads to a situation where the object of study is not what one would like to know and what would be of decisive importance for the further development of society, but only those complexes of facts that can be measured using a certain already developed method. Instead of trying, as accurately as possible under the circumstances, to discover what is most important, one is usually satisfied with ascribing significance to what can be measured only because it happens to be available to that measurement. (S. 48-50)
Two directions in epistemology
In one case, they put emphasis on existential determinism and insist that this determinism is necessary element progress of social cognition, which, consequently, one's own position, in all likelihood, is also existentially conditioned and partial. Then the theory of knowledge should be revised and to base it on the thesis of the relational structure of human cognition(just as the perspective of visually perceived objects is unconditionally recognized). (p. 251)
If we accept the thesis about the existential conditioning of thinking, objectivity will mean something completely new and different: a) observers who are within the same system and have the same aspect of vision can, precisely because of the identity of their conceptual and categorical apparatus, come in the course of an unambiguous discussion possible in this case to unambiguous conclusions, and all those deviating from them should be eliminated as an error; b) if aspects of the observation are different, then "objectivity" can only be established indirectly; in this case, an attempt is made to explain the fact that the object is seen correctly, but from two different angles of view, by the difference in the structure of vision, and efforts are made to develop a formula that can combine and reconcile the conclusions obtained from these different perspectives. After such a control formula has been developed, it is no longer difficult to separate deviations, inevitable in various aspects of vision, from arbitrary, incorrect conclusions, which in this case should be considered as errors. (S. 251-252)
You can go the other way, bringing to the fore the following facts: the research impulse can be directed not to the absolutization of existential conditioning, but to the fact that it is in the discovery of existential conditionality existing views to see the first step towards solving the problem itself conditionality visions of being. By qualifying a certain, which considers itself absolute, vision as seeing from a certain point of view, I neutralize its partial character in a certain sense. In most cases, our entire study of this problem has spontaneously moved towards the neutralization of existential conditioning, the possibility of rising above it. In this direction moves the doctrine of the expansion of the basis of vision, capable of integrating and substantiating all partial points of view, the doctrine of the inevitable expansion of horizons and positions (based on experience), the doctrine of an all-encompassing ontology to which one should strive. A similar trend actually exists in spiritual and social history, and it appears in close connection with the processes of group contacts and interpenetration of groups. At the first stage, this tendency leads to the mutual neutralization of various existentially conditioned types of vision (deprives them of their absolute significance); in the second stage it creates a broader and more solid foundation out of this neutralization. At the same time, it is interesting to note that the creation of this broader framework is associated with a higher degree of abstraction and always leads to a formalization of the studied phenomena. This formalization consists in the fact that the analysis of specific qualitative data containing a certain direction is increasingly receding into the background, and a qualitative description of a given object is being replaced by observations of a purely functional nature, a purely mechanical model. This theory of ever-increasing abstraction, combined with distancing from social life, we will call the theory of the social genesis of abstraction. According to this sociological derivation of the roots of abstraction (which is first of all found and traced in the emergence of the sociological point of view), the highest degree of abstraction should be considered as a correlate to the fusion of social groups. This theory finds its justification in the fact that the ability of individuals and groups to abstraction grows as they unite into large groups and organizations, into larger social units capable of absorbing local and other smaller groups. However, this tendency to abstraction at the highest level does not contradict the doctrine of the existential conditionality of thinking, for the adequately ranked subject of this thinking is by no means absolutely free-floating “consciousness in general”, but a subject that more and more embraces (neutralizes) the former partial and concrete points of view. .
