Battle of Kursk. Chronology of FAME.
If the Battle of Moscow was an example of heroism and dedication, when there was really nowhere to retreat, and the Battle of Stalingrad forced Berlin to plunge into mournful tones for the first time, then it finally announced to the world that now the German soldier would only retreat. Not a single piece of native land will be given to the enemy again! It is not for nothing that all historians, both civilian and military, agree on the same opinion - Battle of Kursk finally predetermined the outcome of the Great Patriotic War, and with it the outcome of the Second World War. There is no doubt that the significance of the Battle of Kursk was correctly understood by the entire world community.
Before approaching this heroic page of our Motherland, let’s make a small footnote. Today, and not only today, Western historians attribute the victory in World War II to the Americans, Montgomery, Eisenhower, but not to the heroes of the Soviet army. We must remember and know our history, and we must be proud that we belong to the peoples who saved the world from a terrible disease - fascism!
1943. The war is moving into a new phase, the strategic initiative is already in the hands of the Soviet army. Everyone understands this, including the German staff officers, who, nevertheless, are developing a new offensive. The last offensive of the German army. In Germany itself, things are no longer as rosy as they were at the beginning of the war. The Allies land in Italy, the Greek and Yugoslav forces are gaining strength, and all positions in North Africa are lost. And the vaunted German army itself has already undergone changes. Now everyone is being herded under arms. The notorious Aryan type of the German soldier is diluted by all nationalities. The Eastern Front is every German's worst nightmare. And only the possessed Goebbels continues to preach about the invincibility of German weapons. But does anyone except himself and the Fuhrer believe in this?
The Battle of Kursk is a prelude.
It can be said that Battle of Kursk in brief characterized a new round in the distribution of forces on the eastern front. The Wehrmacht needed a victory, it needed a new offensive. And it was planned in the Kursk direction. The German offensive was codenamed Operation Citadel. It was planned to launch two strikes on Kursk from Orel and Kharkov, encircle the Soviet units, defeat them and launch a further offensive to the south. It is characteristic that the German generals still continued to plan the defeat and encirclement of Soviet units, although quite recently they themselves were surrounded and completely destroyed at Stalingrad. The eyes of the staff officers became blurred, or the directives from the Fuhrer became something akin to the orders of the Almighty.
Photos of German tanks and soldiers before the start of the Battle of Kursk
The Germans gathered huge forces for the offensive. About 900 thousand soldiers, more than 2 thousand tanks, 10 thousand guns and 2 thousand aircraft.
However, the situation in the first days of the war was no longer possible. The Wehrmacht had no numerical, no technical, and most importantly, no strategic advantage. From the Soviet side in Battle of Kursk More than one million soldiers, 2 thousand aircraft, almost 19 thousand guns and about 2 thousand tanks were ready to join. And, most importantly, the strategic and psychological superiority of the Soviet army was no longer in doubt.
The plan to counter the Wehrmacht was simple and at the same time absolutely brilliant. The plan was to bleed the German army dry in heavy defensive battles and then launch a counteroffensive. The plan worked brilliantly, as she showed herself .
Reconnaissance and the Battle of Kursk.
Admiral Canaris, head of the Abwehr - German military intelligence, never suffered so many professional defeats as during the war on the eastern front. Well-trained agents, saboteurs and spies of the Abwehr, and on the Kursk Bulge they went astray. Having learned nothing about the plans of the Soviet command or the disposition of troops, the Abwehr became an involuntary witness to another triumph of Soviet intelligence. The fact is that the plan for the German offensive was already on the table of the commanders of the Soviet troops in advance. Day, start time of the offensive, all Operation Citadel were known. Now all that remained was to position the mousetrap and slam the trap shut. A game of cat and mouse began. And how can one not resist saying that our troops were now the cat?!
The Battle of Kursk is the beginning.
And so it all began! The morning of July 5, 1943, the silence over the steppes is living out the last moments, someone is praying, someone is writing the last lines of a letter to their beloved, someone is simply enjoying another moment of life. A few hours before the German offensive, a wall of lead and fire collapsed on the Wehrmacht positions. Operation Citadel received the first hole. An artillery strike was carried out along the entire front line on German positions. The essence of this warning strike was not so much in causing damage to the enemy, but in psychology. Psychologically broken German troops went on the attack. The original plan was no longer working. In a day of stubborn fighting, the Germans were able to advance 5-6 kilometers! And these are unsurpassed tacticians and strategists, whose savvy boots trampled European soil! Five kilometers! Every meter, every centimeter of Soviet land was given to the aggressor with incredible losses, with inhuman labor.
The main blow of the German troops fell in the direction of Maloarkhangelsk - Olkhovatka - Gnilets. The German command sought to get to Kursk along the shortest route. However, it was not possible to break the 13th Soviet Army. The Germans threw up to 500 tanks into battle, including new development, heavy tank "Tiger". It was not possible to disorient the Soviet troops with a wide offensive front. The retreat was well organized, the lessons of the first months of the war were taken into account, and the German command was unable to offer anything new in offensive operations. And it was no longer possible to count on the high morale of the Nazis. Soviet soldiers defended their country, and the warrior-heroes were simply invincible. How can we not remember the Prussian king Frederick II, who was the first to say that a Russian soldier can be killed, but impossible to defeat! Maybe if the Germans had listened to their great ancestor, this catastrophe called the World War would not have happened.
Photo of the Battle of Kursk (on the left, Soviet soldiers are fighting from a German trench, on the right, the attack of Russian soldiers)
First day of the Battle of Kursk was coming to an end. It was already clear that the Wehrmacht had lost the initiative. The General Staff demanded that the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Kluge, introduce reserves and second echelons! But this is only one day!
At the same time, the forces of the Soviet 13th Army were replenished with reserves, and the command of the central front decided to launch a retaliatory counterattack on the morning of July 6th.
The Battle of Kursk is a confrontation.
The Russian commanders responded with dignity to the German staff officers. And if one German mind was already left in the cauldron at Stalingrad, then Kursk Bulge German generals were opposed by equally talented military leaders.
