In continuation and addition of the topic on 4 Airborne Brigade, we are creating a topic on 214 Airborne Brigade and we hope that there will be relatives of fighters from this brigade who will be interested in our materials and unique documents from 214 Airborne Brigade.
A little later we will try to post a list of fighters of the 214th Airborne Brigade1938
The 214th separate airborne brigade (like the other 5 brigades: 201, 202, 204, 211 and 212) was formed in 1938. The formation took place in the city of Maryina Gorka, Belarusian Military District (on the basis of ground units of the 47th adron, commander A.F. Levashov).
After the reorganization, all airborne brigades were transferred to the subordination of the ground forces. Each airborne brigade had 1,689 personnel and included:
-one parachute battalion;
-one motorized mechanized battalion;
- artillery battalion.1939
During the attack on Poland in September 1939, the 214th Brigade was transferred by land.
The brigade took part in the Soviet-Finnish war. The 204th and 214th airborne brigades, being in the reserve of the 15th Army, were repeatedly brought into battle at the most critical moments of the situation. The teams completed their assigned tasks with honor. The personnel showed massive heroism in battles.1940
The brigade took part in the liberation campaign of the Red Army in Bessarabia in the summer of 1940. It was decided to land the 204th and 201st airborne brigades as airborne assault forces, and the 214th was to be kept in reserve. For the landing, 4 heavy bomber aviation regiments (TB-3), combined into an aviation group, were involved. In total, the group consisted of 170 heavy aircraft, adapted for parachute drop of people and cargo. The airborne brigades were concentrated in advance by rail to the initial landing area of Boryspil, Kalinovka, Skomorokhi, Gogolevo. The length of the route from the initial area to the landing area averaged 350 km.1941
The 214th Airborne Brigade of the 4th Airborne Corps entered the battle near Minsk back in June 1941. For about two months, the paratroopers operated behind the lines of the Nazi troops. Carrying out bold raids, they boldly attacked enemy garrisons and destroyed them, set up ambushes on the routes of movement of the reserves of the advancing German troops, and destroyed military equipment, transport, and communications equipment.
Initially, the brigade conducted combat operations on the communications of enemy formations that broke through to the Berezina, Sozh and Dnieper rivers. Unfortunately, there are few paratroopers of this legendary brigade left and almost no documents about its military affairs have been preserved. But individual episodes show that the soldiers of the brigade who found themselves in the rear did not lose heart, believed in victory and gave all their strength in order to inflict as many losses on the enemy as possible and provide assistance to the front troops holding back the enemy’s onslaught.
For example, on the night of July 19, the 214th brigade made a bold raid on the Maryina Gorka railway station. That night, an enemy train with military equipment and ammunition arrived at the station to unload. It was decided to set up an ambush against the train on the approaches to the station, and to launch an attack on the garrison immediately after the train was blown up. For insurance, a specially trained group mined the station's exit switches. The ambush site was chosen 2 kilometers from the station in a section where the road ran through a notch and the paratroopers’ positions were located, as it were, above the rails. First, two armored railcars passed from the western direction. The paratroopers let them through. Soon the train appeared. Approaching the border of the station, the locomotive slowed down. As soon as the locomotive caught up with the paratroopers, dozens of bunches of grenades flew at it. There was an explosion of terrible force. At the same time, the station garrison was attacked. The enemy was completely defeated. The paratroopers of the 214th Brigade acted so boldly and boldly throughout the raid on enemy rear lines.
At the end of August, the 214th Airborne Brigade made its way to its troops and reached the location of the 21st Army. On August 28, she concentrated on the southwestern outskirts of the city of Mena (east of Chernigov) in readiness to advance in the direction of Semenovka. On September 5, the brigade defended itself on the southern bank of the Desna River in the area of Butovka station. after being replaced in defense by units of the 67th Rifle Corps, the brigade was withdrawn to the army reserve in the Shapovalovka area. Subsequently, the brigade was withdrawn from the battle and returned to the airborne forces.
As of September 1, 1941, it was part of the 21st Army of the Bryansk Front.
On December 15, 1941, west of the city of Klin, a battalion of 415 people, commanded by Captain I. G. Starchak, was dropped behind German troops retreating under the onslaught of the Red Army, which launched a counteroffensive near Moscow on December 5. The Germans retreated to Volokolamsk, hoping to gain a foothold on a line prepared in advance for defense along the Lama and Ruza rivers. They moved along the only road that had not yet been cut, leading to Teryaeva Sloboda. A battalion from the 214th Airborne Brigade landed here. On the night of December 15, he straddled the road, destroyed communication lines and blocked the path of German troops. The paratroopers not only blocked the path from Klin to Teryaeva Sloboda. They also blocked other possible routes of German escape to the west. For 9 days they attacked moving columns, destroyed small garrisons, blew up bridges, and set fire to tankers with gasoline for tanks and trucks. In total, the paratroopers blew up 29 bridges, burned 48 tankers, knocked out 2 tanks, and destroyed at least 400 enemy soldiers. Operating in small sabotage groups along enemy communications in a wide area, the paratroopers forced the enemy to abandon their heavy weapons. Only a few managed to break out of Klin in a western direction. For the successful leadership of the operation, Captain Starchak was promoted to major.
Fierce spring of 1942. The surrounded Germans are holding the Demyansk bridgehead with their last strength. In order to disrupt the “cauldron” communications, the Soviet command throws the First Maneuverable Airborne Brigade into battle. In monstrously difficult conditions, behind enemy lines, in swamps, in thirty-degree frost, without help or supplies, eating tree bark and horses that had died in the fall, 18-year-old paratroopers accomplished the impossible - thanks to their actions, the Luftwaffe lost half of its transport vehicles in the Demyansk “cauldron” planes that they will miss so much...
General Maltsev. History of the Air Force... Boris Plushov
History of the Air Force of the Russian Liberation Movement during the Second World War (1942–1945). Edited and with a foreword by I. Shtifanov. Publishing house SBONR. Author Archpriest Boris Vlasenko (Boris Petrovich Plushov) was born in 1923 (according to other sources, in 1921) in Mogilev. Lieutenant of the Red Army. During the Second World War in 1941, he was captured by the Germans (according to other sources, he was a Russian emigrant, studied at the Faculty of Architecture of the University of Munich). In 1942 he ended up in Berlin, where he met a colonel of the Russian liberation...
Against the Messers and Sabers Sergei Kramarenko
Do you want to know what luck is? Read the book by Sergei Kramarenko, a fighter pilot, the first ace of the jet era, who went through two wars. He was lucky - after graduating from college with twenty minutes of flying time on LaGG-3, he got the chance to finish his studies in the reserve regiment and only in the fall of 1942 he went to the front. He was lucky, he did not immediately fall into the thick of battle, but began to fight, gradually gaining combat experience. He was shot down and captured, but he was lucky again, and the German officer canceled the execution. And soon the offensive operation of the Red Army began, Kramarenko...
Companions of Peter Nikolai Pavlenko
N.M. Karamzin called the associates of Peter I “pygmies arguing about the legacy of a giant.” But the assessment of the great historian can hardly be considered fair. Peter's gift for guessing the talents of the people around him and using them for the benefit of the state is known. And the reader will be convinced that Peter’s comrades-in-arms had undoubted talents by reading the book offered to his attention. It is based on N.I. Pavlenko’s study “Chicks of Petrov’s Nest”, which has gone through several editions, telling about four of Peter’s associates – Field Marshal Boris Petrovich...
Afghan diary Yuri Lapshin
This book is an impartial story from a paratrooper officer of the Russian Armed Forces, a direct participant in the hostilities, about the military operations of the Airborne Forces in Afghanistan, as well as about soldiers and officers who fulfilled their military duty with honor. And also a real confirmation that the memory of those events and people who showed themselves to be real heroes will remain forever. Publisher's abstract from the cover: Yu. Lapshin's personal diaries were written in difficult conditions. Their significance is even greater now, when the times of the Afghan War are receding further into history. From…
Under the wing of the earth Lev Ekonomov
Lev Arkadyevich Ekonomov was born in 1925. He grew up and studied in Yaroslavl. In 1942 he volunteered for the Soviet Army and participated in the Patriotic War. He was first an aviation mechanic in an assault regiment, then an air gunner. In 1952 he graduated from the literary department of the Yaroslavl Pedagogical Institute. After demobilization in 1950, he began working in the regional newspapers “Severny Rabochiy”, “Yunost”, and then in Moscow in the newspaper “Soviet Sport”. He wrote essays, correspondence, and stories. The newspaper “Soviet Aviation” published a story...
Interceptors Lev Ekonomov
Lev Arkadyevich Ekonomov was born in 1925. He grew up and studied in Yaroslavl. In 1942 he volunteered for the Soviet Army and participated in the Patriotic War. He was first an aviation mechanic in an assault regiment, then an air gunner. After demobilization in 1950, he began working in the regional newspapers “Severny Rabochiy”, “Yunost”, and then in Moscow in the newspaper “Soviet Sport”. He wrote essays, correspondence, and stories. The newspaper “Soviet Aviation” published L. Ekonomov’s story “Readiness No. 1”. In 1952 he graduated from the literary department of Yaroslavl...
