According to the demographic forecast of Rosstat, natural population decline will increase and from 2025 will exceed 400 thousand people annually; a slowdown in population decline is predicted only closer to the 2030s. International migration (according to the forecast, the influx of migrants will be less than 300 thousand people per year) in the future will not be able to compensate for the population decline.
In December 2017, the head of the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, Maxim Topilin, said that the birth rate in Russia is insufficient to ensure population growth, and in the coming years the situation will only worsen, as the number of women of childbearing age in the country will decrease by a quarter or even more.
“The number of women of reproductive age will decrease by 28% by 2032 or 2035.” Unfortunately, it is not possible to assume that in this situation the absolute number of births will remain at the level of 1.8-1.9 million,” said Topilin.
The birth rate in the Russian Federation in 2017 was the lowest in the last 10 years
(Video: RBC TV channel)
Ramilya Khasanova, a researcher at the Institute of Social Analysis and Forecasting at RANEPA, explained to RBC that the birth rate will decline in the next 15 years due to the fact that most current mothers were born in the 1990s, when the birth rate was low.
“The number of women - potential mothers is small, and therefore the number of births is also falling,” the expert explained.
Earlier, the head of the Ministry of Economic Development, Maxim Oreshkin, classified the demographic situation in Russia as one. The minister noted that a sharp reduction in the size of the working-age population will be led by the fact that Russians born at the very end of the 1990s, when the maximum decline in the birth rate was recorded in its composition, are beginning to be taken into account.
“The generation is very small, so the negative dynamics in terms of the working-age population will continue. The situation from a demographic point of view is one of the most difficult in the world: we will lose approximately 800 thousand people of working age every year due to the demographic structure,” Oreshkin said.
In response to the challenge of low birth rates, the president talks about “rebooting” the country’s demographic policy. From January 1, two new monthly benefits appeared in Russia. At the birth of the first child and until he reaches one and a half years of age, families are provided with a monthly payment equal to the regional subsistence minimum per child (on average in 2018 it is 10.5 thousand rubles). From maternity capital funds (the program has been extended until the end of 2021), families can receive monthly payments upon the birth of a second child. Both payments are provided to families whose average per capita income does not exceed 1.5 times the regional subsistence level. In addition, for families with a second and third child, a special program for subsidizing mortgage rates (the state will cover the cost of servicing a mortgage in excess of 6% per annum).
Khasanova assessed the measures taken by the state as positive. “Maternity capital influenced a slight increase in the number of third and second births. It will increase the opportunity for young families to rise out of poverty. The benefit adopted for the first child will most likely not be such an effective way to increase the number of births, but it will affect the birth calendar: those who were planning to give birth in the next few years will hurry up,” she said.
The Russian labor market is losing its attractiveness for migrants; without them, it will not be possible to make up for the decline in the country’s working-age population, experts from the Center for Strategic Research (CSR) warn in the report “Migration Policy: Diagnosis, Challenges, Proposals,” published on January 26. The total decline in the working-age population by 2030 will range from 11 million to 13 million people, experts say. There are no reserves for the growth of internal migration and to attract foreign labor, according to experts, new migration policy measures are needed - work visas, lottery systems similar to the American Green Card, as well as contracts for the integration of migrants.
In 2017, experts, relying on official Russian statistics, said that Russia again found itself in a demographic hole. The reason for this is that the country’s female population is aging, and young people are afraid to have children due to the unstable economic situation and tensions in the political arena.
After the difficult nineties, another population crisis was observed in Russia at the beginning of the twenty-first century and only in 2008 it gradually began to decline. Since 1992, only by 2013 the number of citizens of the Russian Federation began to increase. But already in 2014, a new wave of demographic decline began.
Demographic peaks and pits
A demographic hole is usually called an extremely low population indicator, a significant decrease in the birth rate simultaneously with an increase in mortality. Experts attribute all modern problems with the stable reproduction of the population of Russia to the sixties of the last century, when after the post-war peak the birth rate decreased. The situation worsened in the eighties, when, along with a decrease in the birth rate, the mortality rate increased.
In the twentieth century, Russia experienced more than one demographic crisis. The events of the First World War and the Civil War did not cause significant damage to the population, since at that time the birth rate in our country was higher than in Western countries. Further collectivization and famine led to the collapse of the rural way of life for most citizens, and the number of urban residents increased. Many women became hired workers, which undermined the institution of the family. As a result of all these events, the birth rate fell.