German Operation Citadel was supervised by two most talented generals, this cannot be taken away from them, Field Marshal von Kluge and General Erich von Manstein. The coordination of the Soviet fronts was carried out by Marshals G. Zhukov and A. Vasilevsky. The fronts were directly commanded by: Rokossovsky - Central Front, N. Vatutin - Voronezh Front, and I. Konev - Steppe Front.
Lasted only six days Operation Citadel, for six days the German units tried to move forward, and all these six days the steadfastness and courage of an ordinary Soviet soldier thwarted all the enemy’s plans.
On July 12, she found a new, full-fledged owner. Troops of two Soviet fronts, Bryansk and Western, began an offensive operation against German positions. This date can be taken as the beginning of the end of the Third Reich. From that day until the end of the war, German weapons no longer knew the joy of victory. Now the Soviet army was fighting an offensive war, a war of liberation. During the offensive, the cities were liberated: Orel, Belgorod, Kharkov. German attempts to counterattack had no success. It was no longer the power of weapons that determined the outcome of the war, but its spirituality, its purpose. Soviet heroes they liberated their land, and nothing could stop this force; it seemed that the earth itself was helping the soldiers, going and going, liberating city after city, village after village.
It went on for 49 days and nights fierce battle on the Kursk Bulge, and at this time the future of each of us was completely determined.
Kursk Bulge. Photo of Russian infantrymen going into battle under the cover of a tank
Battle of Kursk. Photos of the greatest tank battle
Battle of Kursk. Photo of Russian infantrymen against the background of a destroyed German Tiger tank
Battle of Kursk. Photo of a Russian tank against the background of a destroyed "tiger"
The Battle of Kursk is the greatest tank battle.
Neither before nor after, the world has known such a battle. More than 1,500 tanks on both sides throughout the entire day of July 12, 1943, fought the hardest battles on a narrow patch of land near the village of Prokhorovka. Initially, inferior to the Germans in the quality of tanks and in quantity, Soviet tankers covered their names with endless glory! People burned in tanks, were blown up by mines, the armor could not withstand German shells, but the battle continued. At that moment nothing else existed, neither tomorrow nor yesterday! The dedication of the Soviet soldier, who once again surprised the world, did not allow the Germans to either win the battle itself or strategically improve their positions.
Battle of Kursk. Photos of destroyed German self-propelled guns
Battle of Kursk! Photo of a destroyed German tank. Work by Ilyin (inscription)
Battle of Kursk. Photo of a destroyed German tank
Battle of Kursk. In the photo, Russian soldiers inspect a damaged German self-propelled gun
Battle of Kursk. In the photo, Russian tank officers inspect the holes in the "tiger"
Battle of Kursk. I'm happy with the work! The face of a hero!
Battle of Kursk - Results
Operation Citadel showed the world that Hitler's Germany was no longer capable of aggression. The turning point of the Second World War, according to absolutely all historians and military experts, came precisely at Kursk Bulge. Underestimate meaning of Kursk battles are difficult.
While German troops suffered huge losses on the eastern front, they had to be replenished by transferring reserves from other parts of conquered Europe. It is not surprising that the Anglo-American landing in Italy coincided with Battle of Kursk. Now the war has come to Western Europe.
The German army itself was completely and irrevocably broken psychologically. Talk about the superiority of the Aryan race came to naught, and the representatives of this very race themselves were no longer demigods. Many remained lying in the endless steppes near Kursk, and those who survived no longer believed that the war would be won. The time has come to think about protecting our own “Fatherland”. So, all of us who are now living can proudly say that Battle of Kursk in brief and definitely proved once again that strength does not lie in anger and the desire for aggression, strength lies in love for the Motherland!
Battle of Kursk. Photo of a shot down "tiger"
Battle of Kursk. The photo shows a damaged self-propelled gun from a direct hit from a bomb dropped from an airplane
Battle of Kursk. Photo of a killed German soldier
Kursk Bulge! In the photo, a killed crew member of a German self-propelled gun
We continue the topic of the Kursk Bulge, but first I wanted to say a few words. Now I have moved on to the material about the losses of equipment in our and German units. Ours were significantly higher, especially in the Battle of Prokhorov. The reasons for the losses suffered by the 5th Guards Tank Army of Rotmistrov, was dealt with by a special commission created by Stalin's decision, chaired by Malenkov. In the commission's report, in August 1943, the fighting Soviet troops July 12 near Prokhorovka is called an example of an unsuccessful operation. And this is a fact that is not at all victorious. In this regard, I would like to provide you with several documents that will help you understand the reason for what happened. I especially want you to pay attention to Rotmistrov’s report to Zhukov dated August 20, 1943. Although it sins in places against the truth, it still deserves attention.
This is only a small part of what explains our losses in that battle...
"Why was the Battle of Prokhorovsk won by the Germans, despite the numerical superiority of Soviet forces? The answer is provided by combat documents, links to the full texts of which are given at the end of the article.
29th Tank Corps :
“The attack began without artillery bombardment of the occupied line by pr-kom and without air cover.
This made it possible for the pr-ku to open concentrated fire on the battle formations of the corps and bomb tanks and motorized infantry with impunity, which led to large losses and a decrease in the tempo of the attack, and this in turn made it possible for the pr-ku to conduct more effective artillery and tank fire from the spot . The terrain for the offensive was not favorable due to its ruggedness; the presence of hollows impassable for tanks to the northwest and southeast of the PROKHOROVKA-BELENIKHINO road forced the tanks to press against the road and open their flanks, without being able to cover them.
Individual units that took the lead, even approaching the storage facility. KOMSOMOLETS, having suffered heavy losses from artillery fire and tank fire from ambushes, retreated to the line occupied by the fire forces.
There was no air cover for the advancing tanks until 13.00. From 13.00 cover was provided by groups of fighters from 2 to 10 aircraft.
With the tanks coming out to the front line of the defense from the forest in the north. STORZHEVOYE and eastern. env. STORDOZHEVOYE pr. opened hurricane fire from ambushes of Tiger tanks, self-propelled guns and anti-tank guns. The infantry was cut off from the tanks and forced to lie down.
Having broken through into the depths of the defense, the tanks suffered heavy losses.
Units of the brigade, supported by a large number of aircraft and tanks, launched a counterattack and parts of the brigade were forced to withdraw.