When the violin cries. Part 1 Victor Dan
Trainee investigator Mikhail Egorovich Grechka (M.E.Gre.) is investigating the brutal murder of a young and beautiful violinist, a rising star in the musical horizon, four years ago. The killer is convicted, but does not agree with the court's decision. The real criminal, suspects, relatives and the city prosecutor are obstructing the investigation for various reasons. The hero of the novel went through a difficult test in the Afghan war as part of the airborne troops, and this helps him overcome many obstacles in the investigation of the crime. Stunning...
Hate of the Wolf Vadim Tarasenko
A graduate of the Higher Ryazan Institute of Airborne Forces, Andrei Kedrov, by the will of fate, finds himself hundreds of thousands of light years from Earth, where three powerful civilizations have come together in a brutal confrontation. The Russian special forces officer was not at a loss and took an active part in this confrontation. Kedrov will have to fight not only with the enemies of his new homeland, his new family, his manhood will require protection. And winning such a battle is sometimes much more difficult than against an obvious enemy. About Star Wars, about the adventures of the Russian...
Wolf from Planet Earth Vadim Tarasenko
A graduate of the Higher Ryazan Institute of Airborne Forces, Andrei Kedrov wants to serve in the special forces of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, to participate in the dangerous operations carried out by this elite of Russian troops. And when his dream seemed about to come true, Andrei finds himself in a mess in which, in order to survive, he will need all the knowledge and skills of a paratrooper officer. And a little more luck. After all, by the will of fate, he will find himself hundreds of thousands of light years away from his homeland, where two...
Warriors of the Zone Andrey Levitsky
A mysterious force shoots down an army helicopter over the Exclusion Zone. A special group of military stalkers goes in search of a fallen car to save its only occupant. Suddenly, a hunt begins for the paratroopers. Ominous messages arrive on the PDA, their sender is unknown. Former comrades become enemies, strange creatures and previously unknown anomalies stand in the way. Fighting their way through the Zone, military personnel are trying to understand what is happening, who lured them into a deadly trap... The author of this book served in the airborne troops...
German paratroopers 1939-1945 B. Querry
The official order on the creation of the German airborne troops was signed on January 29, 1936. According to this document, a recruitment of volunteers was announced to participate in parachute training. The harsh training methods corresponded to the “ten commandments” that Hitler himself gave to the paratroopers: “You are the chosen soldiers of the Wehrmacht. You must strive for battle and be able to endure all hardships. War must become your need. Tells about the history of creation, combat operations, organization, equipment and uniforms of German paratroopers...
Paratroopers of the Japanese fleet Masao Yamabe
Abstract: The book "Paratroopers of the Japanese Fleet" is the first work among translated foreign books published in the Soviet Union and dedicated to the former airborne troops of Japan. It was written by a naval parachute officer, Lieutenant Commander Yamabe, and was published in Japan in May 1956. Until the end of 1940, that is, before his transfer to naval aviation, the author was a navigator of the destroyer Kiji, participated in the blockade of the Chinese coast, and then was assigned to the Yokosuka naval aviation detachment as a parachute tester.…
Vest for a cyborg Nikolay Ruban
Nikolai Ruban is a lieutenant colonel of the GRU special forces, an Afghan warrior, a brilliantly educated person who speaks English and Chinese, and an amazing lover of life. He managed to excitingly tell how ordinary boys become real special forces officers, to show the real life of future soldiers in such a way that boys and girls, grown men and women, even far from army problems, laugh and worry with him, are proud and fall in love. He writes in such a way that the reader stops only at the last line of the book. And, having finished reading it, he suddenly realizes...
The privilege of landing Vladimir Osipenko
This is not a detective story, not a fantasy, it is a true document of the era. Sparkling notes from an Airborne Forces officer - about difficult service, about fierce battles on Afghan soil, about friends and, of course, about himself. It’s like a mosaic: from seemingly small and not very significant stories, a canvas of military labor is formed. The airborne troops are presented not in ceremonial splendor, but in the sweat and calluses of soldiers and officers, in overcoming themselves, in true camaraderie, in respect for the memory of grandfathers and fathers who laid down their lives “for their friends”...
Notes from test parachutist Vasily Romanyuk
The name of test parachutist Vasily Grigorievich Romanyuk is well known not only in the Soviet Union, but also beyond its borders. The courage and high parachute skill of this outstanding tester brought our Motherland more than one world record in parachuting and magnified his glory. Vasily Grigorievich Romaniuk was the first in the world to complete 3,000 parachute jumps. Most of these jumps are test ones and behind each of them there are months of hard work, creative quests, doubts and hopes of a whole team of designers, engineers, doctors,...
Margelov Boris Kostin
The name of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Army General V.F. Margelov (1906 - 1990), is inextricably linked with many bright pages in the history of the Airborne Forces of our country. Veterans of the Great Patriotic War remember Vasily Filippovich as a participant in the famous Victory Parade on Red Square in Moscow in June 1945. Many generations of paratroopers know that he rightfully belongs to the primacy in developing issues of the operational-strategic use of the Airborne Forces, equipping them with modern mobile equipment and landing equipment.…
On the very eve of the German offensive, the full-blooded 9th Guards Rifle Division, intended to strengthen Efremov’s strike group, entered the breakthrough. Divisional Commander General A.P. Beloborodov immediately “became clear that the fascist troops had taken decisive action with the goal of “cutting down” the basis of the breakthrough of the strike group of the 33rd Army and encircling it.” However, on the same day, by order of Zhukov, the division was transferred to Golubev’s army and received an order to leave the breakthrough and take the village of Zakharovo, which the guards were storming until February 13. The divisions of the 33rd Army that remained under the command of the alcoholic tyrant General Kondratiev were generally unable to carry out any tasks due to the complete disorganization of management. One after another, members of the Army Military Council and even the head of the Front Political Directorate wrote the most negative characteristics about the chief of staff: “Kondratiev continues to drink. Today I got so drunk that I was unable to work... Kondratiev completely decomposed. There is now no person who could be entrusted with the leadership of the headquarters... ...On March 6, 1942, while drunk, he signed a clearly impossible combat order. As a result, the units suffered unnecessary losses... Everyone at headquarters and units knows about Kondratyev’s drunkenness and idleness, which is why Kondratyev has no authority.” It was to this person that Zhukov entrusted the responsibility to provide the rear of the Efremov group. To radiograms from Efremov, who found himself surrounded, demanding that communications be quickly restored and the strike force strengthened, Zhukov responded with reinforced concrete: “Less hysterics. Be more calm" or "You are not given the right to enter into polemics with the Military Council of the front and direct criticism...", but he could not provide any real help. All attempts by the 43rd Army to restore contact with the Efremovites were unsuccessful. By the beginning of March, at the cost of heavy losses, Golubev’s troops only managed to slightly push back the enemy and reach the Vorya River. On February 5, Model's 9th Army unexpectedly delivered a strong blow to the 29th Army of the Kalinin Front from Rzhev and at the same time a counter attack from the Olenino area. As a result, by February 17, Shvetsov’s army was cut off from the 39th and found itself in complete isolation.