Mass mobilization in 1939 also contributed to a decline in the birth rate, since extramarital affairs were frowned upon and early marriage was the normal state of affairs. All this does not yet fully fit the definition of a demographic hole, but the population began to decline even then.
As a result of the post-war famine and the forced deportation of certain peoples, extramarital relationships spread. The birth rate dropped to 20-30% of the pre-war level, while in Germany the rate remained consistently high - 70% of the pre-war years. After the war, a population explosion occurred, but it was unable to stabilize the situation and restore indirect and actual losses.
Period from the late eighties to the present
According to statistical data, from the beginning of the 50s to the end of the 80s, there was a stable natural population increase, but still the republics of Central Asia and Transcaucasia had the best rates. In Russia itself, the birth rate has dropped below the 1964 level.
A slight improvement occurred in 1985, but a few years later another demographic hole was recorded. The sharp decline in population in the nineties was the result of the simultaneous overlap of several unfavorable trends. Firstly, the birth rate fell and the mortality rate increased, and secondly, others also had their influence, social and crime, poverty and so on.
The consequences of the demographic hole of the 90s were overcome relatively recently. In the Russian Federation, the rate of population reproduction increased for the first time only in 2013. This was facilitated by active government policy, support for young families and other measures, which will be discussed in more detail below.
In 2014, Russia again suffered a demographic crisis. Thus, the demographic pitfalls (period 1990-2014) are one big fall with an attempt to overcome the crisis, but another failure.
Causes of the demographic crisis
Crises of population reproduction become a reflection of the existence of certain problems in society. The demographic hole is a consequence of social, economic, medical, ethical, information and other factors:
- General decline in fertility and increase in mortality in developed countries, regardless of quality of life.
- Replacement of the previously existing traditional social model of society with new trends.
- General decline in living standards.
- Deterioration of the environmental situation.
- Decline in the general level of population health.
- Increased mortality.
- Massive alcoholism and drug addiction.
- State refusal to support health care policies.
- Deformation of the structure of society.
- Degradation of family and marriage institutions.
- An increase in the number of families consisting of one parent and a child or childless couples.
- Negative impact of new technologies on public health.
Scientists are divided in their opinions about which reasons are dominant in a particular case. Demographer S. Zakharov argues that negative population growth rates are observed in any country at a certain stage of development. Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences S. Sulakshin considers the main reasons for the demographic pitfalls to be the replacement of traditional Russian values with Western ones, the spiritual devastation of the Russian people, and the lack of a common ideology.
Signs of demographic problems
Demographic gaps in Russia and the world are usually defined by the following features:
- Declining birth rate.
- Declining birth rate.
- Decrease in life expectancy.
- Increasing mortality rate.
Immigration and emigration
The topic of demography is associated with the concept that from Russia to other countries has a negative impact on the population. But, fortunately, all mass emigrations are already a thing of the past. After the collapse of the Union, the number of those leaving decreased and reached a minimum by 2009. Starting next year, the number of immigrants began to increase.
At present, a sharp increase in emigration is unlikely because few people leaving can obtain citizenship in their host countries. This does not mean that the number of people wishing to leave has decreased, it’s just that citizens are faced with quotas in other countries and do not want to live abroad “on a bird’s license.”
As for the pace of immigration, in Russia the number of people entering has long exceeded the number of people leaving. Throughout the twenty post-Soviet years, a significant flow of citizens from neighboring states has been sent to our country, which compensated for the natural population decline. It is noteworthy that the largest part of these immigrants are compatriots who left for the republics of the USSR from the 50s to the 80s, as well as their direct descendants.
Distrust of Rosstat data
Of course, the issue of demographics is not without lovers of “conspiracy theories.” Some even call the demographic hole the last, arguing that statistics are deceiving, and in fact, the modern population of the Russian Federation does not number 143 million citizens, but at best 80-90 million. Rosstat has something to answer here, because statistical data is indirectly confirmed by many sources. Firstly, primary information about civil status is transmitted by all registry offices, secondly, some conspiracy theorists themselves act as co-authors of Demographic Yearbooks, and thirdly, other very authoritative demographic institutions in the world also use official data from Rosstat.