During the attack on the front line of the tank, self-propelled guns, operating in the first echelon of tank battle formations and even breaking out ahead of the tanks, suffered losses from the tank's anti-tank fire (eleven self-propelled guns were put out of action)."
18th Tank Corps :
“Enemy artillery fired intensely at the corps’ battle formations.
The corps, lacking adequate support from fighter aircraft and suffering heavy losses from artillery fire and intense air bombardment (by 12:00, enemy aircraft had carried out up to 1,500 sorties), slowly moved forward.
The terrain in the corps' zone of action is crossed by three deep ravines running from the left bank of the river. PSEL to railway station BELENIKHINO - PROKHOROVKA, why the 181st, 170th tank brigades advancing in the first echelon were forced to operate on the left flank of the corps line near a strong enemy stronghold. OCTOBER. The 170th Tank Brigade, operating on the left flank, had lost up to 60% of its combat equipment by 12.00.
By the end of the day, the enemy launched a frontal attack of tanks from the area of KOZLOVKA, GREZNOE with a simultaneous attempt to bypass the battle formations of the corps units from the direction of KOZLOVKA, POLEZHAEV, using their Tiger tanks and self-propelled guns, intensively bombarding the battle formations from the air.
Carrying out the assigned task, 18th Tank Corps encountered a well-organized, strong enemy anti-tank defense with pre-buried tanks and assault guns at the line of heights 217.9, 241.6.
In order to avoid unnecessary losses in personnel and equipment, by my order No. 68, parts of the corps went on the defensive at the achieved lines.""
"The car is on fire"
Battlefield on the Kursk Bulge. In the foreground on the right is a damaged Soviet T-34
T-34 shot down in the Belgorod area and a tanker killed
T-34 and T-70, shot down during the battle on the Kursk Bulge. 07.1943
Destroyed T-34s during the battle for the Oktyabrsky state farm
Burnt T-34 “For Soviet Ukraine” in the Belgorod area. Kursk Bulge. 1943
MZ "Li", 193rd separate tank regiment. Central Front, Kursk Bulge, July 1943.
MZ "Li" - "Alexander Nevsky", 193rd separate tank regiment. Kursk Bulge
Destroyed Soviet light tank T-60
Destroyed T-70 and BA-64 from the 29th Tank Corps
OWL SECRET
Instance No. 1
TO THE FIRST DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR UNION - MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION
Comrade Zhukov
In tank battles and battles from July 12 to August 20, 1943, the 5th Guards Tank Army encountered exclusively new types of enemy tanks. Most of all on the battlefield there were T-V (Panther) tanks, a significant number of T-VI (Tiger) tanks, as well as modernized T-III and T-IV tanks.
Commanding tank units from the first days Patriotic War I am forced to report to you that our tanks today have lost their superiority over enemy tanks in armor and weapons.
The armament, armor and fire targeting of German tanks became much higher, and only the exceptional courage of our tankers and the greater saturation of tank units with artillery did not give the enemy the opportunity to fully exploit the advantages of their tanks. The presence of powerful weapons, strong armor and good sighting devices on German tanks puts our tanks at a clear disadvantage. The efficiency of using our tanks is greatly reduced and their breakdown increases.
The battles I conducted in the summer of 1943 convince me that even now we can successfully conduct a maneuverable tank battle on our own, taking advantage of the excellent maneuverability of our T-34 tank.
When the Germans go over to the defensive with their tank units, at least temporarily, they thereby deprive us of our maneuvering advantages and, on the contrary, begin to fully use the effective range of their tank guns, while at the same time being almost completely out of reach from our aimed tank fire .
Thus, in a collision with German tank units that had gone over to the defensive, we, as general rule, we suffer huge losses in tanks and have no success.
The Germans, having opposed our T-34 and KV tanks with their T-V (Panther) and T-VI (Tiger) tanks, no longer experience the former fear of tanks on the battlefields.
T-70 tanks simply cannot be allowed into tank battles, since they are more than easily destroyed by fire from German tanks.
We have to admit with bitterness that our tank equipment, apart from the introduction into service self-propelled units SU-122 and SU-152, during the war years, did not give anything new, and there were shortcomings on the tanks of the first production, such as: imperfection of the transmission group (main clutch, gearbox and side clutches), extremely slow and uneven rotation of the turret , exceptionally poor visibility and cramped crew accommodation have not been completely eliminated to this day.
If our aviation during the years of the Patriotic War, according to its tactical and technical data, has been steadily moving forward, producing more and more advanced aircraft, then unfortunately the same cannot be said about our tanks.
Now the T-34 and KV tanks have lost the first place that they rightfully had among the tanks of the warring countries in the first days of the war.
Back in December 1941, I captured a secret instruction from the German command, which was written on the basis of field tests of our KV and T-34 tanks conducted by the Germans.
As a result of these tests, the instructions read approximately the following: German tanks they cannot conduct a tank battle with Russian KV and T-34 tanks and must avoid tank battles. When meeting Russian tanks, it was recommended to take cover with artillery and transfer the actions of tank units to another section of the front.
And, indeed, if we recall our tank battles in 1941 and 1942, then it can be argued that the Germans usually did not engage us in battle without the help of other branches of the military, and if they did, it was with a multiple superiority in the number of their tanks, which it was not difficult for them to achieve in 1941 and in 1942.
On the basis of our T-34 tank - the best tank in the world at the beginning of the war, the Germans in 1943 managed to produce an even more improved T-V tank"Panther"), which is essentially a copy of our T-34 tank, is significantly superior in quality to the T-34 tank and especially in the quality of weapons.
To characterize and compare our and German tanks, I provide the following table:
| Tank brand and control system | Nose armor in mm. | Turret front and stern | Board | Stern | Roof, bottom | Gun caliber in mm. | Col. shells. | Speed max. |
| T-34 | 45 | 95-75 | 45 | 40 | 20-15 | 76 | 100 | 55,0 |
| T-V | 90-75 | 90-45 | 40 | 40 | 15 | 75x) | ||
| KV-1S | 75-69 | 82 | 60 | 60 | 30-30 | 76 | 102 | 43,0 |
| T-V1 | 100 | 82-100 | 82 | 82 | 28-28 | 88 | 86 | 44,0 |
| SU-152 | 70 | 70-60 | 60 | 60 | 30-30 | 152 | 20 | 43,0 |
| Ferdinand | 200 | 160 | 85 | 88 | 20,0 |
x) The barrel of a 75 mm gun is 1.5 times longer than the barrel of our 76 mm gun and the projectile has a significantly higher initial velocity.