The position of Soviet troops in the Western direction deteriorated sharply in February. Weakened by prolonged battles, they lost their offensive capabilities. Therefore, the Headquarters allocated to General Konev from its reserve the Guards Rifle Corps, 7 rifle divisions and 4 air regiments, and for Zhukov - the Guards Rifle Corps, 3 rifle divisions, the 4th Airborne Corps, 200 tanks and 60 thousand marching reinforcements. By a directive dated February 16, the Headquarters demanded that the Western High Command mobilize all the forces of the Kalinin and Western Fronts to complete the defeat of Army Group Center. The troops were tasked with destroying the enemy group operating in the area of Rzhev, Vyazma, Yukhnov, and by March 5 reaching the line of Olenino, the Dnieper River, Yelnya and further along the Desna River to Snopoti. At the same time, the armies of the left wing of the Western Front were supposed to eliminate the enemy group in the Volkhov, Zhizdra, Bryansk region and liberate the city of Bryansk. Guided by these instructions, Zhukov decided first to defeat the Olenin and Yukhnovsky enemy groups with the forces of the 22, 30 and 39 armies of the Kalinin Front and the 43, 49 and 50 armies of the Western Front, and then with a combined blow from both fronts to complete the defeat of the main enemy forces in the area Rzhev and Vyazma. The 16th and 61st armies were given the task of attacking in the Bryansk direction. Subsequent events showed that the troops were given overly complex tasks. The new offensive of the Kalinin Front did not bring success; it was not possible to release the troops of General Shvetsov; They had to break through to join the 39th Army with heavy fighting and heavy losses. To help those surrounded, Konev decided to parachute the 4th parachute battalion of the 204th airborne brigade under the command of senior lieutenant P.A. into the Monchalovo and Okorokovo area they held. Belotserkovsky - more than 400 people. The landing took place on the night of February 17 by single aircraft in several passes from an altitude of 300 m. During the drop of paratroopers and cargo, TB-3 aircraft flew in a circle over the landing site. The Germans fired at them with rifles and machine guns, since the radius of the 29th Army's combat area had by this time been reduced to 4 km. Despite this, neither the pilots nor the paratroopers suffered any losses in the air. In total, 312 people were transferred to the given area, 75 people were brought back, and 38 paratroopers were mistakenly dropped off near Staritsa. Only 166 people gathered at the location of Shvetsov’s troops. How they could help the army commander is unclear. On February 28, the remnants of the 29th Army, numbering 6,000 people, broke out of the ring to their own. According to German data, 4,888 soldiers and commanders were captured, and another 26,647 people died on the battlefield. Thus, the Germans cut off the first half of the pincers that were supposed to squeeze the main forces of Army Group Center in February. Konev's attempts in March and April to continue the offensive and complete the assigned tasks failed. General Model received from the Fuhrer the Oak Leaves of the Iron Cross and the nickname “fireman for hopeless situations.” On February 17, General Belov’s group received an order from the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Direction to bypass Vyazma from the west and intercept the Vyazma-Smolensk railway. At the same time, Sokolov's 11th Cavalry Corps, breaking through from the north, was supposed to reach the highway. The offensive began in the evening of the next day and developed successfully. The 2nd Guards Cavalry Division with an unexpected blow knocked the Germans out of the village of Izborovo; on February 21, the 8th Airborne Brigade occupied the village of Bekasovo, and the 41st Cavalry Division occupied Yakovlevo. Soviet units cut the railway and partially destroyed it. At this time, Sokolov’s corps intercepted the highway and consolidated in the villages of Azarovo and Chernovo, 6 km to the north. However, the two mobile groups failed to connect. The enemy, having brought up tanks, aircraft and 3 armored trains, first pushed Sokolov’s corps away from the highway, and on February 25 launched a series of counterattacks on Belov’s group, encircling the 41st Cavalry Division, Onufriev’s brigade, Major Soldatov’s 250th Regiment and the 329th Infantry Division. Belov had to abandon the attack on Vyazma in order to save his troops. The 2nd Guards Cavalry Division went to help those surrounded. After 3 days of fighting, the cavalrymen and paratroopers managed to break through the enemy ring and connect with the main forces. But the losses were great. Thus, in the 75th Cavalry Division there were only 59 active bayonets. The command of the 329th Division decided to fight its way east, to Efremov’s 33rd Army. In fact, no one was in control of the division anymore; it broke up into small groups that acted according to their own understanding. As a result, approximately 700 people were able to infiltrate through the enemy’s battle formations to Belov and Efremov. On March 10, Major Soldatov brought the remnants of the 250th regiment - 75 skiers - to the location of the cavalry corps. In the midst of the most difficult battles in the most unfavorable conditions Zhukov sent the group commander a new telegram: “... Why did you, contrary to the orders of Headquarters and the Military Council of the front, leave Vyazma? Who gave you the right to choose your task? The task is determined by my order. You seem to have forgotten what happens for failure to comply with an order, although you yourself arrest and bring to trial those responsible...” What, however, is the management style! The infallible Zhukov “seems to have forgotten” that the troops of Belov and Efremov have been fighting behind enemy lines for more than a month, receiving almost no help from the front command, except for new tasks and monotonous threats: “We did not receive ammunition from the “Mainland”, so we used guns and shells that were collected behind enemy lines.
They were left here during the retreat of Soviet troops in the fall of 1941. The shells lay under the snow for a long time, ninety percent of them did not explode.” All that remained was to load the guns with Zhukov telegrams. It was clear that Vyazma could no longer be taken. To assist the troops of the Western Front in encircling and defeating the Yukhnov group, Zhukov decided to conduct another airborne operation. February 10 The 4th Airborne Corps received the task, with the forces of the 9th and 214th brigades and the battalion of the 8th brigade, to land in the area west of Yukhnov, break through the enemy’s defense front from the rear in the direction of Klyuchi, and subsequently reach the Varshavskoe highway and connect with units of the 50th Army. Boldin's army should have advanced towards the airborne assault and captured the areas of Babykino, Klyuchi, and Pesochnya. To land the corps, an aviation group consisting of 64 PS-84 and TB-3 aircraft was formed. This time the landing was supposed to be carried out from the Lyubertsy and Vnukovo airfields near Moscow, well covered by Moscow air defense forces. The landing center was chosen to be a site east of the village Desire , which was controlled by the partisans. The operation was planned to be carried out over three days, each transport aircraft was supposed to perform 2 flights per night. The command strictly warned the aircraft crews about personal responsibility for the accuracy of the drop of each group of paratroopers. After such instructions, many pilots, in cases where the signals posted on the ground inspired doubts, preferred to return to their airfields without completing the mission. This led to disruption of the departure schedule and repeated flights of a significant number of aircraft. German aviation did not have the ability to strike airfields near Moscow, but provided active opposition on transport aviation flight routes and over the landing area, especially since air echelons with landing forces often followed without fighter escort. German bombers attacked the landing sites of paratroopers. Soviet bombers and attack aircraft did not support the landing forces in the landing area or during the fighting. First on the night of The 4th battalion of the 8th airborne brigade landed. Only 12 crews completed the task, dropping 293 people and 32 bales of cargo. The remaining aircraft were unable to find the target area due to loss of orientation. Confusion and uncertainty in the actions of the pilots was brought about by a large number of bonfires and fires on the ground, among which it was difficult to recognize “their” signals. In addition, in the future the enemy also gave signals, designating false sites or gathering places. Our bosses didn’t think of using light or radio equipment instead of primitive fires laid out in the form of various “letters,” or maybe they simply didn’t know what it was. Moreover, the imagination was not even enough to assign a separate signal to each Soviet group behind enemy lines: Belov’s air-supplied cavalry, Kirilov’s partisans and Efremov’s infantrymen were burning fires in an identical manner at the same time. In the following nights, units of the 9th and 214th brigades landed. Instead of three nights, the operation took a week, during which time 7,100 people and 1,500 bales were thrown behind enemy lines. On the night of February 23, the headquarters of the 4th Airborne Forces flew to the landing area. The entire command followed in one low-speed TB-3 aircraft, which, on approaching the target, was attacked by a German Me-110 night fighter. As a result, the corps commander, General Levashov, was killed by shrapnel and several staff officers were wounded. Command was assumed by the Chief of Staff, Colonel A.F. Kazankin. But overall, the damage caused by German aircraft was small. The paratroopers suffered much more serious losses - over 2,000 people - as a result of an inaccurate drop due to the fault of their own transport aircraft. As before, there were numerous cases of people and cargo being thrown over a large area, from a height of 1000-2000 m, instead of the required 600 m - to the location of the 33rd Army, Belov's corps, to enemy battle formations and further beyond the Dnieper. Losses of cargo significantly reduced the combat effectiveness of the landing force; the loss of skis deprived many units of mobility. Until February 23, while the landing continued, parts of the corps concentrated in the assembly areas, searched for dropped property and conducted reconnaissance. The Germans, in turn, from the very first night of the appearance of paratroopers in their rear, began to strengthen the garrisons and defensive structures. Many buildings in populated areas were adapted for firing points, ice trenches and various barriers were built. The garrisons were reinforced with tanks and artillery. Having taken command of the corps, Colonel Kazankin contacted his brigades and the command of the 50th Army. By this time, General Boldin's troops, approaching the Warsaw Highway at the Sapovo-Savinki line, encountered stubborn enemy resistance, which they were unable to overcome. On the night of 18th of Febuary 9th Airborne Brigade Colonel I.I. Kurysheva, destroying small garrisons along the way, reached the settlements of Prechistoye and Kurakino, where she was stopped by the Germans. 