All those categories that formal sociology formulates (with good reason) are the product of such neutralization and formalization; however, in the end, this process leads to the fact that the formal mechanism of these formations comes to the fore. So, for example, within the framework of formal sociology, domination is a category that can only be abstracted from the specific positions of the respective parties (i.e., dominant and subordinate) because it does not go beyond the structural connection (as it were, a mechanism) of interacting acts. behavior (in terms of such concepts as submission, power, obedience, coercion, etc.). The qualitative content of concrete domination (which, incidentally, would immediately give this "domination" a historical character) cannot be comprehended here; it could only be adequately described if both the subordinates and the dominators could describe their experiences and their experiences in their social conditioning. For the formal definitions that have been formulated do not hang in the air, but arise from the specific existentially conditioned problematics of the given situation.<...>(p. 252-254) If we follow this train of thought, which in its unformulated relationism is strikingly similar to ours, then the assertion of a logical postulate about the existence and significance of a certain sphere of “truth in itself” will turn out to be as unconvincing an act of thinking as all those named here dualistic ideas about being; for as long as we find everywhere in empirical cognition only that which can be determined relationally, this establishment of a "sphere in itself" has no bearing on the process of cognition. (p. 256)
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Karl Mannheim
Karl Mannheim (March 27, 1893, Budapest - January 9, 1947, London) was a German and English philosopher and sociologist of Hungarian origin, one of the founders of the sociology of knowledge.
From Mannheim's point of view, there are two types of collective representations: ideologies proper - the thinking of the dominant social groups, and utopias - the thinking of the oppressed strata. With these concepts, Mannheim tries to show the dynamics in the realm of ideas, and most importantly, to make the sociology of knowledge the scientific foundation of politics and political education, thus forming a stronger foundation for democracy.
Mannheim's ideas had a great influence on the sociological thought of the West. Although he did not have successors who unconditionally accepted his sociological methodology, Mannheim's specific historical sociological studies are recognized as classics. It can be said that here Mannheim is to a certain extent a forerunner of the "sociological turn" in the philosophy of science, although he does not extend his conclusions to the sphere of natural science knowledge.
Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge can be seen as an impressive scientific-political attempt at the end of the Weimar period to save liberalism by supporting it with a kind of ontological pluralism. According to Mannheim, thinking should distinguish between removable and irremovable contradictions, seek ways to a rational compromise where such is possible, and in other cases instill in people respect for the mystery of "the irremovable roughness of an existential nature."
Karl Mannheim and his contribution to science
Mannheim Studied at the Universities of Budapest, Freiburg, Heidelberg and Paris. Mannheim's views were formed under the influence of the ideas of B. Zalosh, E. Lask, Heinrich Rickert, György Lukacs, Edmund Husserl, Max Weber, Scheler - in the traditions of neo-Kantianism, phenomenology, Marxism (in the interpretation of the early D. Lukacs).
After the fall of the Hungarian Soviet Republic (1919) he emigrated to Germany. From 1925 he was Privatdozent of philosophy at Heidelberg University, from 1929 he was professor of sociology and national economics at the F. Oppenheimer department in Frankfurt.
Since 1933, having emigrated to Great Britain, he lectured on sociology at the London School of Economics and Political Science, since 1941 - at the Institute of Education at the University of London, where in 1945 he became professor of pedagogy. Shortly before his death, he was the head of the UNESCO department. He was the initiator and editor of the "International Library for Sociology and Social Reconstruction", contributed to the constitution of sociology as an academic discipline in England.
The first, "German", period is the most productive from a creative point of view. Mannheim dealt with the problems of interpretation of "spiritual formations", the theory of knowledge, first in line with the philosophy of culture and epistemology, then developed his own philosophical and sociological methodology - the sociology of knowledge, or the sociology of thinking. In further works, Mannheim deepens his sociological methodology, developing its categorical apparatus on specific socio-historical material - he explores the genesis of the conservative style of thinking in Germany, the phenomenon of generational unity, the problems of competition in the spiritual sphere, the essence of ideology and utopian consciousness.
In the second, "English" period, he was mainly engaged in popularizing the sociology of knowledge, developing its ideas in the field of cultural theory, cultural and educational policy. Borrowing the Marxist position on the dependence of social consciousness on social being and the social conditionality of cognition, Mannheim, following Scheler, believed that social being is not reduced only to " economic relations production".
Karl Mannheim gave a talk on "the significance of competition in the spiritual Sphere", in which, as it seemed at first glance, he resorted to the usual
Marxist explanation of "spiritual formations" from the conditions of the social basis. What was provocative for the Marxists, however, was the fact that Mannheim turned the suspicion of "ideology", to which Marxists, as a rule, only subjected their opponents, against them. In doing so, he questioned their claim to possess universal truth. However, such an insult to the Marxists in itself could hardly have caused such a strong and general excitement in the scientific world. Mannheim's speech was provocative primarily because he proposed the principle
according to which, when analyzing "spiritual formations", the question of truth should not be raised at all. From his point of view, in the spiritual realm there are only different "styles of thinking", defined by two types of relations (Mannheim himself called his approach "relational": on the one hand, these styles of thinking are directly related to "natural" and "civilizational" realities, with the other is related to each other.