Economic consequences of crises
Demographic gaps have both positive and negative consequences on the economy. At the second stage of population decline, the share of citizens of working age exceeds the share of the younger and older generations. The third stage of the crisis is characterized by a negative effect (the share of the older generation exceeds the working-age population, which creates a burden on society).
Consequences in education and military sphere
Due to demographic gaps, the number of school graduates is decreasing, so universities are fighting for every applicant. In this regard, the issue of reducing the number of higher educational institutions (from 1115 to 200) is being discussed; layoffs of teaching staff by 20-50% are coming. Some politicians, however, say that such a step will allow us to get rid of universities that provide insufficiently high-quality education.
It is currently expected that the number of schoolchildren will increase by one million in five to six years, and by another two million in the next five years. After the 2020s, an intensive reduction in the number of school-age children will begin.
Another consequence of demographic crises is a reduction in mobilization resources. All this has an impact on military reforms, forcing them to cancel deferments, reduce the number of troops and switch to the contact principle of recruitment. The risk of China developing a low-intensity conflict is heightened by the low population density in the Far East. Thus, only 4.4% (less than 6.3 million) of citizens live in territories that make up more than 35% of the country. At the same time, 120 million people live in the neighboring regions of Northeast China, 3.5 million in Mongolia, 28.5 million in the DPRK, almost 50 million in the Republic of Korea, and more than 130 million in Japan.
By the twenties of this century, the number of men of military age will decrease by a third, and by 2050 - by more than 40%.
Social sphere and demographic holes
In the life of society, there have been trends towards the Scandinavian model of existence - a bachelor, familyless life. The number of children in families, and families themselves, is gradually decreasing. Until the end of the nineteenth century, Russia was a country with a young population. At that time, the number of children significantly exceeded the number of the older generation; it was customary to have five or more children in a family. Since the sixties of the twentieth century, the process of demographic aging began, which was the result of a decrease in the birth rate. In the nineties, the Russian Federation was already among the countries with high rates of aging citizens. Today the share of people of retirement age in our country is 13%.
Threats of demographic crisis
The pace of the demographic crisis across the country is uneven. Many researchers are inclined to believe that depopulation affects the Russian people to a greater extent. For example, according to researcher L. Rybakovsky, from 1989 to 2002 the number of Russians by nationality decreased by 7%, and the total population - by 1.3%. According to another ethnographer, until 2025, more than 85% of the decline will be among Russians. All regions populated by Russians have recently experienced negative growth.
Given the high level of migration, a likely consequence of the demographic crisis in the Russian Federation will be a change in the national and religious composition of the population. For example, by 2030, every fifth resident of our country will profess Islam. In Moscow, every third birth is already due to migrants. All this can subsequently lead to the loss of the territorial integrity of the country.
Population forecasting
The next demographic hole in Russia (according to the forecast of Igor Beloborodov) is expected in 2025-2030. If the country can stay within its existing borders, subject to a decrease in the permanent population, then only 80 million people will remain in the Russian Federation by 2080. Russian demographer Anatoly Antonov claims that without the revival of the large family, by 2050 only 70 million people will live in Russia. Thus, the demographic hole of 2017 is either an opportunity to revive the country, or another point in the consolidation of population decline trends.
The main ways out of the crisis
Many believe that solving problems in demography is possible only with the systematic strengthening of the institution of the traditional family. Modern Russia so far only provides financial support for parents (one-time assistance and maternity capital are paid). True, according to many politicians and experts, this form of support resonates only with marginal segments of the population or those who already create large families. This is not a motivation for the middle class.
Fertility crisis
In all CIS countries, public opinion regards the changes experienced by the family and not always fully understandable with a certain wariness. But the greatest attention and concern in these, as well as in many other countries, is attracted by the latest trends in changes in the birth rate, its reduction often to extremely low levels. In these changes, the differences between the CIS countries were especially pronounced, due to the non-simultaneous onset and different speed of passage of the main stages of the demographic transition. It is these differences that give grounds to divide all the CIS countries into two demographic groups, although such a division did not develop immediately. Currently, one group according to birth rate includes 7 “European” countries: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine.
But such a unification became possible no earlier than the 1980s.