212th Brigade of Lieutenant Colonel N.E. Kolobovnikova tried to immediately capture strongholds in Ivantsevo, Kostinki, Zherdovka, but was unsuccessful. During the night from February 24 to February 25, corps units conducted reconnaissance searches, improved their positions and prepared for repeated attacks on strong points. The only means of suppression that the paratroopers had was fire from small arms and mortars. However, it could not be particularly intense due to the limited amount of ammunition. Therefore, the corps operated mainly at night, with surprise attacks. In total, Kazankin’s units had about five infantry regiments in front of them, belonging to the 131st, 34th and 31st divisions. They were located in populated areas adapted for defense, occupied fortified positions, were reinforced with artillery and supported by bomber aircraft. Thus, from the first day of hostilities, the corps along the entire offensive front encountered an organized defense, which became increasingly stronger due to the fact that the landing and collection of airborne units dragged on for a long time. The enemy, having determined the intentions and direction of attacks by the troops of the 4th Airborne Forces, immediately began to pull additional forces into the area of operation. Despite this, the paratroopers in certain directions advanced 20-22 km towards the front forces and captured a number of settlements. As a result of the battles on February 23-28, units of the corps reached the line indicated by the command of the Western Front, where a meeting was to take place with the troops of the 50th Army. Several reconnaissance groups of the 9th Airborne Brigade even managed to get through the Warsaw Highway and establish contact with the units of General Boldin. But the 50th Army was unable to break through the front and connect with the paratroopers, and the corps, having suffered significant losses and with a limited amount of ammunition, went on the defensive on March 1. As a result, the landing operation did not achieve its goals. The troops of the 43rd, 49th and 50th armies did not achieve decisive success. Only in early March, after heavy multi-day battles, they managed to cut off the Yukhnovsky ledge and liberate Yukhnov. They were unable to advance further. The current situation necessitated a long stay of units of the 4th Airborne Forces behind enemy lines. In this situation, the corps' tasks were reduced to holding the captured area and sabotage activities on German communications. The lack of regular supplies - after all, according to the plan of the operation, the airborne combat operations were supposed to last no more than 2-3 days - artillery and tanks, as well as weak air support from front-line aviation, did not allow the paratroopers to successfully carry out complex combat missions. Essentially, airborne brigades and battalions turned into ordinary lightweight rifle units and partisan detachments. Analyzing this operation, General Lisov writes: “...at the end of January and beginning of February, several centers of struggle for Soviet troops developed in the rear of the enemy’s Vyazma grouping. These are the groups of General Belov and Efremov, the groups of paratroopers Major Soldatov and Lieutenant Colonel Onufriev. By the time the decision was made to use the 4th Airborne Corps in February, the position of these groups could not even be considered satisfactory. This raises the question: was it worth throwing paratroopers towards the troops of the 50th Army in this situation? Wouldn't it be better to use the 4th Airborne Forces first to strengthen Efremov's group, then, connecting these troops with General Belov's group, form a single bridgehead and, relying on it, under a single command... strike to the north between Vyazma and Smolensk , towards the 11th Cavalry Corps of the Kalinin Front or south towards the army of General Boldin? But the command of the Western Front did not give appropriate instructions. Inconsistency both in the timing and direction of the actions of the Soviet troops near Vyazma did not allow decisive successes to be achieved, and the enemy was able to repel their attacks piecemeal, now in one place or another, maneuvering with their own forces and means.” During the Patriotic War, the Soviet command tried to carry out another major airborne operation in September 1943, when our troops reached the ruble of the Dnieper. It would seem that, having the most valuable experience of the Vyazma landings, it was now possible to foresee everything. However, in reality, no one needed the experience, and miscalculations in organizing the operation reached the level of cretinism. The purpose of the landing was to assist the troops of the 40th Army of the Voronezh Front in expanding the so-called Bukrinsky bridgehead on the western bank of the river. For the landing, a consolidated airborne corps consisting of the 1st, 3rd and 5th brigades was allocated under the command of the deputy commander of the Airborne Forces, Major General I.I. Zatevakhina. The operation plan was personally approved by the Headquarters representative, Marshal Zhukov, who, in order to maintain secrecy, prohibited interaction and exchange of information between the army and airborne headquarters - “let everyone solve their own problems.” In accordance with this idea, brigade commanders received a combat order on September 24 at 16.00 - an hour and a half before the personnel boarded the planes; battalion commanders have 30 minutes left to assign tasks to their subordinates; Company and platoon commanders briefed the soldiers in the air. There was no reliable intelligence information about the composition and grouping of the enemy, and those that were available were ignored. The advance of German reserves to the area of the proposed landing went unnoticed. Significantly fewer transport aircraft arrived in the initial areas than planned, and their carrying capacity turned out to be less than that included in the landing calculations and tables. The gas tankers sent 30 minutes (!) before takeoff did not have time to refuel all the cars in such a short time. As a result, the landing was carried out not according to plan, but by individual aircraft as they were refueled. Already during the operation it became clear that the fuel had run out, so the operation was stopped. Total night September 25 managed to land the 3rd and 2nd battalions of the 5th Airborne Brigade - 4575 people without 45 mm guns. As a result of the pilots losing their bearings and the desire to quickly leave the enemy’s anti-aircraft fire zone, paratroopers and cargo were dropped randomly from altitudes of up to 1000 m and at high speeds. This led to the scattering of the landing force over a huge area between Rzhishchev and Cherkassy. Some of the paratroopers were thrown directly into the Dnieper, 230 people - on their territory. 13 planes returned back without finding the landing area. The bulk of the landing force fell directly into the enemy’s battle formations, and here, so to speak, empirically it was established that five German divisions, including two tank divisions, were concentrated against the bridgehead. But the paratroopers were not even able to report their “discovery” to their multi-star superiors due to loss of communication (as a result of disorderly loading and improper distribution of radio equipment). For example, the commander of the 3rd Airborne Brigade, flying on the same plane with his chief of staff, did not take with him a single long-range radio, while other planes had 3-6 radio stations with radio operators. And the radio stations, in turn, were parachuted separately from the power supplies. And all this was scattered over an area of over 1500 km! Many radios were lost in the air or immediately after landing; some failed due to technical reasons. As a result, most unit commanders were left without radio equipment. Due to an unsuccessful drop, the paratroopers were doomed to operate independently in small groups in their landing areas. From September 25 to October 5, 43 such groups with a total number of about 2,300 people operated behind enemy lines. Of course, they could not provide any real assistance to the troops of the Voronezh Front. At the end of September, Lieutenant Colonel Sidorchuk managed to gather several such groups in the Kanevsky forest and put together a combined brigade of 600 people, which proceeded to sabotage operations. Only on October 6 was it joined by a group of signalmen with a working radio station, which for the first time established contact with the 40th Army.
Meanwhile, it was enough to open Field manual of the Red Army 1940, which clearly stated: "The use of airborne assaults requires the organization of thorough reconnaissance of the release areas(landing) and landing actions; secrecy and surprise of use; reliable provision of combat aviation for the transportation of airborne troops and their subsequent ground operations; strict accounting of the time required for the landing force to prepare for the operation and perform the combat mission; organizing reliable communications with the dropped troops». That charter was not written for our marshals. Zhukov did not say a single line about these events in his memoirs, nor about Stalin’s order, which, in particular, indicated that “the release of a mass landing at night indicates about the illiteracy of the organizers of this case... (emphasis added) ». Neither the General Staff nor Zhukov dabbled in airborne operations anymore— the idea turned out to be too complicated.
This year marks the 70th anniversary of the landing at Vyazma. Check out the action plan for landing the 106th Airborne Division and 45th Special Operations Division and BMD-1, BMD-2, 2S-9 The date of the event is still being coordinated. Most likely February 10, 2012
1 prisoner of war, captured 2.4.42 south of the Maslovo - Lyubno line
Military unit: 7th company, III battalion
Rank: lieutenant – active
Position: company commander
Name: Voiko Andrey
Indications: Indications have been confirmed.
The brigade commander, Grinev, must have been wounded near Igozhevo and is now in the 1st brigade. From the 1st brigade, approximately 500 wounded must still be running through the forests south and southwest of Igozhevo. After the attack on Igozhevo, the captain of the 204th brigade headed with them through Zalesye to the southeast and fell in battles near the village of Novosel.
According to unverified data, the 204 brigade should belong to I airborne corps. The commander of this corps is Major General Zholudev, who is located with his headquarters in Lyubertsy, 25 km. east of Moscow. The corps should include the following brigades: 1, 11 and 204 airborne brigades.
Regarding the general mood in Russia, he said that few people believe in the final victory of Russia. The mood everywhere, even in officer circles, is depressed. There is no point in hiding human losses, since almost every family has faced this. In rural areas there is a significant increase in food prices. A card system for food products has been introduced. Speculation brings good results.
In October, servicemen born 23 and 24 years old were already called up. The prisoner of war presents all the human material available in Russia in the form of 3 sets. The first and second sets have already been practically used up, so now it is necessary to introduce the 3rd set into battle.
A month ago, one of the Russian newspapers indicated the number of Russians missing and killed in battle since 22.6.41: 4 million. At the beginning of the war, Russia was able to mobilize 25 million people. They could not all be equipped with everything necessary, since the military industry did not meet the demand. Only during the autumn was it gradually possible to supply new divisions with weapons and introduce them into battle.
1 prisoner of war, captured 3.4.42 in a Russian camp near the Gladkoe swamp.
Military unit: 8th company, III
Indications: The remnants of the 204th and 1st airborne brigades, numbering 400 people, had been in this camp for 6 days. Half the soldiers were wounded and suffered from severe frostbite. 2 days ago, most of them left the camp and headed north. Only the sick and wounded remained, who could no longer move.
400 m to the west of the camp there was a food release site. On nights 1, 2 and 3.4, Russian planes dropped food, namely crackers and canned food. Food was calculated only for the remaining sick and wounded of both brigades. The landing of the planes - we were talking about 2 planes that replaced each other - was not crowned with success.
1 prisoner of war, captured 4.4.42 south of Annino
(administrator’s comment: presumably Dmitry Pavlovich Opanasenko: see staffing table (age) + list without losses)
Military unit: 12th company, IV battalion 1st airborne brigade
Rank: junior lieutenant
Position: platoon commander
Testimony: After the attack on Tarasovo, the brigade tried to break through to the south through Chernoye. When this attempt failed, the brigade moved from Cherny through square 84.7 to square 80.1. There she received provisions by air. The further route passed through square 74.0 to the camp on the Gladkoe swamp. The unification took place there I, III and IV battalions - total number 150 people - with II battalion, which arrived earlier and numbered 150 people. The remnants of the 204th brigade, consisting of 200 people, also arrived a little later at the camp.
The brigade commander, senior lieutenant Tarasov, left this camp, but returned again after 1.5 days. The prisoner could not say whether he left alone or with military personnel.