According to Mannheim, the task of the sociology of knowledge is to analyze the socio-historical conditioning of thinking - both theoretical and everyday - and to develop a doctrine of "extra-theoretical conditions of knowledge." Analyzing the Marxist concept of ideology, he singles out two different meanings in it: “partial” ideology manifests itself where there is a more or less conscious distortion of facts dictated by the social interests of the subject; "total" ideology reflects the originality of the entire structure of consciousness of an entire social group, class or even era.
, sociology
Biography
In the second, "English" period, he was mainly engaged in popularizing the sociology of knowledge, developing its ideas in the field of cultural theory, cultural and educational policy. Having borrowed the Marxist position on the dependence of social consciousness on social being and the social conditionality of cognition, Mannheim, following Scheler, believed that social being is not reduced only to "economic relations of production."
Sociological and philosophical views
Mannheim's ideas had a great influence on the sociological thought of the West. Although he did not have successors who unconditionally accepted his sociological methodology, Mannheim's specific historical sociological studies are recognized as classics (Historical Sociology). It can be said that here Mannheim is to a certain extent a forerunner of the "sociological turn" in the philosophy of science, although he does not extend his conclusions to the sphere of natural science knowledge.
Compositions
- "Ideology and Utopia" (Ideologie und Utopie. Bonn, 1929.)
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- Diagnosis of our time: Wartime essays of a sociologist. - L., 1943.
- Freedom, power and democratic planning. - L., 1950.
- Wissens sociology. Auswahl aus dem Werk. - B. und Newied, 1964.
- Structural analysis of epistemology: Specialist. inform. according to general academic prog. “Man, science, society: complex. research. ": To the XIX World. philosophy congr. / Abbr. per. and foreword. E. Ya. Dodina; Ros. acad. Sciences, INION, All-Union. interdepartmental Center for Human Sciences under the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences. - M.: INION, 1992.
- The problem of intelligence. Studies of its role in the past and present. - M., 1993
- Diagnosis of our time. - M.: Lawyer, 1994.
- Selected works: Sociology of culture. - M.-SPb.: University book, 2000.
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As soon as the curtain rose, everything fell silent in the boxes and stalls, and all the men, old and young, in uniforms and tailcoats, all the women in precious stones on their naked bodies, with greedy curiosity directed all their attention to the stage. Natasha also began to look.On the stage there were even boards in the middle, painted pictures depicting trees stood on the sides, and a canvas on boards was stretched behind. In the middle of the stage were girls in red corsages and white skirts. One, very fat, in a white silk dress, was sitting especially on a low stool, to which a green cardboard was pasted at the back. They all sang something. When they finished their song, the girl in white went up to the prompter's booth, and a man in tight-fitting silk pantaloons on thick legs, with a feather and a dagger, came up to her and began to sing and spread his arms.
The man in tight trousers sang alone, then she sang. Then they both fell silent, the music began to play, and the man began to run his fingers over the hand of the girl in the white dress, obviously waiting for the beat again to begin his part with her. They sang together, and everyone in the theater began to clap and shout, and the man and woman on the stage, who portrayed lovers, began to bow, smiling and spreading their arms.
After the village, and in the serious mood in which Natasha was, all this was wild and surprising to her. She could not follow the progress of the opera, could not even hear the music: she saw only painted cardboard and strangely dressed men and women moving, talking and singing strangely in the bright light; she knew what all this was supposed to represent, but it was all so pretentiously false and unnatural that she felt ashamed of the actors, then laughed at them. She looked around her, at the faces of the spectators, looking for in them the same sense of mockery and bewilderment that was in her; but all the faces were attentive to what was happening on the stage and expressed feigned, as it seemed to Natasha, admiration. "It must be so necessary!" thought Natasha. She alternately looked either at these rows of pomaded heads in the stalls, or at the naked women in the boxes, especially at her neighbor Helen, who, completely undressed, with a quiet and calm smile, without taking her eyes off the stage, feeling the bright light spilled throughout the hall and the warm, crowd-warmed air. Natasha, little by little, began to come into a state of intoxication she had not experienced for a long time. She did not remember what she was and where she was and what was happening before her. She looked and thought, and the strangest thoughts suddenly, without connection, flashed through her head. Now she had the idea of jumping up on the ramp and singing the aria that the actress sang, then she wanted to hook the old man who was sitting not far from her with a fan, then bend over to Helen and tickle her.