In the 1960s - 1970s, there were still large differences between them, although even then there was a clear tendency towards convergence in fertility levels due to its decline, first in Moldova, then in Armenia and, finally, in Azerbaijan. By the early 1990s, fertility in these three countries was still slightly higher than in the others within the selected group, but none of them could be classified as countries with pre-transition high fertility.
The similarity of the seven countries was clearly manifested after 1990, when they all went through a new stage of a sharp decline in the birth rate and even in Azerbaijan, which retained some differences, its level dropped significantly below the threshold of simple generation replacement.
There is likely a connection between the decline in fertility in the CIS countries in the 1990s and the economic and political reforms carried out at that time. But this connection should hardly be simplified, seeing in the transition to a very low birth rate evidence of the “wrongness” of the reforms and, as a consequence, the economic crisis, degradation of living conditions, etc. In essence, all the countries under consideration were only repeating the path that many countries of Western Europe had done a little earlier at almost the same speed in the absence of any shocks and even during periods of prosperity. Just look at Fig. 7 to see that there was nothing particularly specific in the fertility trends of the 1990s in the European CIS countries.
Figure 7. Declining fertility in some European countries
Apparently, we are talking about deeper changes than those that can be associated only with market fluctuations in the economic or political situation. Small children are spreading in all European societies, and although this shift does not occur everywhere at the same time, and may be artificially inhibited under totalitarian regimes or strong clerical pressure, sooner or later life takes its toll. Then mass demographic behavior changes rapidly, and the later the turn comes, the sharper the changes, the steeper and deeper the decline in the birth rate. Ultimately, it turned out to be even lower than in such classic strongholds of low fertility as France or the Scandinavian countries. This is exactly what happened in the 1990s in the “European” CIS countries.
In the Central Asian countries of the CIS - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan - events developed differently.
For the indigenous peoples of these countries, the demographic transition began later, and as early as the 1970s the birth rate was very high, especially among rural residents, where it was perhaps the highest in the world.
But by the beginning of the 1980s, a turn towards low birth rates had emerged in these countries (then republics of the USSR), and demographers assumed that “the period of a decisive turning point in the procreation behavior of the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan will most likely be the 80s - 90s.” years, and then the rapid erasure of the still existing large interethnic and interrepublican differences in the procreation behavior of the population of the USSR will begin." This is what happened. By the end of the 1990s, the birth rate here was lower than in Azerbaijan, Armenia and Moldova in the second half of the 1980s, and in Kazakhstan it was already noticeably below the level of simple generation replacement (Fig. 8). The lower birth rates in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are explained mainly by the high proportion of small-child “European” populations. In 1989, Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians and Germans made up half of the population of Kazakhstan and 27% of the population of Kyrgyzstan. In other countries of Central Asia, the share of the “European” population did not reach 10%.
The experience of most countries that have already completed a demographic transition suggests that the birth rate in them tends to decline to a very low level that does not even ensure simple replacement of generations. This, in fact, is the birth crisis, because throughout human history all social institutions have always been aimed at preventing such a situation and ensuring the sustainable continuation of the human race. Now in 8 out of 12 CIS countries, due to the low birth rate, even simple population reproduction, not to mention its growth, is not ensured.
Thus, the fertility crisis is at the same time a population reproduction crisis, which is discussed in the next section. But before moving on to its consideration, we should dwell on one more aspect of the fertility crisis in the CIS countries.
With a very low birth rate and, therefore, almost universal regulation of childbirth, women in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova very often resort not to preventing pregnancy, but to interrupting it, induced abortion. In Western countries, which, as a rule, have gone through a “contraceptive revolution,” abortion as a means of regulating childbirth has been relegated to a third role; it has given way to various methods of preventing conception and “family planning.” The USSR did not know the contraceptive revolution, which resulted in a huge spread of abortion.
Only in the second half of the 1990s did changes for the better begin here, and a trend toward a reduction in both the absolute and relative (per 100 births) number of abortions became clear (Table 3). This is mainly due to the increased use of modern methods and means of contraception, although it is possible that part of this decline is due to incomplete registration of abortions performed in non-state medical institutions. However, even the reduced number of abortions is much higher than in Western European countries, where it rarely reaches 30 per 100 births.