The remainder of both brigades set up the next camp in the northwest of a small swamp 2 km away. west of Igozhevo. On the night from 1 to 2.4 they tried to cross the Demyansk - Bobkovo line in a northerly direction. Since they did not succeed, they continued their journey in a southerly direction. They moved in 3 groups, led by the remnants of the 204th brigade. There were 200 people in group 1. It also included Tarasov. Group 2 consisted of 100 people. The prisoner cannot name the exact number of soldiers of the 3rd group, which was slightly smaller. Between the 3 groups there was a distance of approximately 100 - 150 m. After the 3.4 air attack, a group of 200 people lost approximately 48.
On the night of 4.4 they tried to cross the Annino-Zalesye line in a southwestern direction. They intended to cross the German front to reunite with their units.
The last time supplies were dropped was U2 on the night of 2.4. The serving was 50–60 g of crackers per person and one can of canned food.
All brigade officers were equipped PPSh , and privates with semi-automatic weapons. Each company had approximately 12 light machine guns. Heavy mortars were initially available to the brigade, but were then abandoned by the crews. Each was also equipped with a raincoat, which they almost all threw away. In the end, only the brigade commander had 1 radio station, all the rest were either damaged or fell into the hands of the Germans. The prisoner said that the servicemen were equipped with felt boots instead of leather boots, since they thought that they would not need leather boots until 21.4, when both brigades were supposed to finish their operations in the Demyansk area and return to their units.
The brigade had 2 translators who had the rank of junior lieutenant. The prisoner himself made a relatively good impression; he was only 21 years old, an active officer, and a soldier since 1939.
1 prisoner of war, taken on 4/4/42 in Maslovo.
Military unit: 3rd company, I battalion 204 airborne brigade.
Indications: The prisoner belonged to a scattered group of 70 people. The group consisted of sick and wounded who, after the attack on Igozhevo, during the march to the south, fell behind the brigade and, when trying to cross the front east of Kornevo, lost contact with it. They walked under the leadership of a lieutenant from the 1st brigade, who explained to them that they must engage in partisan warfare in order to get provisions. Most of them were so weak that they could hardly move. They received their last supply on March 26.
1 prisoner of war , taken 5.4.42 from Zalesye.
Rank:medical captain
Job title:head of the medical aid station
Name:SUSLIN Vsevolod
Military unit:1 airborne brigade
Indications:After futile attempts to break through at Cherny and Lunevo, approximately 800 people remained from the remnants of the 204th and 1st brigades, who were located in the Gladkoe swamp area.
The plane that then landed at Lunevo was supposed to pick up the wounded commissar of the brigade, Machikhin. But since the plane could no longer rise, it was destroyed by the pilots. The plane brought 2 bags of crackers.
After the attack on Tarasovo, they were delivered by air 3 times, namely: 1 time north of Lunevo and 2 times at the Gladkoe swamp. They received their last supply 3-4 days ago. Everyone was supposed to receive 5-6 crackers and 1 can of canned food per person. When asked how it happened that Russian planes sometimes circled all night and looked for the brigade, he explained that the location of the supply drop had been broadcast in advance by radio. But they did not always complete the task of the day. Supplies were delivered to them mainly by U2 type vehicles. Less commonly used was a large four-engine bomber capable of carrying 28 bags of crackers.
After a halt at the Gladkoe swamp, both brigades headed north. But they failed to cross the Bobkovo-Demyansk line. Then they changed the direction of movement to make their way south of Annino. The prisoner cannot name the number of losses that the brigades suffered due to numerous German air attacks. But he believes that these losses were not very great, since they were quite widely dispersed. The rank and file were so exhausted that despite numerous demands from their commanders to take cover from an air attack when a German reconnaissance plane appeared, they not only did not follow them, but continued to stubbornly march.
When crossing the Annino-Zalesye line, both brigades numbered over 700-750 more people. Only about 250-300 people had to cross the line. The rest remained and wandered in parts in the forest north of Zalesye and did not want to follow Tarasov anymore. The commander of the 1st brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Tarasov, was described by the prisoner as a power-hungry, selfish and vain man who, among other things, claimed that he was the only one who would be able to bring the remnants of both brigades back to the USSR. By the way, Tarasov is wounded, his foot is damaged. The chief of staff of the brigade, Major Shishkin, died near Cherny.
The prisoner had seen so far only one German prisoner of war, namely a wounded pilot who was in the Moscow hospital.
In Russia there is a unified card system that applies to the entire USSR. The rations are as follows:
|
Workers |
Employees |
People with doubts. livelihood |
||||
|
Bread: |
500 g. |
in a day |
||||
|
Meat: |
1200 |
1200 |
1200 |
per month |
||
|
Sugar: |
200 g. |
|||||
|
Candies: |
||||||
|
Oil or lard: |
||||||
The prisoner was born in 1919 in Chita in Siberia, graduated from 10-year school and studied at the medical faculty in Moscow for 4.5 years. He is a Komsomol member.
3 prisoners, taken 6.4.42 at the Diven Mokh swamp.
Military unit: communications company 1st brigade
Indications:On the night of 4.4 the 1st brigade reached, following in a certain order: I, II, III, IV battalions, communications unit and headquarters, Annino - Zalesye line. The prisoners could not say where the remnants of the 204th brigade were going. The commander of the 1st brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Tarasov, had the habit of leading. Before crossing this line, Tarasov explained to them that the battle was over, and they must now avoid any clashes in order to quietly join their units. Before the transition, the battalions dispersed and advanced on a wide front. The units that managed to cross concentrated 3 km southwest of the Annino-Zalesye line on the eastern edge of the Diven Mokh swamp. They had several camps there. The number of people in the camp, where the communications unit and brigade headquarters were located, was approximately 100 people. Commander Tarasov was not with them. The next camp with the 3rd battalion was located 500 m north of the previous one. A fire was lit. The positions were not equipped, but only guards were posted.
They were told that the plane was to bring in supplies that night and that they should rest. On the evening of April 4, at the place where the provisions were dropped, they lit 4 fires, placing them in a square. Throughout the night, supplies were delivered by 2 U2 aircraft. The portion for each person was 400 g of crackers, 200 g of pressed porridge, 75 g of lard, 100 g of sugar, 20-30 g of tea, and a bouillon cube weighing 75 g.
In addition, one U2 plane landed at night, which took away the wounded brigade commissar; he had a serious injury to his foot. The brigade commissar was wounded near Cherny and from that time on he was dragged on tied skis.
The number of both brigades after crossingthe Zalesye-Annino line should have been as follows:
204 crew of only 100 people
1 brigade 460 people
The number of wounded and sick, including frostbite, included in these teams ranged from 40 to 70%.
5.4 the brigades did not change their positions. On the night of 6.4, supplies were again delivered to them by air, namely, each received triple the amount of food received the previous night. The plane was accompanied by a 4-engine bomber. In addition, tobacco was provided.
After an air attack on the morning of June 6, the brigade lost approximately 50 people. The 4th battalion suffered the most from artillery fire. By the way, the commander of this battalion died during the shelling. During the shelling, the brigades left their camps, but returned again after the shelling ended. They did not stay in the camp for long and changed their positions in a southerly direction. There was an intention to go 3 km to the south and set up a new camp there.
On the night of April 5, a new commander, a lieutenant colonel, must have arrived from the army by plane with the task of withdrawing the remnants of the brigades. The prisoner could not say the date of crossing the German front.
Ammunition was still available, although not very large reserves, since the Red Army soldiers threw away most of the ammunition. Each person had to have an average of over 40 rounds of ammunition.
The identification mark for Russian pilots consisted of 2 red and 1 green flares fired one after another. 2 red flares indicated a rapid change of positions. The signs have not changed. The 1st brigade also had a radio station, with the help of which they maintained contact with the 34th Army. One of the captives is the carrier of the machine for generating current for this radio station. The prisoner left this car in the snow right before his arrest. On the night of 6.4 there was last contact with the army.
On 6.4.42, three Russian soldiers captured in the northern part of the Diven Mokh swamp, who were radio operators or telephone operators in the 1st Airborne Brigade, were interrogated.
In response to questions, they gave the following testimony:
1.) The sergeant, who was part of the brigade's communications company, was primarily in charge of radio broadcast materials and data. As his company commander he calls Lieutenant Utorny(?), who, according to him, must have died. He further confirms that Captain Grummov was the head of communications in the brigade.
The proposed radio communication scheme contains radio communication between the brigade and 2 battalions. The hours indicated are the time of communication with the battalions. Time data refers to special characters that serve as a password with the exception of call signs. By using a password, radio communication can be ensured even in doubtful cases. He does not know the radio communication plan number 8 of the transcript of radio broadcast No. 2, just as he cannot know the location of the radio station that connects the brigade with the army. The sergeant was servicing a device for communication with battalions, which, according to him, was lost or out of order about 8-10 days ago. These devices received electricity using a pedal generator.
2.) An ordinary soldier, also a radio operator, was said to be carrying a pedal generator for a radio station at the brigade headquarters. This the pedal generator must be lost too, because of which communication with the army was called into question. It is still possible that this connection could survive.
The third prisoner, when asked where the called station is located, replies that it is must stand in the forest 1 that the sergeant doesn't know.