At one of the minutes, when everything was quiet on the stage, waiting for the beginning of the aria, the front door of the parterre creaked, on the side where the Rostovs' box was, and the steps of a belated man sounded. "Here he is Kuragin!" whispered Shinshin. Countess Bezukhova, smiling, turned to the incoming person. Natasha looked in the direction of Countess Bezukhova's eyes and saw an unusually handsome adjutant, with a self-confident and at the same time courteous look, approaching their box. It was Anatole Kuragin, whom she had long seen and noticed at the St. Petersburg ball. He was now in the uniform of an aide-de-camp, with one epaulette and an exelbane. He walked with a restrained, valiant gait, which would have been ridiculous if he were not so good-looking and if there were not such an expression of good-natured contentment and merriment on his beautiful face. Despite the fact that the action was going on, he, slowly, slightly jingling his spurs and saber, smoothly and high, carrying his perfumed beautiful head, walked along the carpet of the corridor. Glancing at Natasha, he went up to his sister, put his gloved hand on the edge of her box, shook her head and leaned over to ask something, pointing to Natasha.
Mais charmante! [Very nice!] - he said, obviously about Natasha, as she not only heard, but understood from the movement of his lips. Then he went into the first row and sat down beside Dolokhov, friendly and casually elbowing that Dolokhov, whom others treated so ingratiatingly. He winked merrily, smiled at him and put his foot on the ramp.
How similar brother and sister are! the count said. And how good both are!
Shinshin in an undertone began to tell the count some story of Kuragin's intrigue in Moscow, to which Natasha listened precisely because he said charmante about her.
The first act ended, everyone in the stalls got up, got mixed up and began to walk and go out.
Boris came to the Rostovs' box, accepted congratulations very simply and, raising his eyebrows, with an absent-minded smile, conveyed to Natasha and Sonya the request of his bride to be at her wedding, and left. Natasha, with a cheerful and coquettish smile, talked to him and congratulated on his marriage the same Boris with whom she had been in love before. In the state of intoxication in which she was, everything seemed simple and natural.
Naked Helen sat beside her and smiled the same way at everyone; and Natasha smiled at Boris in exactly the same way.
Helen's box was filled and surrounded on the side of the stalls by the most noble and intelligent men, who seemed to vied with each other to show everyone that they knew her.
Kuragin stood all this intermission with Dolokhov in front of the ramp, looking at the Rostov box. Natasha knew that he was talking about her, and it gave her pleasure. She even turned so that he could see her profile, in her opinion, in the most advantageous position. Before the start of the second act, the figure of Pierre appeared in the stalls, whom the Rostovs had not seen since their arrival. His face was sad, and he had grown even fatter since Natasha had last seen him. He, not noticing anyone, went to the front rows. Anatole went up to him and began to say something to him, looking and pointing to the Rostov box. Pierre, seeing Natasha, perked up and hurriedly, along the rows, went to their bed. Approaching them, he leaned on his elbows and, smiling, spoke for a long time with Natasha. During her conversation with Pierre, Natasha heard a male voice in the box of Countess Bezukhova and for some reason found out that it was Kuragin. She looked back and met his eyes. He looked almost smiling straight into her eyes with such an admiring, affectionate look that it seemed strange to be so close to him, to look at him like that, to be so sure that he liked you, and not to be acquainted with him.
In the second act there were paintings depicting monuments and there was a hole in the canvas depicting the moon, and the lampshades on the ramp were raised, and trumpets and double basses began to play bass, and many people in black robes came out to the right and left. People began to wave their hands, and in their hands they had something like daggers; then some other people came running and began to drag away that girl who was formerly in white, but now in a blue dress. They didn’t drag her away right away, but sang with her for a long time, and then they dragged her away, and behind the scenes they hit something metal three times, and everyone knelt down and sang a prayer. Several times all these actions were interrupted by the enthusiastic cries of the audience.