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Table 3. Number of legal abortions per 100 births in European post-Soviet states |
Belarus |
Moldova |
Russia |
|
Ukraine Source
In the countries of Transcaucasia and Central Asia, especially where the Muslim tradition is still strong, the number of registered abortions is relatively small, although it may still be higher than in statistical reports, because, for various reasons, not all abortions performed are recorded . But as these countries transition to low birth rates in an environment where the need for family planning is better understood than in the Soviet period, one can hope that abortion will not become as widespread in them as in Russia, Ukraine or Belarus.
Table 4. Number of legal abortions per 100 births in the post-Soviet states of Transcaucasia and Central Asia
|
Azerbaijan |
Armenia |
Georgia |
Kazakhstan |
Kyrgyzstan |
Tajikistan |
Turkmenistan |
Uzbekistan |
|
At the same time, one should not underestimate the new function of abortion associated with the regulation of the sex of born children: in conditions when it is possible to find out the sex of the unborn child already in the early stages of pregnancy, parents decide to terminate the pregnancy if the sex of the child does not suit them (usually they refuse birth of girls). This practice is observed in a number of Asian countries - China, Vietnam, South Korea, India, and it has also been recorded in.
Population is an extremely important factor for human development. We live and don’t even think about how many people die per day in the world and how many are born. Isn't it time to pay attention to this?
Population on the planet
Today there are seven billion people. China has the largest number of them, with India in second place. The USA took third place.
The average life expectancy today is about 67 years. Despite the fact that women live 12 years longer on average. However, the lives of people in the Central African Republic tend to be the shortest.
Statistics say that an average of 55 million people die each year around the world. Sounds quite threatening. But also inexorable statistics report that 140 million children are born every year. In total, 108 billion have ever lived on Earth.
Already today there is a tendency towards “overpopulation” of the planet with people. The standard of living is constantly rising in developed countries and is steadily approaching zero in third world countries. But, despite this, scientists began to sound the alarm about the overpopulation of the Earth.
Mortality
Have you ever wondered how many people die every day in the world? Of course not. But in Russia?
Data related to the population census are regularly published, and much less often - with mortality, and most importantly, with the causes of death. Not long ago the following information was announced:
- On average, 150 thousand people die every day around the world. And only a third part from infectious diseases. In Russia, at the same time, 233 people die per hour every day.
- The most common cause of death in countries considered more developed was coronary heart disease, heart attacks, strokes and road accidents. In countries considered to be underdeveloped, deaths are more often caused by hunger and chronic malnutrition.
The most common causes of death
If we talk only about developed countries with a high standard of living, the most common causes of death are strokes, heart disease, cancer, road accidents, AIDS and severe lung diseases (pneumonia, tuberculosis).
From such data it follows that people often try to kill themselves and quite successfully. While tracking how many people die per day around the world, scientists have discovered one interesting thing: they are often to blame for their own deaths. The laureates alone are worth it!
If we talk about the countries of the “third world,” then hunger tops the list of “killers” - the main problem of countries with a low standard of living. At the same time, on the other side of the world, doctors are tired of treating obesity.
Fertility
Despite all these terrible figures, it is worth remembering the general growth of demographics. Around the world, an average of 15,347 children are born every hour, 163 of them in Russia. How many people die per day in the world? 150 million. How many babies are born per hour? 15 thousand. So humanity is not yet in danger of extinction.
Forecasts
At this rate of demographic growth, by 2083 the world's population will reach ten billion. Of course, this is just wonderful, but why then are scientists so worried about the already mentioned overpopulation?
The problem here is that the higher the population density, the more disease there will be. This fact has been proven more than once by various numerous experiments. Too many people will provoke outbreaks of diseases and infections, and it will be almost impossible to fight them, not to mention the fact that throughout the entire evolution of Homo sapiens, we have never learned to use the Earth’s resources wisely. The oil reserves that have already been extracted and stored today will, if used wisely, last for more than fifty years, but production has not been stopped. The same can be said about clean fresh water and coal.
Among other things, no matter how good and wonderful our lives are, the problem of hunger has not yet been solved. There is enough food for everyone, people just don’t know how to share. How many people die every day of hunger? How much from overeating? Should we raise the birth rate?
Why does the death rate exceed the birth rate?