The sergeant confirms that radio signal table No. 4 and the printed code communication table, compiled in a language of 2 and 3 digits, are known only to officers or commanders.
Radio communication between the brigade radio station and the called station in the army should be carried out on wave 102, call signs are not known. He indicated wave 2200 as a backup wave.
The officers mentioned in transcript No. 2 under number 6 are not known.
3.) The third prisoner is also a sergeant and was appointed a telephone operator in the brigade communications company. He says the brigade headquarters has 10 field telephones without cable. Battalions must be equipped with 5-7 telephone sets. He confirms the prisoners' testimony from 5.4. The fact is that the telephone operators do not have a cable with them, a German cable must have been taken and used. He further stated that there was a disagreement between the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Communications before the operation regarding the taking of field telephones with them. The head of communications, Grummov, insisted on taking the telephones.
The prisoner confirms that they saw German cable (permanent line, field telephone cable and field cable) during their movements. The breaking of the permanent communication line on the highway from Demyansk to the west was carried out not by telephone operators, but by sappers of the third battalion. Telephone operators were ordered not to cut the field cable under any circumstances, in order to keep their movements secret. Despite this order, the Ermakovo-Tarasovo wire was still cut, the pieces were partially used for dressing boots. He doesn't remember that the field telephone cable (he calls it the underground cable) was cut. He denies listening to German conversations. He knows nothing about cutting the wire from Zalesye towards Volbovichi; he repeats that there was a categorical order not to cut the wires. The brigade commander Tarasov threatened the death penalty if the wires were cut.
The brigade's telephone sets were thrown away during the movement. They did not have listening devices with them, probably due to a lack of translators. The two translators who were part of the team had other tasks.
On 6.4, a Russian soldier taken 4.4 near Annino, who was appointed as a telephone operator in the 1st Airborne Brigade, was interrogated.
In response to questions, he gave the following testimony:
The brigade's communications chief is Captain Grummov, the brigade commander is Tarasov. – Captain Plusov (Plyusov) is not familiar to him.
The telephone operators were equipped only with field devices; they did not have cable with them; I had to take a German cable. The communications platoon of the battalion headquarters had 7 telephone operators with 7 telephone sets.
He did not cut the field cable; judging by his testimony, he himself had never seen a German cable. The task of destroying the wires was to be entrusted to sappers. According to him, they did not have devices for connecting to German wires.
He does not know the captured radio documentation that was presented to him; he also did not work with it. According to his data, he saw that the radio station was working on 4.4. We are talking about the brigade's radio station. Probably radio contact was maintained with the headquarters of the northwestern front. The radio station is running low on batteries and can no longer be supplied by air due to the impossibility of establishing an appropriate command post.
There is a telephone company at the headquarters. The company consists of telephone operators and radio operators. The head of communications is Captain Grummov.
2 prisoners taken 7.4. to the Diven Mokh swamp (1 doctor and 1 orderly)
Military unit:204th Airborne Brigade
Indications:The brigade still numbers approximately 200 people and 1.4. separated from Tarasov. The 204th brigade is now headed by Commissar Nikitin. Her last mission was to break through the German lines. The last German artillery fire scattered them. This artillery fire caused many casualties, so the doctor was bandaging 50 wounded.
In the north of the Diven Mokh swamp, until a few days ago, planes landed and took away the wounded.
The last supplies were delivered by 5.4 aircraft. for 2 days. The brigade is almost completely equipped with PPSh and automatic rifles. There were only a few machine guns available, while there were no mortars at all.
1 airborne brigade should consist of another 500 people.
2 prisoners taken near Zalesie 7.4.42
Military unit: I MDBR and artillery battalion of the 204th airborne brigade
Indications:Both prisoners belong to a group of 50 escapees who were part of all battalions of both airborne brigades. The group scattered while trying to cross the Zalesye-Annino line. In the morning hours 7.4. 30 people, among whom were 2 political instructors, were supposed to cross the line south of Zalesye and head west to Volbovichi. They then turned off the path into a clearing, as they believed that their units were there.
Despite the long-term shortage of food, the prisoners made a fairly good impression.
6 prisoners taken near Zalesie 7.4.42
Military unit:204th Airborne Brigade
Indications:The prisoners belonged to a group of 60 stragglers who had already been separated from the brigade for 10 days. Of these 60 people, another 20 should have remained. There were 4 officers in this group.
One of the prisoners was in the artillery battalion of the 204th airborne brigade. The entire battalion had three batteries each with 4 anti-tank rifles.
The prisoners gave the impression of completely exhausted people. A few days ago they found the corpse of a horse, which they pounced on and ate.
4 prisoners taken 12.4. north of Novosel
Military unit: 1 prisoner, lieutenant, mortar. company IV
1 junior lieutenant, machine gun platoon IV /1 airborne brigade
1 quartermaster 2nd rank with the rank of lieutenant, supply officer IV /1 airborne brigade (Kassin K.I)
1 prisoner, Red Army soldier, 9th company III /204 airborne brigade
Indications: After the attack on the village of Chernaya, the 4th battalion probably received orders to remain overnight near the village of Chernaya and the next morning to march to the meeting place of both brigades at the Maslovskoye swamp. During artillery fire on the forest northeast of Kornevo, the 4th battalion suffered heavy losses. There was complete confusion. The 4th battalion, consisting of 2 groups, retreated to the Maslovskoye swamp at night.
Prisoners of the 1st brigade were part of a group of 30 people. Group 2 was supposed to consist of approximately 80 people. The unification of both groups did not follow, although they later met again. The group of 30 people was led by a company commander, mortar company IV battalion, which 12.4. he shot himself.
A prisoner of the 204th brigade joined this group a little later. The group once tried to break through the German defense near Ozheedy. Since this attempt failed, they moved north and tried to cross the Annino-Zalesye line. When this attempt failed, they moved south.
In recent days, most of the soldiers were so weak that they could only cover 2-3 km a day. The last time they received supplies was 23.3. Meanwhile, they ate carrion, tree bark and buds. When asked whether they ate human flesh, all the prisoners answered negatively.
The quartermaster was an accountant at a shoe factory in Kirov/Vyatka. The factory employs 3,000 workers and produces 3,000 to 4,000 pairs of boots or lace-up boots daily for the army. There he earned 550 rubles a month. The prisoner was a soldier until the end of January, and then was promoted from Red Army soldier to quartermaster 2nd rank - the rank of lieutenant - due to his knowledge of accounting.
1 prisoner of war, was captured on 4/18/42 west of the Maslovskoe swamp
Military unit: communications company / 1st airborne brigade
Last name, etc.: Alexey Yakovlev, b. 12/21/1915 in Kolomna near Moscow, single
Position: political instructor with the rank of junior lieutenant
Testimony: The prisoner graduated from high school and the technical “Course of Socialist Work” for the metallurgical industry. After completing the course, he was awarded the qualification of a production master. He worked as a production foreman from 1930 to 1936 at the Kolomna metallurgical plant "Kuibyshev". The plant, which produced diesel engines, locomotives, railway cars, trams, etc., employed 20,000 people. From 1936 to 1938 he served in the Far Eastern Military District, namely in the 167th Security Regiment, division unknown, and after finishing his service he continued to work at the Kolomna plant. He finished his service as a private. In 1940 he joined the party. Due to his level of education, party affiliation and leadership position, he was sent on July 15, 1941 to a political school in Moscow. After completing his studies, he was appointed political instructor. The studies included, along with political training, military training. Political courses were conducted by senior commissars, while military courses were led by military specialists. In addition, lectures were held on geography, the economic situation of Germany and its allies, etc. During the course they were told that not a single German had ever been captured.
On September 26 he was transferred to the 1st Airborne Brigade in Zuevka. From that time on, he also knows Tarasov. He described Tarasov as a good commander who was strict but fair and enjoyed authority among the Red Army men. He cannot give any evidence about Tarasov’s military abilities. He also did not know whether Tarasov was politically reliable.
The strength of the communications company, in which he was a political instructor, was 34 people. The commander of the communications company, Captain Grummov, died near Kornevo and was buried by Yakovlev. The 1st Airborne Brigade was assigned a representative of the special department of the NKVD with 5 employees as a supervisory authority. Commissioner Grinshpun, who was a senior political instructor, was with 1 employee at the brigade headquarters, while 4 employees were distributed among the battalions. The control authorities observed exclusively the command staff of the brigade.
19.3. In the Maloye Opuevo area, 3 officers from the headquarters of the Northwestern Front landed, namely Lieutenant Colonel Latypov, Major Stepanchuk and a second major, whose last name the prisoner does not know. When asked about the task of these officers, he explained verbatim: “they were supposed to help the brigade get back on its feet and get out of the encirclement.”
It struck the prisoner that the brigade had been in the Maloye Opuevo area for a very long time, and he considers it likely that this long stay caused dissatisfaction among the command of the Northwestern Front, and therefore 3 officers had to ensure that orders were strictly followed. When asked about Tarasov's attitude towards Latypov, he explained that Tarasov's orders were transmitted to the battalion commanders, but Latypov was against it, and Tarasov at the end of the discussion asked Latypov if he agreed and if he had anything to add. Latypov influenced operations from the first day of his stay in the brigade.