I, as an ardent patriot of tank forces, ask you, Comrade Marshal Soviet Union, to break the conservatism and arrogance of our tank designers and production workers and will raise with all urgency the question of the mass production of new tanks by the winter of 1943, superior in their combat qualities and design to the currently existing types of German tanks.
In addition, I ask you to dramatically improve the equipment of tank units with evacuation means.
The enemy, as a rule, evacuates all his damaged tanks, and our tankers are often deprived of this opportunity, as a result of which we lose a lot in terms of tank recovery time. At the same time, in those cases when the tank battlefield remains with the enemy for some period, our repairmen find shapeless piles of metal instead of their damaged tanks, since this year the enemy, leaving the battlefield, blows up all our damaged tanks.
TROOPER COMMANDER
5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY
GUARDS LIEUTENANT GENERAL
TANK FORCES -
(ROMISTROV) Signature.
Active Army.
=========================
RCHDNI, f. 71, op. 25, building 9027с, l. 1-5
Something I would definitely like to add:
"One of the reasons for the staggering losses of the 5th Guards TA is also the fact that approximately a third of its tanks were light T-70. Front hull armor - 45 mm, turret armor - 35 mm. Armament - 45 mm 20K cannon, model 1938, armor penetration 45 mm at a distance of 100 m (one hundred meters!). Crew - two people. These tanks had nothing to catch at all on the field near Prokhorovka (although, of course, they could damage a German tank of the Pz-4 class and older, driving up point-blank and working in “woodpecker” mode... if you persuade the German tankers to look in the other direction; well, or an armored personnel carrier, if you’re lucky enough to find one, drive it into the field with a pitchfork). There is nothing to catch in the framework of an oncoming tank battle, of course - if they were lucky enough to break through the defenses, then they could quite successfully support their infantry, which is, in fact, what they were created for.
One should also not discount the general lack of training of the personnel of the 5th TA, which received reinforcements literally on the eve of the Kursk operation. Moreover, both ordinary tank crews and junior/middle-level commanders are untrained. Even in this suicidal attack it was possible to achieve best results, observing proper formation - which, alas, was not observed - everyone rushed into the attack in a heap. Including self-propelled guns, which have no place at all in attacking formations.
Well, and most importantly - monstrous ineffective work of repair and evacuation teams. This was generally very bad until 1944, but in this case the 5th TA simply failed on a massive scale. I don’t know how many were on the BREM staff by that time (and whether they were even in its combat formations in those days - they might have forgotten in the rear), but they couldn’t cope with the job. Khrushchev (then a member of the Military Council of the Voronezh Front), in a report on July 24, 1943 to Stalin about the tank battle near Prokhorovka, writes: “When the enemy retreats, specially created teams evacuate their damaged tanks and other materiel, and everything that cannot be taken out, including ours tanks and our materiel, burns and explodes. As a result, the damaged materiel captured by us in most cases cannot be repaired, but can be used as scrap metal, which we will try to evacuate from the battlefield in the near future" (RGASPI, f. 83, op.1, d.27, l.2)
………………….
And a little more to add. Regarding the general situation with command and control of troops.
The point is also that German reconnaissance aircraft discovered in advance the approach to Prokhorovka of the 5th Guards TA and 5th Guards A formations, and it was possible to establish that on July 12, near Prokhorovka, Soviet troops would go on the offensive, so the Germans especially strengthened the anti-tank missile defense on the left flank of the division." Adolf Hitler" 2nd SS Panzer Corps. They, in turn, were going to, after repelling the advance of the Soviet troops, go on a counteroffensive and encircle the Soviet troops in the Prokhorovka area, so the Germans concentrated their tank units on the flanks of the 2nd SS Tank Tank, and not in the center. This led to the fact that on July 12, the 18th and 29th Tank Tank had to attack the most powerful German anti-tank tanks head-on, which is why they suffered such heavy losses. In addition, German tank crews repelled the attacks of Soviet tanks with fire from the spot.
In my opinion, the best that Rotmistrov could have done in such a situation was to try to insist on canceling the counterattack on July 12 near Prokhorovka, but no traces were found that he even tried to do this. Here the difference in approaches is especially clearly evident when comparing the actions of the two commanders of tank armies - Rotmistrov and Katukov (for those who are bad with geography, let me clarify - Katukov’s 1st Tank Army occupied positions west of Prokhorovka at the Belaya-Oboyan line).
The first disagreements between Katukov and Vatutin arose on July 6. The front commander gives the order to launch a counterattack with the 1st Tank Army together with the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps in the direction of Tomarovka. Katukov sharply replies that, given the qualitative superiority of German tanks, this is disastrous for the army and will cause unjustified losses. The best way combat is maneuverable defense using tank ambushes, allowing you to shoot enemy tanks from short distances. Vatutin does not cancel the decision. Further events occur as follows (I quote from the memoirs of M.E. Katukov):
“Reluctantly, I gave the order to launch a counterattack. ... Already the first reports from the battlefield near Yakovlevo showed that we were doing not at all what was needed. As one would expect, the brigades suffered serious losses. With pain in my heart, I saw NP, how thirty-fours burn and smoke.
It was necessary to achieve the cancellation of the counterattack at all costs. I hurried to the command post, hoping to urgently contact General Vatutin and once again report to him my thoughts. But he had barely crossed the threshold of the hut when the communications chief reported in a particularly significant tone:
From Headquarters... Comrade Stalin. Not without excitement, I picked up the phone.
Hello, Katukov! - a well-known voice rang out. - Report the situation!
I told the Commander-in-Chief what I saw on the battlefield with my own eyes.
“In my opinion,” I said, “we were too hasty with the counterattack.” The enemy has large unspent reserves, including tank reserves.
What are you offering?
For now, it is advisable to use tanks to fire from a spot, burying them in the ground or placing them in ambushes. Then we could bring enemy vehicles to a distance of three to four hundred meters and destroy them with targeted fire.