1893-1947) - German philosopher and sociologist, student of M. Weber, one of the founders of the sociology of knowledge, author of numerous works on education, upbringing and culture. Since 1933 he emigrated to Great Britain. In the center of scientific interests - the study of the essence of ideology and utopian consciousness. According to Mannheim, any ideology is a theorized reflection of the will of the ruling political elite. Ideologies, in turn, always oppose "utopias" - unstable, emotionally colored "spiritual formations" generated by the consciousness of oppositional social groups. Hopes for the preservation of democracy in the era of "mass societies", subject to the danger of establishing a totalitarian regime of the fascist type, Mannheim associated with the existence of a creative intelligentsia in every society. Major works: "Ideology and Utopia" (1929); "Man and Society in the Age of Transformation" (1935); "The Diagnosis of Our Times: Wartime Essays by a Sociologist" (1943).
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Mannheim, Carl
Mannheim (1893-1947)
German philosopher and sociologist, one of the founders of the sociology of knowledge, since 1933 in Great Britain. Based on the Marxist doctrine of ideology, he considered it to be illusory views that justify the status quo and oppose utopia, the false consciousness of the opposition layers. He argued that only the creative intelligentsia, standing outside the classes, was capable of true social cognition, with whom Mannheim pinned hopes for the preservation of democracy in the face of the threat of fascism. Author of Ideology and Utopia (1929), Man and Society in the Age of Transformation (1935), Diagnosis of Our Times: Wartime Essays by a Sociologist (1943). In his work “Ideology and Utopia”, Mannheim emphasized that any ideology is an apology for the existing system, theorized views of a class that has achieved dominance and is interested in maintaining the status quo. "Ideologies" are always opposed by "utopias" - as a rule, insufficiently theorized, emotionally colored "spiritual formations" generated by the consciousness of oppositional, oppressed classes, strata and groups striving for social revenge, and therefore just as subjectively biased as "ideologies ". In essence, "utopias" are no different from "ideologies", since they also strive to "pass off the part for the whole" their one-sided rightness as absolute truth. With the coming to power of previously oppressed layers, "utopias" automatically turn into "ideologies". Mannheim distinguishes and characterizes four ideal-typical forms of utopian consciousness: "Orgiastic chiliasm of the Anabaptists", "liberal-humanistic idea", "conservative idea" and "socialist-communist utopia".
Mannheim(Mannheim) Karl (March 27, 1893, Budapest - January 9, 1947, London) was a German sociologist who formed the original concept of the sociology of knowledge. One of the leading lines in the development of youth theories is connected with the name of Mannheim.
Educated at the Universities of Budapest, Freiburg, Heidelberg, Paris, Mannheim adopted the ideas of at least three mainstreams of social thought for his time, which were Marxism, neo-Kantianism and phenomenology. His scientific views were formed under the influence of such significant and at the same time different thinkers as K. Marx and G. Rickert, D. Lukacs and E. Husserl, M. Weber and M. Scheller. Participated in the establishment of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, after the fall of which he emigrated to Germany in 1919, where he taught at the universities of Heidelberg and Frankfurt. After Hitler came to power in 1933, he emigrated to Great Britain, where he continued teaching sociology at the London School of Economics and Political Science, from 1942 he worked as a professor of pedagogy at the Institute of Education at the University of London, and in last years- at UNESCO.
Mannheim's book "Ideology and Utopia" (Mannheim, 1929) gained particular fame, in which he interpreted ideologies as an apologetic justification by the ruling class of their power and utopias as spiritual formations generated by the oppositional forces of society (oppressed classes and other social groups striving to establish their own power). With the coming to power of the opposition, utopias naturally turn into ideologies. This concept had a great influence on the sociological and political thought of the West and at the same time was actively criticized by Marxists. 
In modern sociology of youth, special importance is attached to Mannheim's article "The Problem of Generations" (Mannheim, 1928; Mannheim, 2000), in which he showed that a generation is an integrity that is characterized by a certain "position", a specific "relationship" and a certain "unity" (Generationslagerung, Generationszusammengang, Generationseinheit). Each generation thus has its own spatio-temporal dimension, and consideration of a generation can give a valid result if it takes into account its "historical-cultural space".