Izvestia reader Igor DROZDOV from Germany “I’m surprised by the persistence of the “experts”. They insist that the population decline in Russia can only be compensated by migrants. Why does the mortality rate exceed the birth rate? Is it because the majority of the people, roughly speaking, have nothing to eat, that having a child is an unaffordable luxury “We have to think about how to give our citizens the opportunity to earn a decent living, for themselves and for their children, but the “experts” took the position: at least you stop everything here, we’ll bring in foreigners!”
Demoscope knows more.
We think that “there is nothing to eat, that having a child is an unaffordable luxury” not only in Russia, which is far from Igor Drozdov, but also in Germany, which is close to him. Just as in Russia 1.2 children are born per woman, so in Germany - apparently, the Germans with Igor Drozdov who joined them also do not have enough grub. Isn't it time for Mr. Schroeder - or whoever is on their farm - to think about how to give his citizens the opportunity to earn a decent living, for themselves and for their children? If necessary, Demoscope can even now write a letter to Die Welt or, there, in Hamburger Abendblat, give some advice.
And, most importantly, there is someone to follow by example. For example, the richest country is Niger. There's more than enough grub. The gross national product - and even taking into account purchasing power parity - is over 700 bucks per capita per year, not like $23-24 thousand in Germany. Naturally, Nigerians have the luxury of having children.
It is clear that, after reading the letter from a Russian-German friend, Demoscope decided to no longer have anything to do with the notorious “experts” and to properly understand the question posed in the letter about why the mortality rate in Russia still exceeds the birth rate. And first of all, he thought about what this expression meant, so often repeated by real, without any quotation marks, experts writing letters to various newspapers. And this is what we managed to come up with.
If the number of deaths is greater than the number of births, then everyone will say that the mortality rate exceeds the birth rate, and will be understood. After all, this is as obvious as the fact that the Sun revolves around the Earth.
Meanwhile, in Demoscope’s soul, which has not yet been completely cleansed of the previous filth, the persistent “expert” suddenly appears again and says: “That’s not true. The number of births and deaths depends, of course, on the birth and death rates, but it also depends on the age composition More young people - more births; more elderly - more deaths. And this is with the same age-specific indicators of fertility and mortality, and in post-war Russia the number of deaths exceeded the number of births for the first time in 1992, and of course, this is understandable. , who is to blame for this. But if the age pyramid of the Russian population had not been distorted by wars and other well-known events of the first half of the last century, then such an excess would have been revealed much earlier (says the “expert”), if only our age structure. would have been the same as that of the Swedes who had not fought for a long time, then with the same age-specific birth and death rates that we actually had, the number of deaths in Russia would have exceeded the number of births already in 1969. And from then on, instead of natural population growth, there would be a natural population decline, increasing every year, as evidenced by Figure 1. And who is to blame for this is no longer so clear.”
“And in general,” the “expert” does not calm down, “you should at least read some book. After all, any student should know that measuring the ratio of fertility and mortality and its influence on population changes, regardless of the age structure, was invented a long time ago - and not just anywhere, but in Germany, where such business letters are written to us, - a special indicator. It is called the “net population reproduction rate” and shows how many girls from the generation of daughters replace one woman of the mother’s generation at the existing level of fertility. and mortality. And as soon as this number drops below one, we can say: mortality exceeds birth rate, the generation does not reproduce itself.
Peculiarities of the age structure can mask this excess for a long time; natural population growth can persist for a long time, but if the net coefficient always remains below one, sooner or later natural population growth will be replaced by its natural decline. In post-war Russia, such an excess appeared for the first time already in 1964 and, apart from the three “perestroika” years - 1986, 1987 and 1988, it has persisted for almost 40 years, as can be seen by looking at Figure 2. You can also see there that and Germany was not far behind Russia in terms of timing - its mortality rate began to exceed its birth rate in 1970 - but in terms of the depth of the decline in the indicator it was far ahead of it."
Figure 2. Net population replacement rate in Russia and West Germany since 1960
And all this time, Igor Drozdov from Germany was silent, like a fish, and did not bother the Izvestia newspaper with his piercing letters. And how good his letter would have looked on the pages of this newspaper in those years, remembered for unprecedented food abundance.
But now that these nice shaven-headed guys have appeared, a sign of an awakening national consciousness, he can no longer remain silent. With his letter from afar, he must help find the true culprits of what is happening, and these, of course, are the persistent “experts”.