Stalin was silent for some time.
“Okay,” he said, “you won’t launch a counterattack.” Vatutin will call you about this."
As a result, the counterattack was canceled, the tanks of all units ended up in the trenches, and July 6 became the darkest day for the 4th German Tank Army. During the day of fighting, 244 German tanks were destroyed (48 tanks lost 134 tanks and 2 SS tanks - 110). Our losses amounted to 56 tanks (mostly in their formations, so there were no problems with their evacuation - I again emphasize the difference between a knocked out tank and a destroyed one). Thus, Katukov’s tactics fully justified themselves.
However, the command of the Voronezh Front did not draw any conclusions and on July 8 issued a new order to carry out a counterattack; only 1 TA (due to the stubbornness of its commander) was tasked not to attack, but to hold positions. The counterattack is carried out by 2 Tank Corps, 2 Guards Tank Corps, 5 Tank Corps and separate tank brigades and regiments. The result of the battle: the loss of three Soviet corps - 215 tanks irretrievably, the loss of German troops - 125 tanks, of which 17 were irretrievable. Now, on the contrary, the day of July 8 becomes the darkest day for the Soviet tank forces, in terms of its losses it is comparable to the losses in the Battle of Prokhorov.
Of course, there is no particular hope that Rotmistrov would be able to push through his decision, but it was at least worth a try!
It should be noted that limiting the battles near Prokhorovka only on July 12 and only to the attack of the 5th Guards TA is unlawful. After July 12, the main efforts of the 2nd SS Tank Tank and 3rd Tank Tank were aimed at encircling the divisions of the 69th Army, southwest of Prokhorovka, and although the command of the Voronezh Front managed to withdraw the personnel of the 69th Army from the resulting pocket in time, however, most of the weapons and they had to give up technology. That is, the German command managed to achieve very significant tactical success, weakening the 5 Guards A and 5 Guards TA and for some time depriving the 69 A of combat effectiveness. After July 12, on the German side there were actually attempts to encircle and inflict maximum damage on the Soviet troops (in order to calmly begin withdraw your forces to the previous front line). After which the Germans, under the cover of strong rearguards, quite calmly withdrew their troops to the lines they occupied until July 5, evacuating the damaged equipment and subsequently restoring it.
At the same time, the decision of the command of the Voronezh Front from July 16 to switch to a stubborn defense on the occupied lines becomes completely incomprehensible, when the Germans are not only not going to attack, but, on the contrary, are gradually withdrawing their forces (in particular, the “Totenkopf” division actually began withdrawing on July 13 ). And when it was established that the Germans were not advancing, but were retreating, it was already too late. That is, it was already too late to quickly catch the Germans’ tail and peck them in the back of the head.
It seems that the command of the Voronezh Front had little idea of what was happening at the front in the period from July 5 to 18, which manifested itself in a too slow reaction to the rapidly changing situation at the front. The texts of orders for advancement, attack or redeployment are replete with inaccuracies and uncertainties; they lack information about the opposing enemy, its composition and intentions, and there is no at least approximate information about the outline of the front line. A significant part of the orders in the Soviet troops during the Battle of Kursk was given “over the heads” of subordinate commanders, and the latter were not informed about this, wondering why and why the units subordinate to them were carrying out some incomprehensible actions.
So it is not surprising that the chaos in the units was sometimes indescribable:
So on July 8, the Soviet 99th Tank Brigade of the 2nd Tank Corps attacked the Soviet 285th Infantry Regiment of the 183rd Infantry Division. Despite the attempts of the commanders of the units of the 285th regiment to stop the tankers, they continued to crush the soldiers and fire guns at the 1st battalion of the said regiment (result: 25 people were killed and 37 wounded).
On July 12, the Soviet 53rd Guards Separate Tank Regiment of the 5th Guards TA (sent as part of the combined detachment of Major General K.G. Trufanov to help the 69th Army) without accurate information about the location of its own and the Germans and without sending forward reconnaissance (into battle without reconnaissance - this is close and understandable to us), the tankers of the regiment immediately opened fire on the battle formations of the Soviet 92nd Infantry Division and the tanks of the Soviet 96th Tank Brigade of the 69th Army, defending against the Germans in the area of the village of Aleksandrovka (24 km southeast of Prokhorovka station). Having fought through their own, the regiment came across advancing German tanks, after which it turned around and, crushing and dragging along separate groups of its own infantry, began to retreat. The anti-tank artillery, which was following the same regiment (53 Guards Tank Regiment) to the front line and had just arrived at the scene of events, mistaking the tanks of the 96 Tank Brigade for German tanks pursuing the 53 Guards Separate Tank Regiment, turned around and did not open fire on its infantry and tanks only thanks to serendipity.
Well, and so on... In the order of the commander of the 69th Army, all this was described as “these outrages.” Well, that's putting it mildly.
So we can summarize that the Germans won the Battle of Prokhorovka, but this victory was a special case against a generally negative background for Germany. The German positions at Prokhorovka were good if a further offensive was planned (which Manstein insisted on), but not for defense. But it was impossible to advance further for reasons not directly related to what was happening near Prokhorovka. Far from Prokhorovka, on July 11, 1943, reconnaissance in force began from the Soviet Western and Bryansk fronts (mistaken by the German command of the OKH ground forces for an offensive), and on July 12, these fronts actually went on the offensive. On July 13, the German command became aware of the impending offensive of the Soviet Southern Front in the Donbass, that is, practically on the southern flank of Army Group South (this offensive followed on July 17). In addition, the situation in Sicily became more complicated for the Germans, where the Americans and British landed on July 10. Tanks were also needed there.