Major Spepanchuk was an aviation officer and had to organize active air defense and ensure the delivery of food by air. Stepanchuk died near Kornevo.
The second officer was from the reconnaissance detachment of the headquarters of the Northwestern Front. The prisoner does not know whether he was a member of the Supreme Military Council of the Soviet Union.
When asked why only a few Red Army men knew about Latypov's existence, he explained that the officers told the soldiers that officers had arrived to lead them out of encirclement.
The prisoner knows nothing about the conflict between Tarasov and Grinev.
Only the political leaders were poorly informed about the military situation and the tasks of both brigades. He himself only knew that the brigade’s task was to create panic behind enemy lines and break through the encirclement from north to south. His task was mainly to encourage the Red Army soldiers when there was no supply, and to reassure them with the speedy delivery of food. Before the attack on Tarasovo, he inspired the soldiers that they must fight courageously and use all their strength to take possession of the village.
After the attack on Tarasovo, all orders were given only to battalion commanders, and not to company commanders, in order to avoid the fact that too much about the brigade's plans would be known when captured.
After an unsuccessful attack on the Nikolaevskoye – Novosel line 7.4. Yakovlev retreated to the Diven Mokh swamp. The group of 40 people that gathered there also included a major of the reconnaissance detachment of the headquarters of the Northwestern Front. The major took all the healthy soldiers under his command and headed with them to the new camp in order to break through the German defense line from there. The number of this group was 18 people. In addition to the major, this group also included 1 lieutenant and 2 junior lieutenants. These 3 officers were sent forward as a reconnaissance party to determine where best to cross the German front. Since these officers did not return, the group set off and, by order of Major 16.4, at the Maslovskoye swamp, it was divided into 4 groups, since he thought that it would be easier to cross the German front. The major chose the 4 best soldiers for himself. There was no radio station available. They had to move in a south or southwest direction.
Whether parts of the brigade managed to cross the Nikolaevskoye-Novosel line is unknown to the prisoner.
The prisoner is of the opinion that, due to better weapons and a numerical advantage, the German Air Force will be able to defeat Russia this year. He considers the Russian winter offensive a failure, since Russia only regained a few cities, although it was planned to return the entire territory of the former Soviet Union.
The prisoner knows that Russian prisoners of war were subjected to repression by the government. They were even shot. Russian prisoners of war released from German captivity were also shot.
Yakovlev confirms that he told the Red Army soldiers that they would be shot by the Germans if they were captured, and therefore it was better if they shot themselves. This was also written in Russian newspapers. He believed it himself.
Yakovlev did not consider himself a convinced communist. He had to then join the party so as not to lose his position. The career of a political instructor began without his special participation. There were many young commissars in the Red Army who, like him, had no inner conviction, but were simply given a choice, either they join the party and use this as a launching pad to become something, or they become railway workers in Siberia.
Communications battalion 123 from 29.3.42
Commander
Interrogation protocol
On 29.3.42 at approximately 18.00, Sergeant Badger of the 204th Airborne Brigade was interrogated. In Lyubertsy, Moscow region, he received the specialty of a radio operator. At the front he was a radio mechanic and carried equipment; due to his hearing loss, he was not suitable as a radio operator. Civilian profession: radio engineer. The radio station presented to him belongs to the 12-RP type. He was not taught to work with such radio stations; They received them quite recently. Radio stations of this type did not work near Igozhevo.
In response to the questions asked, he said the following:
The head of communications of the 204th parachute brigade is Captain Ukrainsky. Besides him, he also knows in the brigade the head of the communications company, Lieutenant Dulnev.
Each company has 1 radio station of the 12-RP type, in addition there are radio stations that are used only by officers. He cannot say anything about the use of such devices. They are smaller in shape and cannot be used simultaneously for radio and telephone communications.
Z The code does not change regularly, but from time to time. Commanders also use a special code consisting of 3- or 5-letter combinations. Information is encoded using a special table or code book. Within the battalion, a single 2-letter code is used Z -code. For communication between the battalion and the brigade or higher authority, a different 2-letter code is used Z code.
2-letter Z The code is developed based on the negotiation table. The testimony confirms one's own assumptions and information about the use of the negotiation table and code system.
When asked whether he deciphered the 3- or 5-letter code, he replied that this code was owned only by officers, as a rule, the chief of staff of a battalion or brigade headquarters. So, it's not always the liaison officer. He saw once that the officer had lists of 3-letter combinations. He had never seen the code book.
1 prisoner, taken 12 p.d. near Bobkovo.
Name: Alexey Kislitsin, b. 1912 in Bashkiria.
Military rank: sergeant
Position: squad leader
Military unit: 7th company, III bat./204 airborne brigade, o. item No. 55
Indications: The prisoner served from 1936-37 in the Far Eastern Army in the 87th Cavalry. regiment 8 cavalry divisions and 27.9. was drafted to Marxstadt - Volga - into the 204th Airborne Brigade, which was formed there in September / October 1941.
The brigade consists of 3 battalions. Structure III battalion: headquarters, 3 rifle companies, mortar company, communications platoon, 1 machine gun platoon (RP), 1 flamethrower platoon, 1 sapper platoon. 1 reconnaissance platoon. The strength of the battalion after formation is approximately 750 people. The entire brigade should number about 2500-3000 people. The team is fully equipped with skis. The rank and file has an average age range of 18-23 years.
On December 22, the battalion was moved to Lyubertsy and underwent training there, mostly for infantry. The prisoner has already jumped from a parachute 2 times, namely 1 time in Marxstadt and 1 time in Lyubertsy. Parachute jumps were carried out without prior preparation on a parachute tower. Only 1 jump was needed. There were 24 people in the plane they jumped out of. The make of the plane is not known to the prisoner.
The 8.3 battalion was moved from Lyubertsy to the front and sent further on trucks. The prisoner cannot name a specific place.
12.3 battalion crossed the German front. I and II The prisoner never saw battalions after Lyubertsy. But in any case, both battalions must be behind enemy lines. The battalion was tasked with raiding villages and for this reason it was called a destruction group.
The 7th company has 3 light machine guns (LM), 20 machine guns and 4 automatic rifles. Otherwise they are ordinary rifles. Each person carries 250 rifle cartridges or 400 machine-gun cartridges, which he carries in bags on his belt. The rank and file had already thrown away most of the ammunition. The reconnaissance platoon was to be fully equipped with automatic rifles. The mortar company has only 52 mm mortars available.
Food was taken while crossing the German front for 5 days. During this period of time, crackers were supposed to be delivered by air once.
The battalion was headed by Major Pustovgar. The commander of the 7th company is Lieutenant Voiko.
The battalion took part in 3 battles and suffered heavy losses. The strength of the 7th company after its formation was 130 - 150 people. Before the last battle it consisted of only 90 people.
At night 23.3. III The battalion began an attack on Bobkovo, namely with all 3 companies. The 7th company was in the middle, while the 8th and 9th companies were adjacent to the left and right.
When asked about the combat effectiveness of the battalion, the leader replied that morale had dropped, since they had not received food for 5 days. In addition, most of the rank and file suffered from freezing feet, since their felt boots got wet during the day, while at night they froze again. There were no leather shoes available. The battalion's combat effectiveness was greatly reduced due to major setbacks. Due to lack of food, most of the rank and file were so weakened that they could no longer carry ammunition. As already mentioned, most of the ammunition was thrown away.
The brigade has political instructors or commissars. The brigade is not equipped with gas masks. The prisoner knows nothing about the chemical weapon “Lebeda(?)”.
1 prisoner, taken 27.3. on the Igozhevo – Ermakovo line
Military unit: 4th company, II
Indications: The prisoner was called up to Kirov in October 1941 to serve in the 1st Airborne Brigade. The brigade consists of 4 battalions. When formed, the battalion was supposed to number approximately 700 people. 3 weeks ago all 4 battalions crossed the German front. The 1st brigade was followed by the 204th brigade. 1st brigade made 1 attack near Mal. Opuevo, namely with all 4 battalions. The place was taken. However, they were later driven back in a counterattack. While retreating, they came under fire from the air. The brigade suffered losses, a total of 30% of the rank and file.
4-5 days ago, the brigade crossed the Demyansk-Bobkovo line at night in a southerly direction. While crossing the line they were fired upon by German units. However, they did not return fire. The 204th Brigade was to follow them the next day.
After a temporary stay, 1 brigade was sent on 25.3. to the area east of the Gladkoe swamp. She was there in full force until the evening of March 26. 1 company I The battalion received the task of attacking all vehicles and destroying them. During the German attack on camp 26.3. the prisoner was wounded and abandoned by his unit. With the onset of darkness, the brigade set off in the direction of Tarasovo in the following sequence: II, III, IV, I battalions. This place had to be taken. Then occupy another territory so that eventually they can return to their territory. 1.4 brigade was supposed to be in territory occupied by the Russians.
Igozhevo was attacked by the 204th airborne brigade. The 204th brigade suffered 50% losses. 25. And 26.3. The 204th brigade was with them east of the Gladkoe swamp. Each battalion had its own camp. The distance between battalions was 50 m.