This position is developed in Mannheim's book "The Diagnosis of Our Time" (Mannheim, 1943). One of the chapters of this book, which has become an important theoretical guide for a huge number of researchers on youth topics, is completely devoted to the problem of youth in modern society. Mannheim reports that this chapter was written in April 1941 as an opening speech for a conference on the new education at Oxford. In May of the same year it was given as a lecture at the Masaryk Association in Oxford and in July at a Youth Leadership Conference in Oxford organized by the Ministry of Education (Manheim 1994: 413). The author substantiates the sociological approach to youth, the novelty of which, according to Mannheim, is as follows: “Firstly, sociology no longer considers education and training as purely timeless and timeless methods, but attaches great importance to the specific nature of the society in which young people are brought up and in whose life it will have to contribute... the picture will be sufficiently complete only when the general approach is combined with an analysis of the historical setting and the specific conditions in which the youth will have to act. Secondly, the novelty of the approach lies in the fact that youth and society are considered in interaction. This means that the answer to the question of what and how to teach young people depends to a large extent on the nature of the contribution that society expects from young people. Within a society, we cannot formulate the needs of young people in the abstract, we must do so taking into account the needs and requirements of this society” (Mannheim, 1994: 441–442).
Mannheim shows the variability of the value of youth in society, depending on its character and social structure. Youth is one of the hidden resources that every society has and on whose mobilization its viability depends (ibid.: 443).
Mannheim draws important conclusions:
1. Dynamic societies rely on connection with youth. The special function of youth is that it is “a revitalizing mediator, a kind of reserve that comes to the fore when such revitalization becomes necessary to adapt to rapidly changing or qualitatively new circumstances” (ibid.: 444).
2. The function of the revitalizing mediator of social life, which youth performs, has its important element(“besides the spirit of adventurism that young people have to a greater extent”) incomplete inclusion in the status quo of society.
3. “Young people are neither progressive nor conservative in nature, they are a potency ready for any undertaking” (ibid.: 445).
The conceptual strength of the provisions put forward by Mannheim was determined by his careful observation of the processes in the youth movement in Germany, then Great Britain. For sociologists of non-Marxist orientation, Mannheim performed essentially the same role as Marx, Engels, Lenin, Gramsci did for Marxist sociologists: he became the source of a number of new concepts of youth. At the same time, between the positions of Marx, on the one hand, and Mannheim, on the other, in understanding youth issues, differences can be found in a rather narrow zone of some initial philosophical principles. In the main, Mannheim follows Marx: he recognizes the dependence of social consciousness on social being and the social conditioning of knowledge. But in his concept, the questions of the correlation of generations, the functionality of youth in the social system are more widely posed, the provision on the qualities of youth as a social resource and the possibilities of its implementation has acquired a conceptual character (Kovaleva, Lukov, 1999: 83; Lukov, 2012: 246).
Op.: Mannheim, K. (1928) Das Problem der Generationen // Kölner Vierteljahreshefte für Soziologie. Nr. 7. S. 158–187; Mannheim, K. (1929) Ideologie und Utopie. Bonn: Friedrich Cohen. XV, 250 S.; Mannheim, K. (1943) Diagnosis of our time: wartime essays of a sociologist. London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & co., ltd. xi, 179 p.; Manheim, K. (1994) Diagnosis of our time: trans. with him. and English. / Ch. ed. and comp. series S. Ya. Levit. M.: Lawyer. 700 s.; Mannheim, K. (2000) The problem of generations // Mannheim, K. Essays on the sociology of knowledge: The problem of generations. Competitiveness. Economic ambitions: per. from English. / INION RAN. M., 2000. 164 p. pp. 8–63.
Lit.: Kettler, D., Meija, F. (2003) Karl Mannheim // German Sociology / ed. ed. R. P. Shpakova. SPb. : Nauka, 2003. 562 p. pp. 275–288; , AI, Lukov, VA (1999) Sociology of youth: Theoretical questions. M.: Sotsium. 351 p.; Lukov, V. A. (2012) Theories of Youth: An Interdisciplinary Analysis. M. : Canon + ROOI "Rehabilitation". 528 p.