On July 13, a meeting was held with the Fuhrer, to which Field Marshal General Erich von Manstein was also summoned. Adolf Hitler ordered the end of Operation Citadel in connection with the activation of Soviet troops in various sectors of the Eastern Front and the sending of part of the forces from it to form new German formations in Italy and the Balkans. The order was accepted for execution despite the objections of Manstein, who believed that Soviet troops on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge were on the verge of defeat. Manstein was not directly ordered to withdraw his troops, but was forbidden to use his only reserve, the 24th Panzer Corps. Without the deployment of this corps, a further offensive would lose perspective, and therefore there was no point in holding the captured positions. (soon 24 Tank Corps was already repelling the advance of the Soviet Southwestern Front in the middle reaches of the Seversky Donets River). The 2nd SS Tank Tank was intended for transfer to Italy, but it was temporarily returned for joint operations with the 3rd Tank Tank with the aim of eliminating the breakthrough of the troops of the Soviet Southern Front on the Mius River, 60 km north of the city of Taganrog, in the defense zone of the German 6th Army.
The merit of the Soviet troops is that they slowed down the pace of the German offensive on Kursk, which, combined with the general military-political situation and a combination of circumstances that were not in favor of Germany everywhere in July 1943, made Operation Citadel unfeasible, but to speak purely military victory of the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk is wishful thinking. "
Front commanders
Central Front
Commanding:
Army General K.K. Rokossovsky
Members of the military council:
Major General K. F. Telegin
Major General M. M. Stakhursky
Chief of staff:
Lieutenant General M. S. Malinin
Voronezh Front
Commanding:
Army General N. F. Vatutin
Members of the military council:
Lieutenant General N. S. Khrushchev
Lieutenant General L. R. Korniets
Chief of staff:
Lieutenant General S. P. Ivanov
Steppe Front
Commanding:
Colonel General I. S. Konev
Members of the military council:
Lieutenant General of Tank Forces I. Z. Susaykov
Major General I. S. Grushetsky
Chief of staff:
Lieutenant General M. V. Zakharov
Bryansk Front
Commanding:
Colonel General M. M. Popov
Members of the military council:
Lieutenant General L. Z. Mehlis
Major General S. I. Shabalin
Chief of staff:
Lieutenant General L. M. Sandalov
Western Front
Commanding:
Colonel General V. D. Sokolovsky
Members of the military council:
Lieutenant General N. A. Bulganin
Lieutenant General I. S. Khokhlov
Chief of staff:
Lieutenant General A.P. Pokrovsky
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The Battle of Kursk is a turning point during the entire Second World War, when the Soviet Troops inflicted such damage on Germany and its satellites, from which they could no longer recover and lost the strategic initiative until the end of the war. Although many sleepless nights and thousands of kilometers of fighting remained before the defeat of the enemy, after this battle, confidence in victory over the enemy appeared in the hearts of every Soviet citizen, private and general. In addition, the battle on the Oryol-Kursk ledge became an example of the courage of ordinary soldiers and the brilliant genius of Russian commanders.
The radical turning point during the Great Patriotic War began with the victory of Soviet troops at Stalingrad, when a large enemy group was eliminated during Operation Uranus. The battle on the Kursk ledge became the final stage radical fracture. After the defeat at Kursk and Orel, the strategic initiative finally passed into the hands of the Soviet command. After the failure, German troops were mainly on the defensive until the end of the war, while ours mainly conducted offensive operations, liberating Europe from the Nazis.
On June 5, 1943, German troops went on the offensive in two directions: on the northern and southern fronts of the Kursk ledge. Thus began Operation Citadel and the Battle of Kursk itself. After the offensive onslaught of the Germans subsided, and its divisions were significantly drained of blood, the USSR command carried out a counter-offensive against the troops of Army Groups “Center” and “South”. On August 23, 1943, Kharkov was liberated, marking the end of one of the largest battles of World War II.
Background of the battle
After the victory at Stalingrad during the successful Operation Uranus, Soviet troops managed to carry out a good offensive along the entire front and push the enemy many miles to the West. But after the counter-offensive of German troops, a protrusion arose in the area of Kursk and Orel, which was directed towards the West, up to 200 kilometers wide and up to 150 kilometers deep, formed by the Soviet group.
From April to June, relative calm reigned on the fronts. It became clear that after the defeat at Stalingrad, Germany would try to take revenge. The most suitable place was considered to be the Kursk ledge, by striking at it in the direction of Orel and Kursk from the North and South, respectively, it was possible to create a cauldron on a larger scale than near Kiev and Kharkov at the beginning of the war.
Back on April 8, 1943, Marshal G.K. Zhukov. sent his report on the spring-summer military campaign, where he outlined his thoughts on Germany’s actions on the Eastern Front, where it was assumed that the Kursk Bulge would become the site of the enemy’s main attack. At the same time, Zhukov expressed his plan for countermeasures, which included wearing out the enemy in defensive battles, and then launching a counterattack and completely destroying him. Already on April 12, Stalin listened to General Antonov A.I., Marshal Zhukov G.K. and Marshal Vasilevsky A.M. on this occasion.
Representatives of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Headquarters unanimously spoke out for the impossibility and futility of launching a preventive strike in the spring and summer. After all, based on the experience of past years, an offensive against large enemy groups preparing to strike does not bring significant results, but only contributes to losses in the ranks of friendly troops. Also, the formation of forces to deliver the main attack was supposed to weaken the groupings of Soviet troops in the directions of the main attack of the Germans, which would also inevitably lead to defeat. Therefore, a decision was made to conduct a defensive operation in the area of the Kursk ledge, where the main attack of the Wehrmacht forces was expected. Thus, the Headquarters hoped to wear down the enemy in defensive battles, knock out his tanks and deliver a decisive blow to the enemy. This was facilitated by the creation of a powerful defensive system in this direction, in contrast to the first two years of the war.
In the spring of 1943, the word “Citadel” appeared more and more often in intercepted radio data. On April 12, intelligence put a plan code-named “Citadel” on Stalin’s desk, which was developed by the Wehrmacht General Staff, but had not yet been signed by Hitler. This plan confirmed that Germany was preparing the main attack where the Soviet command expected it. Three days later, Hitler signed the operation plan.
In order to destroy the plans of the Wehrmacht, it was decided to create a defense in depth in the direction of the predicted strike and create a powerful group capable of withstanding the pressure German units and carry out counterattacks at the climax of the battle.
Army composition, commanders
It was planned to attract forces to strike Soviet troops in the area of the Kursk-Oryol bulge Army Group Center, which was commanded Field Marshal Kluge And Army Group South, which was commanded Field Marshal Manstein.