When crossing the German defense line 3 weeks ago, the 1st brigade received food for 8 days. In the period from 20 – 24.3. they were supplied with food for another 4 days by air, namely, part of the food was given when the plane landed, and part was dropped in bags. The planes landed 4 km north of Opuevo at a temporarily equipped airfield. The last food was distributed 3 days ago.
They also planned to place an airfield near the camp to the east of the Gladkoe swamp. The food dump site had already been prepared. Several Russian pilots must have explored the landing site on foot and returned to the planes.
Armament of 1st company: 16 light machine guns
no heavy machine gun
each machine gunner has 450 rounds of ammunition
The mortar company had 82 and 52 mm mortars. I didn’t have the sled with me.
Commander II battalion, captain Strukov (?), died.
3 prisoners, taken 28.3. near Zalesie
Military unit: 2nd company, I battalion/204 airborne brigade
Indications: The brigade consisted of over 4 battalions. While I–III battalions only 12.3. crossed the German front, IV the battalion was supposed to be 12.3. land in the area north of Demyansk. The 1st brigade crossed the German defense line 2–3 days ago.
I The battalion numbered over 650 people when formed. Now the entire brigade consists of only 150 people.
At night 25.3. I, II and III battalions numbering 500 people attacked Igozhevo. IV The battalion was completely destroyed at this time. After the attack on Igozhevo, the remnants of the 204th brigade retreated to the northeastern part of the Gladkoe swamp and settled there until the evening of March 27. Of the 150 people, only 100 were healthy, the rest were either sick or wounded. Tonight 100 people skied west. The sick and wounded followed in their footsteps early this morning. They were given the task of reaching the Russian defense line.
Commander I battalion, captain Dolgushin, died. The brigade commander, Major Grinev, disappeared after the attack on Mal. Opuevo. The commissar of the brigade is Nikitin, who must have the rank of colonel. This commissar explained to them that if they were captured by the Germans, they would either be shot or gradually die of starvation, since they would receive too little food. The Commissioner also explained that in Germany they have already reached the point where they eat sausage made from dog meat. In addition, one of the prisoners explained that newspapers used to present the German economy as exemplary. They even named exact numbers about the number of livestock and it was written that Soviet Russia, in accordance with the size of the country, should also achieve a high number of livestock. It is a paradox that the Commissioner is now promoting the complete opposite.
One of the prisoners is a worker at arms factory No. 384 in Ufa. This enterprise, which employs 50,000 workers, previously manufactured tractors and in October 1941 switched to the production of aircraft engines. Lathes, tools, etc. at this German-made enterprise - the company Wanderer Chemnitz. After the restructuring in October, engine production amounted to 5 units daily. However, production needed to be increased. There is a two-track railway leading to the enterprise. The plant itself contains larger track devices. From all Russian arms production enterprises, 75% of men were called up to the front. They were replaced by women and children.
6 prisoners, taken 28.3. 1 km south of Maslovo
Military unit: 1 prisoner, 2nd company I
2 4th company II bat./ 1 airborne brigade
1 7th company III bat./ 1 airborne brigade
1 12th company IV bat./ 1 airborne brigade
1 bathroom Company IV bat./ 1 airborne brigade
Indications: 26.3. in the afternoon, a brigade from a camp east of the Gladkoe swamp was preparing to attack Tarasovo in the following sequence: IV, III, I, II battalions. The strength of all 4 battalions was 1000 - 1200 people. IV, III and I The battalions definitely attacked Tarasovo. Did you take part in the battle? II battalion, unknown.
After an unsuccessful attack on Tarasovo, the battalions of the brigade united in the area north of square 80.1 and remained there all day - 27.3. After the attack on Tarasovo, the strength of 4 battalions was supposed to be 800 people. IV the battalion lost 60 people. On the night of 28.3. the brigade left square 80.1 with the intention of crossing the front and joining its units.
The Commissioner explained to them that they should not get involved in the battle. The wounded and sick of all battalions, to which all 6 prisoners belonged, moved on foot at the end, while the main body walked ahead on skis. The wounded were placed on tied skis. The number of sick and wounded was 30–40 people.
The prisoners were about to cross the Maslovo-Lunevo line and then move in a southwestern direction when they encountered a German reconnaissance group and were captured.
The last food supply was dropped on 19.3. for 3 days. After this, no food was given out.
North of Mal. Opuevo, many of the wounded had to be transported by air.
All prisoners had severe frostbite on their legs and partially on their hands.
1 prisoner, taken 29.3. in the middle of the eastern border of the Gladkoe swamp
Military unit: communications platoon III / 204 Airborne Brigade
Indications: III a brigade battalion of 400 people took part on the night of 25.3. in the attack on Igozhevo. The prisoner was seconded as a radio operator with his own radio station to the 9th company; during the attack on Igozhevo he was wounded and fell behind and wandered through the forest all this time. He threw away his radio station near Igozhevo. After the attack on Igozhevo, the wounded were supposed to gather in square 70.4 - 1.3 km south of Igozhevo. Planes were likely to land there to deliver food and pick up the wounded. At the airfield north of Mal. Opuevo was supposed to have up to 10 aircraft, namely 1 fighter, 2 transport aircraft and 7 U2 type aircraft. Planes took off and landed only at night. Many wounded were airlifted from there. The brigade commander was last seen crossing the Demyansk-Bobkovo line.
The prisoner reported that the brigade's initial task was to take the important German headquarters in Dobrosly, and then the larger city of Demyansk. The 2nd task was to capture the German headquarters in Igozhevo.
Previous evidence that IV the battalion was airdropped into the territory north of Demyansk 4 weeks ago, were confirmed.
2 prisoners, taken 29.3. near Maslovo
Military unit: engineer company – 204 airborne brigade
Testimony: The sapper company also took part in the attack on Igozhevo on 25./25.3. The company was tasked with setting fire to houses in Igozhevo. After the attack on Igozhevo, they fell behind their units and wandered through the forest all this time. The number of the company was 76 people. Each had 1 kg of explosives and 1 can of “thermite”.
Armament: 24 machine guns
12 automatic rifles
5 rifles
The company did not have any mines with them. The company commander, senior lieutenant, died.
1 prisoner of war, captured 29.3. near Maslovo
Military unit: engineer platoon IV / 1 airborne brigade
Name: Volazhanin Ilya
Born: 1908 in Ulyanovsk region
Military rank: junior sergeant
Indications: In the attack on Tarasovo on the night of March 27. All 4 battalions, numbering 2,000 people, took part. Number IV The battalion consisted of 500 people before the attack; in the battle it lost 150 people. I The battalion lost 200 people during the attack on Tarasovo; after the attack, its strength was only 300 people. After the attack, there was complete confusion, in which many fled and then could not find their units.
After the attack on Tarasovo, the political instructor explained to them that the ski brigade would break through the German front from the south. Together with this brigade they will go around all the villages in the Demyansk region from the flank.
The brigade was there on the evening of March 28. as part of I, III and IV battalions in the forest approximately 1 ½ km northeast of Kornevo. II the battalion must have fallen behind. Due to German artillery fire IV the battalion lost about 200 men, so its strength was only 150 men. The effect of artillery fire was disastrous.
The brigade on 29.3.42 at 2.00 am left the forest 1.5 km northeast of Kornevo to break through the front in the direction of the south. When they failed. They tried to move in a western direction. The prisoner fell behind and after Maslovo went over to the side of the enemy, as he saw the hopelessness of this action.
The commander of the 1st brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Tarasov, was wounded near Tarasovo and had to be sent by air.
The large losses that the brigade suffered, according to the testimony of the prisoner, arose from the fact that they were told the following before the start of the battle: the 16th army was surrounded, for several weeks without ammunition and food and could not provide significant resistance. The consequence of this was that their commanders, without any caution, sent them in dense columns to the villages. They also intended to bring the 9th Airborne Brigade into battle in the Demyansk area.
204 and 1 airborne brigades belonged to the best units of the Red Army. There were many communists and Komsomol members in their ranks. Stalin himself was in charge of equipping these brigades. Both brigades were supplied with the best weapons and clothing.
In the ranks of the Red Army they were told that on April 1 a major offensive was to begin, namely, the entire northwestern front would move in a westerly direction. Therefore, from the beginning of March, large reserves were sent to the northwestern front, so the railway was very much needed at that time. All of Russia is watching the northwestern front, which should succeed in liberating Leningrad.
The 1st airborne brigade landed on the Kalinin-Leningrad line. In Vypolzovo, in addition to the airfield, there are a large number of trucks. During the journey from Vypolzov to the front, the prisoner saw 400 T37 type tanks in early March, as well as a three-axle BA type armored vehicle, which was also designed for the offensive.
The prisoner makes a fairly good impression, his testimony is clear and accurate.
Taken 30.3.42 under New. New settler.
23 prisoners, I and III battalions/204 airborne brigade
1 prisoner I battalion/1st airborne brigade
Indications: After the attack on Igozhevo, the entire brigade disintegrated. The higher ranking officers must have fled after the attack.
All 24 people belong to a group of 200 people that formed after the attack and tried to break through to the southwest through the northeastern edge of the Gladkoe swamp, north of Nov. Ladomir. They had 6 officers, among them 1 captain and 2 political instructors. Among them were several stragglers from the 1st brigade.
Translation - Cheremisinova Rimma Anatolyevna