The German forces included 50 divisions, including 16 motorized and tank divisions, 8 assault gun divisions, 2 tank brigades, and 3 separate tank battalions. In addition, the considered elite SS tank divisions “Das Reich”, “Totenkopf” and “Adolf Hitler” were pulled up for a strike in the direction of Kursk.
Thus, the group consisted of 900 thousand personnel, 10 thousand guns, 2,700 tanks and assault guns, and more than 2 thousand aircraft that were part of two Luftwaffe air fleets.
One of the key trump cards in the hands of Germany was to be the use of heavy Tiger and Panther tanks and Ferdinand assault guns. It was precisely because the new tanks did not have time to reach the front and were in the process of being finalized that the start of the operation was constantly postponed. Also in service with the Wehrmacht were obsolete Pz.Kpfw tanks. I, Pz.Kpfw. I I, Pz.Kpfw. I I I, having undergone some modification.
The main blow was to be delivered by the 2nd and 9th Armies, the 9th Tank Army of Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal Model, as well as Task Force Kempf, the tank 4th Army and the 24th Corps of the group armies "South", which were entrusted to command by General Hoth.
In defensive battles, the USSR involved three fronts: Voronezh, Stepnoy, and Central.
The Central Front was commanded by Army General K.K. Rokossovsky. The task of the front was to defend the northern face of the ledge. The Voronezh Front, the command of which was entrusted to Army General N.F. Vatutin, had to defend the southern front. Colonel General I.S. Konev was appointed commander of the Steppe Front, the USSR reserve during the battle. In total, about 1.3 million people, 3,444 tanks and self-propelled guns, almost 20,000 guns and 2,100 aircraft were involved in the Kursk salient area. Data may differ from some sources.
Weapons (tanks)
During the preparation of the Citadel plan, the German command did not look for new ways to achieve success. The main offensive power of the Wehrmacht troops during the operation on the Kursk Bulge was to be carried out by tanks: light, heavy and medium. To strengthen the strike forces before the start of the operation, several hundred of the latest Panther and Tiger tanks were delivered to the front.
Medium tank "Panther" was developed by MAN for Germany in 1941-1942. According to the German classification it was considered severe. For the first time he took part in the battles on the Kursk Bulge. After the battles in the summer of 1943 on the Eastern Front, it began to be actively used by the Wehrmacht in other directions. It is considered the best German tank in World War II, even despite a number of shortcomings.
"Tiger I"- heavy tanks of the German armed forces during the Second World War. At long combat distances it was invulnerable to fire from Soviet tanks. It is considered the most expensive tank of its time, because the German treasury spent 1 million Reichsmarks on the creation of one combat unit.
Panzerkampfwagen III until 1943 it was the main medium tank of the Wehrmacht. Captured combat units were used by Soviet troops, and self-propelled guns were created on their basis.
Panzerkampfwagen II produced from 1934 to 1943 Since 1938, it has been used in armed conflicts, but it turned out to be weaker than similar types of equipment from the enemy, not only in terms of armor, but even in terms of weapons. In 1942, it was completely withdrawn from the Wehrmacht tank units, however, it remained in service and was used by assault groups.
The light tank Panzerkampfwagen I - the brainchild of Krupp and Daimler Benz, discontinued in 1937, was produced in the amount of 1,574 units.
In the Soviet army, the most massive tank of the Second World War had to withstand the onslaught of the German armored armada. Medium tank T-34 had many modifications, one of which, the T-34-85, is in service with some countries to this day.
Progress of the battle
There was a calm on the fronts. Stalin had doubts about the accuracy of the calculations of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Headquarters. Also, the thought of competent disinformation did not leave him until the last moment. However, at 23.20 on July 4 and 02.20 on July 5, the artillery of two Soviet fronts launched a massive attack on the supposed enemy positions. In addition, bombers and attack aircraft of two air armies carried out an air raid on enemy positions in the area of Kharkov and Belgorod. However, this did not bring much results. According to German reports, only communication lines were damaged. Losses in manpower and equipment were not serious.
Exactly at 06.00 on July 5, after a powerful artillery barrage, significant Wehrmacht forces went on the offensive. However, unexpectedly they received a powerful rebuff. This was facilitated by the presence of numerous tank barriers and minefields with a high frequency of mining. Due to significant damage to communications, the Germans were unable to achieve clear interaction between units, which led to disagreements in actions: the infantry was often left without tank support. On the northern front, the attack was aimed at Olkhovatka. After minor success and serious losses, the Germans launched an attack on Ponyri. But even there it was not possible to break into the Soviet defense. Thus, on July 10, less than a third of all German tanks remained in service.
* After the Germans went on the attack, Rokossovsky called Stalin and said with joy in his voice that the offensive had begun. Perplexed, Stalin asked Rokossovsky about the reason for his joy. The general replied that now the victory in the Battle of Kursk will not go anywhere.
The 4th Panzer Corps, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps and the Kempf Army Group, which were part of the 4th Army, were tasked with defeating the Russians in the South. Here events unfolded more successfully than in the North, although the planned result was not achieved. The 48th Tank Corps suffered heavy losses in the attack on Cherkassk, without moving significantly forward.
The defense of Cherkassy is one of the brightest pages of the Battle of Kursk, which for some reason is practically not remembered. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps was more successful. He was given the task of reaching the Prokhorovka area, where, on an advantageous terrain in a tactical battle, he would give battle to the Soviet reserve. Thanks to the presence of companies consisting of heavy Tigers, the Leibstandarte and Das Reich divisions managed to quickly make a hole in the defenses of the Voronezh Front. The command of the Voronezh Front decided to strengthen the defensive lines and sent the 5th Stalingrad Tank Corps to carry out this task. In fact, Soviet tank crews received orders to occupy a line already captured by the Germans, but threats of court martial and execution forced them to go on the offensive. Having struck Das Reich head-on, the 5th Stk failed and was driven back. The Das Reich tanks went on the attack, trying to encircle the corps forces. They partially succeeded, but thanks to the commanders of the units who found themselves outside the ring, communications were not cut. However, during these battles, Soviet troops lost 119 tanks, which is undeniably the largest loss of Soviet troops in a single day. Thus, already on July 6, the Germans reached the third line of defense of the Voronezh Front, which made the situation difficult.
On July 12, in the Prokhorovka area, after mutual artillery barrage and massive airstrikes, 850 tanks of the 5th Guards Army under the command of General Rotmistrov and 700 tanks from the 2nd SS Tank Corps collided in a counter battle. The battle lasted all day. The initiative passed from hand to hand. The opponents suffered colossal losses. The entire battlefield was covered with thick smoke from fires. However, victory remained with us; the enemy was forced to retreat.
On this day, on the Northern front, the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive. The very next day, the German defenses were broken through, and by August 5, Soviet troops managed to liberate Oryol. The Oryol operation, during which the Germans lost 90 thousand soldiers killed, was called “Kutuzov” in the plans of the General Staff.
Operation Rumyantsev was supposed to defeat German forces in the Kharkov and Belgorod region. On August 3, the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe Front launched an offensive. By August 5, Belgorod was liberated. On August 23, Kharkov was liberated by Soviet troops on the third attempt, which marked the end of Operation Rumyantsev and with it the Battle of Kursk.
* On August 5, the first fireworks display during the entire War was given in Moscow in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod from the Nazi invaders.
Losses of the parties
Until now, the losses of Germany and the USSR during the Battle of Kursk are not precisely known. To date, the data differ radically. In 1943, the Germans lost more than 500 thousand people killed and wounded in the battle of the Kursk salient. 1000-1500 enemy tanks were destroyed by Soviet soldiers. And Soviet aces and air defense forces destroyed 1,696 aircraft.
As for the USSR, irretrievable losses amounted to more than a quarter of a million people. 6024 tanks and self-propelled guns were burned and out of action due to technical reasons. 1626 aircraft were shot down in the skies over Kursk and Orel.
Results, significance
Guderian and Manstein in their memoirs say that the Battle of Kursk was the turning point of the War on the Eastern Front. Soviet troops inflicted major losses on the Germans, who lost their strategic advantage forever. In addition, the armored power of the Nazis could no longer be restored to its previous scale. The days of Hitler's Germany were numbered. The victory at the Kursk Bulge became an excellent help for raising the morale of soldiers on all fronts, the population in the rear of the country and in the occupied territories.
Russian Military Glory Day
The day of the defeat of Nazi troops by Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk in accordance with the Federal Law of March 13, 1995 is celebrated annually. This is a day of remembrance of all those who, in July-August 1943, during the defensive operation of the Soviet troops, as well as the offensive operations of “Kutuzov” and “Rumyantsev” on the Kursk ledge, managed to break the back of a powerful enemy, predetermining the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. Large-scale celebrations are expected in 2013 to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the victory on the Arc of Fire. 
Video about the Kursk Bulge, key moments of the battle, we definitely recommend watching:
The Battle of Kursk (Battle of the Kursk Bulge), which lasted from July 5 to August 23, 1943, is one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into three parts: the Kursk defensive operation (July 5-23); Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive.
During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a protrusion up to 150 kilometers deep and up to 200 kilometers wide, facing west (the so-called “Kursk Bulge”), formed in the center of the Soviet-German front. The German command decided to conduct a strategic operation on the Kursk salient. For this purpose, a military operation codenamed “Citadel” was developed and approved in April 1943. Having information about the preparation of the Nazi troops for an offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to temporarily go on the defensive on the Kursk Bulge and, during the defensive battle, bleed the enemy’s strike forces and thereby create favorable conditions for the Soviet troops to launch a counteroffensive, and then a general strategic offensive .
To carry out Operation Citadel, the German command concentrated 50 divisions in the sector, including 18 tank and motorized divisions. The enemy group, according to Soviet sources, numbered about 900 thousand people, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars, about 2.7 thousand tanks and more than 2 thousand aircraft. Air support for the German troops was provided by the forces of the 4th and 6th air fleets.
By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Supreme High Command headquarters had created a grouping (Central and Voronezh fronts) with more than 1.3 million people, up to 20 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3,300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,650 aircraft. The troops of the Central Front (commander - General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky) defended the northern front of the Kursk ledge, and the troops of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin) - the southern front. The troops occupying the ledge relied on the Steppe Front, consisting of rifle, 3 tank, 3 motorized and 3 cavalry corps (commanded by Colonel General Ivan Konev). The coordination of the actions of the fronts was carried out by representatives of the Headquarters Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.
On July 5, 1943, German attack groups, according to the Operation Citadel plan, launched an attack on Kursk from the Orel and Belgorod areas. From Orel, a group under the command of Field Marshal Gunther Hans von Kluge (Army Group Center) was advancing, and from Belgorod, a group under the command of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (Operational Group Kempf, Army Group South).
The task of repelling the attack from Orel was entrusted to the troops of the Central Front, and from Belgorod - the Voronezh Front.
July 12 in the area railway station Prokhorovka, 56 kilometers north of Belgorod, the largest oncoming collision occurred tank battle World War II - a battle between an advancing enemy tank group (Task Force Kempf) and counterattacking Soviet troops. On both sides, up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in the battle. The fierce battle lasted all day; by evening, tank crews and infantry were fighting hand-to-hand. In one day, the enemy lost about 10 thousand people and 400 tanks and was forced to go on the defensive.
On the same day, the troops of the Bryansk, Central and left wings of the Western Front began Operation Kutuzov, which had the goal of defeating the enemy’s Oryol group. On July 13, troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts broke through the enemy’s defenses in the Bolkhov, Khotynets and Oryol directions and advanced to a depth of 8 to 25 km. On July 16, the troops of the Bryansk Front reached the line of the Oleshnya River, after which the German command began to withdraw its main forces to their original positions. By July 18, the troops of the right wing of the Central Front had completely eliminated the enemy wedge in the Kursk direction. On the same day, troops of the Steppe Front were brought into the battle and began pursuing the retreating enemy.
Developing the offensive, the Soviets ground troops, supported by air strikes from the 2nd and 17th Air Armies, as well as long-range aviation, by August 23, 1943, pushed the enemy back 140-150 km to the west, liberating Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov. According to Soviet sources, the Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. Soviet losses exceeded German losses; they amounted to 863 thousand people. Near Kursk, the Red Army lost about 6 thousand tanks.
